Can the ICGLR reclaim its relevance in the Great Lakes Region?

The DRC is at the centre of the region’s security crisis; its position as ICGLR chair offers a chance to revive collective security.

Published on 12 November 2025 in ISS Today

By

Bram Verelst
Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS Nairobi

Nearly 10 months after seizing Goma, M23 rebels still hold much of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s North and South Kivu provinces. Since regionally driven peace initiatives have stalled, mediation efforts have shifted to external actors such as the United States (US) and Qatar. This has relegated the merged East African Community-Southern African Development Community-African Union (EAC-SADC-AU) process to a secondary role.

Yet these external efforts remain limited. The Washington-Doha processes lack inclusivity and fail to address regional conflict drivers such as resource competition, displacement and cross-border armed groups.

Against this backdrop, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – a peace and security intergovernmental body – faces a crucial test. With the DRC set to host the next ICGLR summit and chair the body from mid-November, could it regain a meaningful role in shaping collective responses to the region’s enduring crises?

Founded in 2006 by the United Nations and Organisation of African Unity after the devastating wars in the Great Lakes Region, the ICGLR aims to reduce tensions and foster dialogue.

During the current M23 crisis, the ICGLR has been largely sidelined as the EAC and SADC took the lead

During the first M23 rebellion (2012-13), it coordinated regional responses that paved the way for the Kampala Dialogue between Kinshasa and M23. It strengthened security cooperation through the Goma-based Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism and Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre, and was guarantor of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and region.

However, during the current M23 crisis, the ICGLR has been largely sidelined as the EAC and SADC – together representing eight of its 12 members – took the lead. Competition between these blocs and tensions among member states have constrained the body.

Its biennial heads of state summit hasn’t convened since 2020, and no extraordinary summit has been held since 2023. This despite flagrant member state violations of its Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence – including using force against the territorial integrity of another state and support to insurgent armed groups.

Member states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Meanwhile, the Sudan war, rising tensions in South Sudan, tense electoral processes and major humanitarian problems in the Great Lakes region challenge the ICGLR’s aim of fostering security and stability.

Several interrelated factors shape the ICGLR’s current predicament.

Regional reconfiguration has eroded some of its comparative advantage as a bridge between economic blocs. The EAC’s expansion to include Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 and the DRC in 2022 reduced its intermediary role. And the EAC-SADC-AU merger to resolve the eastern DRC conflict further eclipsed the ICGLR’s role in regional mediation.

Although the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC aligned peace initiatives in eastern DRC, it also introduced competition with the ICGLR. The 2023 summit of the EAC, SADC, Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS) and ICGLR added more duplication, introducing yet another coordinating mechanism. ‘Forum shopping’, particularly by the DRC, further fragmented regional cooperation.

Conflict management initiatives increasingly occur outside regional frameworks, through bilateral deployments (e.g. Burundian and Ugandan operations in the DRC), private military companies and even proxy arrangements with armed groups. This affects trust and hampers collective action.

The time for an ICGLR revival is right, given its role in monitoring the eastern DRC ceasefire

Regional geopolitics is another complicating factor. The ICGLR commits to curbing illicit trade, yet smuggled gold and other minerals remain key revenue sources for several of its member states. Military deployments and armed groups are linked to broader struggles for influence, reducing incentives to enforce collective commitments such as the Regional Certification Mechanism or Protocol on Non-Aggression.

Political resistance to regional oversight compounds these issues. Low financial contributions by member states affect the operational capacity of the ICGLR Secretariat and institutions, further weakening implementation of its agenda.

With current peace efforts in eastern DRC failing to deliver and the EAC-SADC-AU framework lacking coherence, a reinvigorated regional approach is needed. The ICGLR’s founding logic that Great Lakes’ conflicts are interlinked and have regional dimensions, remains relevant.

The conflict and worsening political climate in the DRC threaten stability beyond the east of the country. The risk of fragmentation and collapse is rising, and would directly affect neighbouring states, all of which are ICGLR members. Meanwhile, tensions have spread to Burundi and Rwanda, further threatening stability.

With the DRC at the centre of this crisis, its upcoming position as chair of the ICGLR offers a chance to revive regional high-level engagement through the ICGLR. The time is right considering that the body has been tasked with monitoring the ceasefire in eastern DRC. However, realising this potential will require several adjustments.

Rwanda may view greater Congolese investment in the ICGLR as an attempt to exploit the organisation

First, member states must clarify and reaffirm the ICGLR’s role in regional and continental initiatives. This should include a follow-up summit with the southern, eastern and central African regional blocs under the auspices of the AU. A review of the EAC-SADC-AU framework for peace in eastern DRC is also needed.

In the longer term, a revision of the ICGLR 2006 Pact would streamline priorities and align the ICGLR with evolving regional realities.

Second, Kinshasa must adjust its approach to the eastern DRC crisis and acknowledge both its domestic and regional dimensions. To align with Washington and Doha’s efforts, the DRC could use its position as ICGLR chair to convene extraordinary or mini-summits to build regional engagement around pressing issues of insecurity. This includes the violation of its territorial integrity by Rwanda.

Rwanda may view greater Congolese investment in the ICGLR as an attempt to exploit the organisation, as it accused Kinshasa of doing with ECCAS before withdrawing from the bloc. Achieving regional peace will require the DRC and other member states to move beyond a focus on regime security and recognise how national and regional stability are interlinked.


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