Situation Report: Lesotho General Elections 2002: Prospects for the Future, Chris Maroleng
LESOTHO GENERAL ELECTIONS 2002: PROSPECTS FOR THE
FUTURE
Chris Maroleng, May 2002
On 25 May Lesotho is set to hold general elections, the third such event
since democracy was restored to this mountain kingdom in 1993 following seven
years
of military rule. As this day draws nearer greater attention is being focussed
on this tiny independent enclave within the Republic of South Africa, anxiously
hoping that the debacle that occurred after the 1998 elections does not recur
in this small mountainous Kingdom. The 2002 elections are not just a watershed
moment for this country and the Southern African region but for the whole of
Africa, as it attempts to sell the idea to the rest of the world that democracy
and good governance can come from within this continent through initiatives
such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The successful
conduct of these elections is important as they come on the back of the controversial
polls recently held in Congo Brazzaville, Zambia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe.
Yet another failed African election could spell the end for NEPAD, which most
analysts’ claim failed its first important ‘litmus test’ in
the African response to Zimbabwe`s 2002 presidential elections.
The Kingdom of Lesotho, which gained its independence from Britain on 4 October
1966, is best described as a constitutional monarchy with an unstable democracy.
It can be argued that the instability that obtains in this country can be traced
to its historically shaky political structure. It is also important to note
that in any analysis of Lesotho one cannot ignore the fact that the kingdom`s
external relations are dominated by its economic and geographic dependence
on South Africa.
Back to the Future
Historically the political space in this country has been dominated by two
main political parties: the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) which was founded
by Ntsu Mokhehle in 1952, with the aim of bringing self-governance to Lesotho
and ending racially discriminatory practices that were primarily imported from
South Africa; and the Basotho National Party (BNP) which won the first elections
under universal suffrage in 1965 led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, who also went
on to become Prime Minister.
Following the second election after independence in 1970, Prime Minister Leabua
Jonathan declared a state of emergence and annulled the outcome of these polls
following his apparent defeat by the BCP. Subsequently Jonathan suspended the
constitution and abolished the National Assembly, resorting to rule without
recourse to representative institutions. These political events led to opposition
leaders such as Mokhehle and the King Moshoeshoe II (Bereng Seeiso), going
into exile. The exiled BCP under the leadership of Mokhehle would later form
an armed wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which launched a number of
nuisance raids into Lesotho from South African soil. These developments merely
served further to narrow the domestic support base of the BNP, and entrenched
the regime`s relationship of dependence vis-Ã -vis the Pretoria government.
All five registered opposition parties boycotted the next general election
in September 1985, allowing the BNP a clean sweep without a single vote being
cast. The deteriorating political and economic situation inside the country
and strained relations with South Africa resulted in the Lesotho Defence Force
(LDF) intervening in the political arena on 20 January 1986, a few days after
the LDF’s top leadership returned from consultations in Pretoria.
Major General Metsing Lekhanya led the military coup that toppled Chief Leabua
Jonathan, and it was General Lekhanya who would later establish a five man
Military Council that effectively ruled the country. The other senior officers
in the Military Council included close relatives of the monarch King Moshoeshoe,
who insisted that the interim nation assembly should be dissolved and executive
and legislative powers should be invested in the monarch. Relations with South
Africa improved at this stage, but all internal political activities were banned
and the constitution remained suspended.
The close association between King Moshoeshoe and the General Lekhanya was
ended after ambitious members of the royalist faction within the Military Council
provoked an open power struggle between the king and the military. Lekhanya
swiftly neutralized this threat by centralizing all power around himself, stripping
the monarch of his powers and removing all royalists from office. This resulted
in the King fleeing into exile in Britain in March 1990. In a an attempt to
fill the vacuum left by Moshoeshoe, Lekhanya responded by passing a decree
deposing Moshoeshoe II and installing in his place his eldest son, the 27 year-old
Prince Mohato Seeiso, who was formally sworn in as King Letsie III. While Moshoeshoe’s
removal was designed to limit the political influence of the monarchy, it ensured
that the crown itself would remain a political issue.
At the end of April 1991 General Lekhanya was removed from power in a bloodless
coup and replaced as head of the Military Council by Colonel (later Major-General)
Phisoana Ramaema. The main instigators of the coup were the rank and file within
the LDF whose ire had been raised when they were offered more than a 22% pay
increase, which they felt compared poorly with the fabulous sums rumored to
be made by those closer to the center of power. This resentment coincided with
the perception in the force’s hierarchy that Lekhanya was losing his
ability to protect the LDF’s corporate interests.
Political developments in South Africa since 1990 had stimulated greater openness
in the public political debate within Lesotho, and had also signaled the removal
of Pretoria’s implicit support for a conservative military regime in
Lesotho. Further, indispensable foreign donors and influential governments
stepped up their pressure on the regime for the introduction of accountable
government.
All this pressure resulted in the Military Council lifting its ban on political
activities in May 1991and approving a draft constitution largely modelled on
that of 1966, which would also set the ground rules for elections. In 1992,
under an amnesty, many political figures including the former king, Moshoeshoe
II and the BCP’s Ntsu Mokhehle returned to Lesotho from exile. The elections
that were eventually held on 27 March 1993 were won by the BCP, which took
54% of the seats in parliament under the first-past-the-post system, and Ntsu
Mokhehle was sworn in as prime minister after the elections were declared largely
free and fair. Interestingly enough, Letsie III was confirmed as the constitutional
monarch ahead of his father, Moshoeshoe II, who had recently returned from
exile.
This ‘honeymoon’ period in Lesotho politics was short lived, and
as early as 1994 the government began to experience problems in its relations
with the army and police, whose discontent was stoked by opposition elements.
As part of an internationally brokered settlement, the BCP agreed to a national
dialogue with the opposition and reinstate Moshoeshoe as the monarch in place
of Letsie in January 1995. Moshoeshoe’s reign as a restored monarch was
short, as he was killed in a car accident in January 1996, after which Letsie
again became king.
The internal differences within the BCP also began to emerge as key members
of this party began to position themselves to succeed the ailing Mokhehle.
When the BCP leader`s term in office was about to come to an end, his rivals
sought to replace him with his deputy, Molapo Qhobela instead of Pakalitha
Mosisili whom Mokhehle favored as his successor. However, Mokhehle still had
an ace up his sleeve; he carried out his own internal party coup by quitting
the BCP in June 1997, taking the majority of the MPs and all the cabinet members
into a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and continuing
as prime minister.
All these prior political machinations augured ill for the 1998 general elections,
which was held under the auspices of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).
All the major political parties contested these elections that were held on
23 May, which were eventually won in a surprising landslide victory by the
LCD. This party took 78 of the 79 contested seats but only just over 60% of
the popular vote. Even though these elections were received a qualified free
and fair assessment from independent observers this victory provoked a legal
challenge from the main opposition parties in around 20 constituencies. Widespread
protest over the election results began to escalate in the months that followed,
resulting in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), establishing
the Langa Commission to investigate the conduct of the elections. The political
situation continued to deteriorate, and there was a mutiny by junior army officers.
The Langa Commission, which released its findings on 17 September 1998, found
that even though there may have been many administrative and practical problems
with the 1998 election there was no widespread fraud. However, the commission’s
calls for a re-run of the elections led to an upsurge of popular protests and
another apparent coup attempt, which saw the senior command of the LDF flee
to South Africa.
The growing civil unrest in the country lead to the chaotic deployment of
an intervention force made up of troops from South Africa and Botswana, under
the auspices of the SADC. This action, code-named ‘Operation BOLEAS’,
eventually quashed an incipient mutiny and accompanying dissent, but 75 lives
were lost including those of a dozen South Africa soldiers, leaving a devastated
capital in the process. The two armies were part of a troika, with Zimbabwe,
on a mission to bolster Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s government,
at the latter`s request. After the civil unrest had been ended, an Interim
Political Authority (IPA) was set up to review the electoral code and recommend
changes to it. From these findings it was agreed that the next general election
(on 25 May 2002) would be based on a system that retained the existing 80 first-past-the-post
constituency seats, supplemented by an additional 40 seats allocated on a proportional
basis. Most observers believed that this would create a more representative
parliament in Lesotho, which would include minority parties, thus preventing
the recurrence of the sort of protests that occurred after the 1998 elections.
The Current Situation
On the surface it would appear that all is in place for the up-coming election
for which 832 000 voters were registered by September 2001. A voter education
campaign is also currently under way, informing the electorate about the technicalities
of the new electoral system (the mixed member proportional system) that includes
elements of the old first-past-the-post system and proportional representation.
This system has not been tried before in this country, and is a cause for concern
in the eyes of many observers. The Head of the International Election Monitoring
Group in Lesotho recently expressed concern that voter education about the
new electoral model left much to be desired, as many registered voters, including
leaders of political parties did not fully understand how it operated, which
could result in voters being misled. This is primarily because insufficient
time was allocated by the Independent Electoral Commission to teach voters
about the new system, the blame for the delay laid partly on the Interim Political
Authority (IPA) and the Parliament who took a long time before they could reach
a consensus on the suitable electoral model and the passage of the Electoral
Act, respectively. Meanwhile, in an attempt to prevent any further disturbances
by the military, the SADC and an Indian army unit have been training soldiers
from the LDF in the hope that they can turn Lesotho’s troubled military
into a more professional force.
There is some cause for concern, however, if one looks at the internal dynamics
of the respective political parties in Lesotho. This is primarily because domestic
politics in the kingdom are largely based on building leadership personalities,
and it is for this reason, rather than disputes over policy or ideology, that
each of the main parties has experienced leadership challenges and severe internal
divisions in recent years. One of the most important of these divisions resulted
in the split in the LCD, which led in September 2001 to the formation of the
Lesotho Peoples Congress (LCP), currently under the leadership of a former
Deputy Prime Minister, Kelibone Maope. This followed the LCD annual meeting
in January 2001, where disputed results of the election of the National Executive
Committee brought into the open long-standing differences in the party. Twenty-six
MPs immediately joined the LPC, making it the LCD’s main challenger in
the forthcoming election. While the LCD is still expected to win the election,
a strong showing form the LPC leading to a vibrant opposition in parliament
hopefully will strengthen democracy’s weak roots in Lesotho.
Early indications were that the BNP and the BCP were not expected to mount
much of a challenge in the elections. According to sources within these parties,
the leaders of both parties are more concerned with securing control of party
structures in the run-up to the elections, so they can influence the choice
of candidates likely to benefit from the introduction of elements of the proportional
representative system. However, since the BNP’s annual conference in
March 2001 Metsing Lekhanya, a former leader of the military regime, has strengthened
his grip on this party and is now expected to do relatively well.
On the other hand, the struggle for control of the BCP has been particularly
intense. This in-fighting led to the formation of two factions lead by Ts’eliso
Makhakhe and Molapo Qhobela respectively, both of whom resorted to the courts
to pursue their leadership claims. In January 2002 the court ruled that Qhobela’s
election at the 2001 annual meeting was illegitimate, and Makhakhe, who had
himself been replaced by Qhobela at a special meeting in 2000, should resume
leadership. This decision did not go down well with Qhobela, who instead chose
to leave the BCP and has recently formed his own party the Basotholand African
Congress (BAC).
Therefore, even though things may seem to be going well in this tiny mountain
kingdom there is still potential for more disturbances should the political
peace not be preserved and respected. This is because the structural problems
in Lesotho’s political system by and large still remain unresolved, and
many still cause future political instability. The introduction of the new
mixed member proportional system of elections may weaken the parliamentary
system and allowed for frequent changes of government. Even though this system
provides for the inclusion of minor parties and marginalized groups, it may
also further reinforce the fragmented nature of Lesotho’s politics, as
parliamentary seats are distributed more thinly across the political spectrum.
The threat of future political instability in this country can only be removed
if a concerted effort is made by both internal and external political actors
to understand the need for a change in Lesotho’s political culture. Given
the political climate over the past year or so, this task could be almost impossible
to achieve in the short term, because the run-up to the election has been marked
by continued feuding within as well as between the leading parties. Personal
exchanges of a virulent and public nature have been the stock-in-trade of leading
members of the Lesotho political class since the resumption of democratic competition.
This trend shows no signs of abating. Until the cycle is broken, a return to
the past undemocratic dispensation that prevailed in Lesotho is not impossible.
Such a turn of events will reverse the progress towards good governance and
democracy that have been achieved to date, and this will surely augur badly
for the Basotho and future African regional initiatives such as NEPAD. Only
time will tell if Lesotho will indeed ‘go back to the future’.
However, this is all very much future music and one hopes against hope, that
a peaceful election and a period of effective government will follow the forthcoming
political contest.