ISS Seminar Report, Pretoria: The Threat of Boko Haram and the Challenges to Peace, Security and Unity of Nigeria
Date: 2012-02-02
Venue: , ISS Conference Room,
Block C, Brooklyn Court,
361 Veale Street, New Muckleneuk, Tshwane (Pretoria),
Parking in Brooklyn Mall & ABSA court for a fee
Presented by the Conflict Prevention and Risk
Analysis & the Transnational Threats and International Crime divisions,
Pretoria
Thursday, 2nd February
2012
Introduction
Introduction
Since
gaining independence in 1960, military coups, ethnic and religious tensions
have characterised post-independence Nigeria.
The end of the civil war (1967-1970) was believed to be an opportunity
to unite Nigerians. Yet, in the post-civil war era, Nigeria has been confronted
by daunting security challenges including recurrent communal violence that has
pitted various communities against one another in the country. After many years
of military rule, the reintroduction of multiparty democratic rule in 1999 has
coincided or seems to have led to an intensification of ethnic and religious
militancy, characterised by acts of terrorism, civil strife and protests.
The
re-emergence of the violent militant group called Boko Haram in 2009 has
threatened the survival and the cohesiveness of Nigeria as a state. Some are
fearful that Nigeria is at the edge of a civil war as Boko Haram has gone on a
killing spree, launching rampant and deadly terrorist acts that have claimed
the lives of thousands of Nigerians and caused widespread fear across the
country. At the same time, the announcement by government to cut fuel subsidies
from early January has also led to waves of protest movements that have further
accentuated tensions and divisions in that country. Boko Haram is only one of
many groups that have committed atrocious acts with impunity. Similar militant
attacks by insurgent groups spearheaded by the Movement for the Emancipation of
Niger Delta, have in the recent past caused mayhem in southern and
south-eastern parts of Nigeria.
The main
objective of this seminar, jointly organized by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis
(CPRA) and the Transnational Threats and International Crime (TTIC) divisions,
was therefore to shed a critical light on this state of insecurity (its causes,
wider dynamics and ramifications) in Nigeria and explore options for containing
it. Questions asked included the following: Who are the Boko Haram? What do
they stand for? What are the dynamics within the group? What the role of
religion and politics is in its activities? Does it have political and/or
financial backing from the country? Who are those and for what purpose? Does it
have foreign links? How valid are those? What are the main implications of all
this? And what are the policy options to engaging with the group?
In his introductory remarks as chair of the seminar, Dr
Issaka Souaré, Acting Head of CPRA-Pretoria, commenced the proceedings by
welcoming the participants and introducing the panel, which consisted of two
prominent Nigerian scholars, in addition to the discussant, Mr Marti Ewi of
ISS’ TTIC division. Dr Souaré noted that
the growing prevalence of the violent activities of the militant group, Boko
Haram, in Nigeria since 2009 has generated a lot of attention from
policy-makers, the media and scholars alike. He then introduced the first
speaker, who joined the seminar via Skype from the United Kingdom and then gave
him the floor.
Presentations
The
first speaker began his presentation by noting that very little is known about
Boko Haram and that a lot of opinion that has been articulated in the media
about the group is inaccurate and misleading. He outlined two main questions,
which would guide his presentation. Firstly, who or what is Boko Haram and
secondly what do they represent with regards to the integrity of Nigeria as a
state. But before trying to answer these
questions, he noted that the atrocities committed by the violent group has
killed approximately 1000 people and resulted in the displacement of scores more
in the country. This is particularly
important as it establishes the criminal aspect of the group, in addition to
its other characteristics.
After
highlighting the series of violent activities carried out by the group against
the Nigerian population, the speaker situated his presentation within Nigeria’s
historical context by providing a timeline of the militant Boko Haram. He noted
that from 2002, when the group was formally established, to 2010, the group had
evolved considerably, making it as a group in transition.
Description of the group
A
large number of the group’s members hail from the north-eastern parts of the
country, particularly the states of Borno and Yobe. He went on to describe the
group as comprising of mostly the lower-middle class of the Nigerian society,
ranging between 25 and 40 years of age. While some of them may have university
degrees, the vast majority of the group’s members are only partly educated. The
north-eastern region of Nigeria represents some of the most marginalised groups
in the country both geographically and in terms of the socio-economic
distribution of resources. He cited that social-economic indicators are poorer
in the region compared to other regions in the country, including the infant mortality,
and unemployment rates, especially among youths for the latter indicator, which
is as a major problem.
Belief System
The
speaker noted that various members of the group (or people purported to member
its members) have expressed their beliefs and the value system of the group through
videos posted on the Internet, as well as some media statements. He said that
in one of these videos, one leader stated that he believes the earth is flat
and not in fact round, indicating his rejection of Western informed knowledge
systems and ideas. The speaker cited that the group is generally opposed to the
corrupt elite of society and, as such, blames this pattern of corruption on
their purported ‘Western education’.
However, he warned that this intolerance towards corruption in Nigeria
and, invariably, towards the West should not be mistaken for a rejection of
‘Western science’ as a system of knowledge or the scientific advancements that
have been made in recent history, but rather a rejection of the ideas and excessive
desire for material gain that they think is fuelled by the exposure to Western
education. While it is not clear as what
it is the Boko Haram long to achieve in the country or seek to attain because
of the shifting demands over the years, the speaker contended that the key
demands for them seem to be for the government to relent in the apparent persecution
of their members and sympathisers by the state security apparatuses and for
government to put an end to their feeling of continuous marginalization,
underrepresentation and exclusion from the gains of the country. Akin to this,
is the right to freedom of belief.
This
notwithstanding, he stated that this right to believe what you want should not
be pushed to impose one’s beliefs on others. Furthermore, the speaker cited
that some members of the group have openly positioned themselves as champions
of the Muslim community, while emphasising the division of society along
religious lines, which, to him, is very problematic because one finds indigenous
Muslim communities in the southern parts of the country and indigenous
Christian communities in the North. He highlighted this point to debunk the
widely reported view that Nigeria is divided into a ‘Muslim North’ and a ‘Christian
South’. In any case, he noted that the group also contradicts itself in its
demands for the Islamisation of the whole country. The speaker suspected that
these pronouncements, allegedly by members of the group, appear more like
propaganda than they are real, since their name suggests a Jihadist ideology.
The group seen through foreign lenses
To complement
the above, the speaker gave an outline of what other people are saying about
Boko Haram, based on observations he’d made from Christian and Muslim groups in
Nigeria, the media, academics and policy makers across the world. He labelled these views as ‘conspiracy
theories’. One such theories, held by some Christians in Nigeria is that ‘Muslims
hate Christians and that Boko Haram is an instrument for the islamisation of the
country.’ A second conspiracy theory he mentioned as being prevalent among some
Muslim communities is to argue that ‘Boko Haram doesn’t really exist and that it’s
a ploy by southern Nigeria to take control of the oil resources and deny the
north any of its gains, since all the oil is located in the south of the
country. He however noted that other
members of the Muslim community on the hand believe that the criminal actions
of the group are likely to lead to widespread civil conflict under the banner
of the ‘Islam’ and, in the process, discredit the image of Islam in the
country. He said this has created a lot
of confusion on the ground about the real identity of the Boko Haram.
In
addition to the above, he also mentioned some conspiracy theories that have
been posited by academics and policy makers. He noted for example a very
prominent American ‘Nigerianist’ who argues that Boko Haram ‘no longer exists
and that the group actually broke down and disbanded in 2004.’ According to
this theory, recent incidences of attacks in Nigeria believed to have been the
work of Boko Haram are the work of small criminal groups. He said that views
such as this clearly show a sense of denialism.
A fourth theory relies or an historical analysis that looks at the history
of Islam in the Sahelian stripe of West Africa over the centuries and observes
a recurring pattern of rise of such groups in the region. The speaker found
some truth in this analysis, but called for a very holistic approach in
analysing the complex group that Boko Haram is.
Policy responses to Boko Haram
In
response to Boko Haram, the speaker recommended that scholars and policy makers
alike look at the structural poverty that plagues much of Nigeria, particularly
the north-eastern part of the country where the group emerged. He called for a
proper analysis of the Nigerian national security situation and urged scholars
and researchers to collect as much information about the group as possible. Moreover, he touched on the need for
collective efforts to eradicate poverty in Nigeria in order to curb the
development of Boko Haram and the emergence of other groups. The speaker then emphasised the significant
role played by history and the political systems of the country. He cited the
Nigerian people’s loss of faith in the country’s electoral system, in the
government mainly due to lack of accountability. In conclusion he highlighted
the sectorial dimension in this, as Boko Haram increasingly adopts the style
and tactics of Al-Qaeda, despite the humbleness of their network in comparison to
the well-established Al-Qaeda international network, the group is expanding its
appeal while maintaining its roots on the soil with the people of Nigeria.
Perhaps the main mitigating factor here is the group seems so far to limit its
demands to national issues, and sometimes even local ones, and not issues
beyond Nigeria’s borders.
Boko Haram as a Symptom of the Crisis in Nigeria’s
Nation-Building
The second
speaker of the seminar complemented the views presented by the first speaker,
while differing on others. He began his presentation by reminding the audience
that the official name of the militant group is actually a translitrration of
an Arabic word that reads as Jama’at Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad meaning
the Association of people committed to the teachings of the Prophet [Muhammed]
and struggle, Boko Haram being a nickname given to it by others based on the
preaching of some of its members, which means ‘Western education is sacrilege’
or ‘Western educations is a sin’. However, he maintained that perhaps the most
accurate definition is the translation that offered by Ioannis Mantzikos (2010)
is ‘Western civilisation is forbidden’.
Following
this, the speaker contextually situated the development of Boko Harem in
Nigeria by briefly outlining the timeline of the group, since its inception in
2002 when Mohammed Yusuf founded the ‘sect’ in the impoverished north-eastern part
of the country. He argued that the group
Mohammed Yusuf founded the group in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri,
capital of the Borno State, by establishing a religious complex that included a
mosque and a school where many poor families from Nigeria and the neighbouring
countries enrolled their children. In 2004 the group extended the complex to
Yusuf’s home state of Yobe in the village of Kanamma near Niger State where it
set up a base called Afghanistan. He argued that the group’s followers consisted
initially of largely impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics as well
as university students and professionals, many of whom are unemployed. For the
first seven years of its existence, he argued, the group conducted its
operations more or less peacefully. This however changed in 2009 when prompted
by repeated warnings that the group was arming itself, the Nigerian government
launched a clampdown, which left some 800 people dead. The group’s leader was
killed in that attack while in police custody.
As a
consequence, Boko Haram changed its approach, adopting a more militant strategy.
Thus, in what was apparently retaliation
for the extra judicial killing of its leader, the group carried out its first
terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010, at Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri
metropolis which resulted in the death of four people. In January 2012,
Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, who was thought to have died in the
government clampdown of 2009, appeared in a video posted on Youtube. According
to media reports, Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf`s death in 2009.
Following
this, the speaker touched on the groups alleged linkages with the international
terrorist network, Al-Qaeda. This is a
view that is strongly held by the government, which has since adapted its
approach to dealing with Boko Haram as a ‘terrorist’ group or a militant
movement that is likely to intensify its activities in such a manner as a terrorist
group. However, he was quick to refute this and warn against such a characterisation
as it could work in the groups favour in terms of creating appeal and recruitment. To him, linking Boko Haram to international
terrorist organisations is like the Devil’s alternative for the government. It
needs such a linkage to attract international sympathy and assistance and blunt
domestic criticisms that it is weak on security. On the other hand, talks of
such linkages, if Boko Haram does not already have one, increases the
likelihood that it will get the attention and sympathy of Al-Qaida and similar
international terrorist groups, especially with the expectation that the US and
other Western countries would likely get involved. Again if Boko Haram actually has an external
linkage, the government will lack the capacity to fight it on its own, meaning
an inevitable involvement of the Western countries, which will facilitate
membership recruitment for Boko Haram.
The
theories that the speaker provided for the Boko Haram phenomenon in the country
echoed those that were offered by the first speaker, highlighting the
repositioning of the group’s strategy to a more militant approach could be
understood as the ‘frustration-aggression hypothesis’. According to this
postulation, the recent state of insecurity in Nigeria can be attributed to
frustration that, in this case was extensively experienced by an isolated group
that felt helpless and unable to challenge the status quo, displaced their
frustration on the innocent upon failure of exerting it towards those it deems
at fault.
This
said, he argued that the main factor underpinning the emergence of Boko Haram
is the ‘crisis in Nigeria’s Nation-Building project, which is largely due to
corruption, mismanagement of resources and moreover the lack of socio-economic
divisions in Nigeria’s population that run along religious and cultural lines.’ To substantiate this view, the speaker contended
that Boko Haram is not the only purveyor of violence or source of insecurity in
Nigeria - even if the audacity of its activities is in a special league of its
own. In the South-East, he observed, ‘the pervasive fear of kidnappers
generates as much sense of insecurity as the fear of Boko Haram’s bombs.’ In
the South- South state of Bayelsa, he continued, ‘militarised gangs fight for
turf while in the rest of the country stories of violent armed robberies and
ritual murders are a daily staple.’ To the speaker, there is in Nigeria s a
heavy burden of institutionalised sectional memories of hurt, injustice,
distrust and even a disguised longing for vengeance. This means therefore that any strategy to
confront the security challenge in the country is bound to evoke these ugly
memories in some sections of the population. No individual or political
authority enjoys universal legitimacy across the main fault lines. ‘Nigeria is
therefore a country in desperate need of creating Nigerians’.
In his
closing remarks, the speaker emphasised the need for the country to unite and
reach consensus on common goals that can shape the course of the construction
of the country in its entirety.
Note:
For
more information on an on-going research on the subject matter, see the Oxford-based
Nigeria Research Network at: www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/nrn
Seminar report
prepared by Refiloe Joala
Research intern
in CPRA-Pretoria
