A seriously worsening situation

Within a period of six weeks (since the author’s last visit to Burundi, ending on 7 December 2002), the situation in Burundi has worsened dramatically. In general, there are ominous signs of large-scale fragmentation, divisions, splits and negative agendas resurfacing. The very survival of the peace process is at stake.

News flash! 21 February 2003: A New Crisis: FDD suspends negotiations with Government As this report was being completed, the FDD announced on 21 February that it had suspended negotiations on the outstanding political issues with the Burundian Government for the following reasons: the Burundian Army continues to attack them; the Government prevents food aid being distributed; Buyoya fails to honour agreements; the cease-fire is not being implemented. Their statement that both negotiating parties (not just the Government) should approve the composition of the African Mission, implies that the FDD was not consulted on this matter. If this is so, and if the FDD has a problem with the present composition, i.e. South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, this could even further delay the implementation of the cease-fire. More ominously, the FDD warns that unless their approval for this force is obtained, they will consider them as “peace disrupters in Burundi” (!). This decision of the FDD to suspend talks will further worsen an already very serious situation in Burundi and can have disastrous consequences for the whole peace process.

Disconnect between the peace process and the Burundian reality

There is a major disconnect developing between the ongoing peace process, which is continuing to implement the strict time-table set down by the Arusha Process, and the reality on the ground. One Burundian role-player summed this situation up well by saying that the process was going “too fast”, i.e. the peace process and the Arusha time-table is rushing along - way ahead of the realities pertaining on the ground.

Non-implementation of the cease-fire has destroyed the hope created by signing

The non-implementation of the cease-fire agreement, which was signed on 2/3 December 2002 between the Burundi Government and the CNDD-FDD of Mr. Pierre Nkurunziza, and the consequential wide-spread violence, cease-fire violations, looting, pillaging, etc. has - in the nearly two months since the signing - virtually destroyed the little bit of hope which existed in early December 2002. Bearing in mind the critical importance Burundians attached to the ending of the war, the fact that the actual signing of the cease-fire with the largest rebellion has created a situation internally, which is indistinguishable from the (war) situation prior to the cease-fire, has resulted in hope being replaced by despair. It is unlikely that the serious damage which has been done since 3 December to the internal opinion, with regard to its perception of the whole peace process, can again be undone - even if the African Mission, foreign observers and all the other implementation mechanisms have eventually been put in place. The credibility of all those external actors and organisations who were mandated to ensure implementation of the accord, has been severely affected.

A cease-fire accord without a political accord

Burundian confidence in this cease-fire is further being undermined by the fact that the Burundian Government and the FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza only signed a military cease-fire on 2/3 December 2002, and are only now trying to negotiate an agreement on the numerous and seriously divisive political issues. Due to the difficulties these negotiations are experiencing (numerous delays, suspension of talks, etc.) it is still far from a foregone conclusion that they will actually reach agreement. And until the parties reach a comprehensive military and political accord, there can be no certainty that they will not again revert back to war. There are also signs of discontent within the FDD about the leader’s decision to agree to a cease-fire before first having obtained major concessions from the Government on political issues. While in August 2000 parties signed a political agreement without a cease-fire, the Government and the FDD in December 2002 signed a cease-fire accord without a political accord!

The absence of the FNL from the whole process

The complete absence from the present cease-fire process of the main Palipehutu-FNL movement led by Agathon Rwasa (the oldest and most active rebel movement in the province surrounding the capital), not only aggravates this negative perception of the whole peace process amongst the public opinion, but also seriously undermines the commitment of Nkurunziza’s FDD to both the cease-fire and the ongoing political negotiations. They do not want to be accused by FNL of having ‘sold out’ the common agenda of ‘liberating the Hutu people’.

Growing support for removing ‘the system’

The most serious consequence of the non-implementation of the 2/3 December cease-fire in specific, and of the peace process in general, is the fact that numerous political, military and civil society groupings are beginning to coalesce around the objective of “removing the whole system’. There are signs that parties which have nothing in common with one another - politically or ethnically - and which have totally contrary visions of what a future Burundi should look like, are finding (short term) common ground with regard to removing “the System”.

By “the system” is meant both President Buyoya and the Uprona party which supports him, and the Frodebu of Dr. Jean Minani and Vice-President Domitien Ndayizye. Besides the fact that both parties are being challenged from within their own ranks, those who question the whole system and the process as such are also increasingly cutting them off from the broader Burundian opinion.

Amongst those who oppose “the system” for numerous and mainly negative reasons, are however also an increasing number of new role-players, who believe that the Burundian conflict will only be resolved once the present political class (representing ‘the system’) is augmented or replaced by a new non-ethnic or multi-ethnic leadership which is able to promote a common vision of a truly new and transformed Burundi.

Return of rebellions threatens stability of Transitional Government

The return (and possible return) of rebel movements, which were previously excluded from the Arusha Process, and their inclusion in the Transitional Institutions is threatening the relative stability of the Transitional Government. The FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza (with the support of certain key regional role-players) is directly challenging the Arusha-imposed position of Frodebu as being ‘the main Hutu movement’. If it is borne in mind that the relative stability of the Transitional Government is primarily due to the active and relatively constructive partnership between Frodebu and Uprona, then any serious challenge to the position of either of these parties, will have the effect of seriously destabilising the functioning of the whole Government. Further indications that a potentially dangerous “intra-Hutu” competition/conflict is developing, was the fact that six of the parties belonging to the G7 Hutu grouping of Arusha signatories, have publicly distanced themselves from Frodebu, which is supposed to be the leading party within the G7. They allege that Frodebu is merely using the present negotiations (with FDD) to ‘further its own interests’ - at their expense.

With more and more Hutu parties turning their back on Frodebu, this key partner in government is being increasingly weakened and isolated. The increasing discontent among traditional Frodebu players is demonstrated by the fact that some Frodebu MP’s have already openly joined Nkurunziza’s FDD. There are also plans to create a ‘new Frodebu’ by bringing about a merger between Nkurunziza’s FDD and Frodebu (minus some of the present key leaders). The objective is to - for the first time - create a major Hutu movement which has both a strong political and military component.

In the strongest indication yet that the negotiations process between the two main opposing ethnic blocks within Burundi, are far from over, there is a growing belief that, contrary to the Arusha Accord, the Hutu could achieve far more concessions if the “Tutsi political and military power” was confronted with such a united Hutu party with its own significant military clout.

The Arusha Accord – an increasing source of dispute and contention

It is evident that the Arusha Peace Accord can no longer claim to be representing a genuine national consensus amongst Burundians. On the contrary, it has in fact become one of the major sources of dispute and contention. The number of parties questioning its legitimacy is growing daily and includes: a significant number of the parties which signed the Accord; parties which signed with reservations; parties which were excluded; parties which refused to participate; parties which were formed after Arusha; all the rebel movements (those included as well as those excluded from Arusha), as well as numerous civil society groupings.

If one adds to that the fact that the overwhelming majority of Burundians, the population, were never involved in this negotiations process. then it should be clear that the Arusha Accord has very little legitimacy. The virtual absence of any real linkage between most politicians and their grassroots, makes the Accord an elitist accord. The fact that the whole Arusha process has, from a Burundian perspective, not produced any positive dividends, further undermines it.

If one, for the moment, ignores those who want to scrap the whole Accord, and replace it either with the 1992 Constitution (the rebel movements and other Hutu parties), or with a more “minority-friendly” accord (the majority Tutsi opinion), then virtually everyone wants to either improve, amend, change, or ‘open up’ the Arusha Accord. While the Government (especially the Frodebu/Uprona partnership), as well as the Facilitation, have tried to prevent this from happening, the returning rebel movements were promised during their cease-fire negotiations with the Government that, although they had no choice but to accept the Arusha Accord (at that stage), they would be able “to discuss” the Arusha Accord once they return to Burundi and form part of the Transitional Institutions. How narrow or wide the definition of “discuss” will be, still needs to be established.

This undertaking however does seem to open the door for revisiting the Arusha Accord. Besides giving this right to the rebel movements, all the other parties referred to above will demand the same right to also “discuss” the Accord. Should this be refused, it is more than likely that many amongst them will (as the Hutu armed movements have done), consider creating their own armed militias/wings.

Opposing agendas heading for a confrontation on 1 May, 2003

It should be evident from the above analysis that unless some active interventions are undertaken, a multitude of parties, groupings and movements will be heading towards the critical date of 1 May with totally different, contradictory and conflictual agendas. Amongst these agendas are: install a Frodebu President (Ndayizeye); install a non-Frodebu President (Nkurunziza); extend the 18-months transitional period; remove Buyoya as President; remove the whole Government, especially the Frodebu/Uprona partnership; scrap, re-negotiate, amend, change, improve the Arusha Accord; end Tutsi domination; protect minority representation at all levels; end the regional domination of the southern Bururi Tutsi; stop all negotiations until the issues of justice and impunity have been dealt with and those guilty of (blood) crimes have been punished; etc.

It should be evident that, in spite of the peace process, Burundians have not yet developed any degree of consensus about the way forward, and that the minimum degree of trust and confidence which was so badly needed, still does not exist. It is in fact declining.

In terms of the Arusha time-table, May 1 is supposed to herald in the start of the second 18-month Phase of the Transition, with a Hutu President replacing the present Tutsi President. In view of the fact that the majority of agendas being pursued presently are to a larger of lesser degree all aimed at ‘removing the system’ (not just changing the President), there exists a real danger that Burundi can on May 1 - if ‘the system’ does not create the necessary space to accommodate valid dissent - be faced with an unmanageable situation which could either result in an increasingly polarised Government, or a dangerous vacuum and general chaos.

A purely objective evaluation of the question whether the Presidency should be changed on 1 May or not, would suggest the negative. The tasks which had to be completed during the first eighteen months of the transition, especially the achievement of an inclusive and durable cease-fire and the integration of the security forces, have either not been completed or not even begun. Those who at the time decided on an eighteen month period, would most definitely have extended this eighteen months period, had they known what the reality on the ground today would be.

But the Burundians are unfortunately now locked into a fixed Arusha time-table. It is highly questionable that any G7 Hutu President would be ‘allowed’ - under the present circumstances - to deal with ongoing negotiations with Hutu rebel movements (FDD and FNL), and start the extremely sensitive process of integrating the Tutsi-led security forces.

Due to the serious challenge which Pierre Nkurunziza and the FDD are posing to Frodebu, there is real concern in Frodebu that if it does not assume the Presidency on 1 May, it may never get the opportunity again. It is due to this reason that Frodebu is adopting a firmer position and is insisting that the change of President takes place on May 1.

Although Frodebu’s concerns are understandable, the risk of Burundi yet again being saddled with a totally paralysed President and Government, (as was the case during the Convention of Government, 1994-1996) - or worse - cannot be overestimated. These comments are not meant to imply that the status quo needs to be maintained at all costs. It however does suggest that if Burundians want to resolve this leadership issue, they will have to find new and preferable options. If they fail to do so, and therefore merely revert back to the sterile ‘pro-Buyoya’ and ‘anti-Buyoya’ positions’ of the recent past, the deadlock will continue.

The date of 1 May 2003 (or 30 April) hovers like a ‘dark cloud’ over the Burundian political landscape. If not managed calmly and in a spirit of what is in the interest of Burundi as a whole, this date will result in a further unravelling of the whole process - and worse.