The Monitor aims to provide decision makers with reliable information based on research, analysis, evaluation and monitoring, to enable them to identify, control and combat money laundering. This exercise requires an identification of indicators of the incidence of money laundering and an analysis of the predicate illicit activities that yield proceeds for laundering. These indicative factors assist in detecting the incidence of money laundering of internally derived, incoming and outgoing proceeds. The Monitor however faces challenges related to the availability and reliability of data, as well as the lack of uniformity of legal and regulatory changes. In some of the countries, there is no legislative framework in place and no structures exist to deal with money laundering.

The Monitor acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining information from the informal sector, which is largely unregulated and amorphous. However, this is an important sector, which could be exploited for money laundering and to finance terrorism. The Monitor will endeavour to share information relating to developments in the informal sector where it is accessible.

Since it was coined to describe the notoriously sneaky activities of entrepreneurial criminal syndicates which mushroomed in the early part of the twentieth century in the United States, the term ‘money laundering’‚ has developed to encompass all acts to disguise or conceal the nature or source of, or entitlement to money or property, or rights to either, being money or property or rights acquired from serious crime or corruption.

Through legislation, some countries have extended money laundering to include proceeds of all crime. Others perceive the fruits of any unlawful activity to be launderable. In some countries money laundering is defined restrictively, and applied only to designated activities. Following the well publicized September 11 (2001) atrocities in the United States, pressure is mounting to expand the concept of money laundering to include dealings with money or property that is intended to be used in committing, or to facilitate the commission of terrorism. If successful, this will shift the focus to resources whose source may be legal, but which are intended to support unlawful acts.

Increased efforts to combat money laundering recognise the link between money laundering and serious crime. Successful money laundering activities not only enrich criminals but also assist in funding more serious criminal activity. Money laundering is closely linked to economic crimes such as fraud, bribery, corruption, exchange control violations, and tax evasion. As activity located within the economic environment, money laundering often has to utilize mechanisms that are intended to serve the lawful economy. It may therefore be classified as economic activity. Money laundering is however, by its very nature a clandestine activity, thus making it difficult to quantify its scale and frequency and to obtain accurate statistics on its prevalence.

It is necessary at the outset to clear some grey areas that tend to obscure inquiry in this sphere. Money laundering activity is not solely derived from criminal activity, although on account of the limitations in many definitions, this usually appears to be the case. Furthermore, not all the funds laundered within a country are derived from activities carried out within it. Some (often indeterminate) proportion of them will be introduced from outside the country. By the same token, not all the funds produced by illicit activities will be laundered within the territory of their origin, as some (or all) may be transmitted to foreign countries. This point underscores the importance of studying the avenues of asset transfer between countries. It should also be pointed out that liquid assets in the form of cash are not the only commodity that is subject to laundering, as other valuable assets have also been used in this manner.

Assessing the incidence of money laundering involves researching crime, since one cannot claim to analyze money laundering without analyzing the predicate illicit activities that yield proceeds for laundering. Four issues suggest themselves in the enquiry:

• How much unlawful activity (particularly, but not just, economic crime) is there?
• How much profit (not all proceeds) is made from these activities?
• How much of the profit is laundered?
• In what manner is it laundered?

US$14m COMMERCIAL BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE FRAUD

On 15 June 2004, a Mozambican court handed down judgment in the country’s biggest bank fraud. Seven of fifteen people originally on trial for the $14m fraud were convicted while eight were acquitted for lack of evidence. The court found that in early 1996, several members of the Satar family and Vincente Ramaya, manager of the branch of the Commercial Bank of Mozambique (BCM) in the Maputo suburb of Sommerschield, conspired to defraud the bank. The Conspiracy also included four other people who had provided chequebooks for the use of the two Satar brothers, Asslam and Nini. The two brothers and Vincente Ramaya are currently serving long prison sentences for the murder in November 2000 of investigative journalist, Carlos Cardoso. At the time of his murder, Cardoso was editor of the Metical and he had been probing and reporting on alleged irregularities at BCM.

Six months before the privatisation of BCM, accounts were opened in the Sommerschield branch in the names of several members of the Satar family and two companies. Between 26th March and 9th August 1996, up to sixty-seven cheques, with a value of 144 billion meticais (US$14m) were deposited into these accounts. The cheques were drawn on accounts that contained little or no money. Vincente Ramaya intervened to credit the cheques to the Satar accounts, the money was withdrawn from the bank and much of it changed into foreign currency. Part of the funds from the BCM fraud was laundered through a bank in London. There is speculation that Nini Satar, who operated a loan-sharking business had used the money stolen from BCM as initial capital for this business.

The BCM case illustrates how banking procedures were flouted to facilitate fraud and theft in the absence of due diligence to verify the identities of bank customers. The case also highlights the significance of widening the form of intention required for money laundering beyond the ordinary form required for fraud. The evidence revealed that Nini Satar used a currency exchange bureaux, Unicambios, which belonged to his brother Ayob Satar, to convert the meticais stolen from the BCM into hard currency. Although Ayob was found to have received cheques totalling 1.5 billion meticais from his brother, it was not established that he was aware of the criminal origins of the money, and he was acquitted. The court also acquitted a Unicambios employee, who had opened an account at the Polana suburb branch of the BCM, even though this account had been used by Nini Satar to move the stolen money out of the Sommerschield accounts to Unicambios. The court found that it had not been proved that he knew about the illicit origins of the money.

<<< Read More >>>

<<< Country Profile - Mozambique >>>

IS SOUTH AFRICA A DESTINATION FOR LAUNDERED FUNDS?

Media reports have linked prominent African politicians and their families to the purchase of up-market properties in Cape Town and Johannesburg. It was reported that Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema’s family had purchased property in Cape Town for about 50 million Rand (US$7,6m). A report by Joe Sinclair states that these purchases come at a time when a United States federal grand jury is said to be investigating a corporate bank account allegedly under Nguema’s control. United States oil companies are said to have invested heavily in Equatorial Guinea. There have been calls for the Financial Intelligence Centre to investigate the purchase of the properties. In terms of the Financial Intelligence Act, 2001, estate agents are required to report transactions that they suspect involve proceeds of unlawful activities.

<<< More in The Star of 25 June 2004 >>>

Another related story involves two cabinet ministers from the Democratic Republic of Congo who are accused by the United Nations of looting the DRC’s mineral wealth. Bonny Schoonaker and Mzilikazi Wa Afrika reported that two ministers, who have been identified as Jean-Charles Okoto, DRC Planning Minister and Mwenze Kongolo, DRC Justice Minister are alleged to have a network of assets in South Africa. Two South African businessmen who have successfully sued the government of the DRC exposed the two. The two businessmen have been granted court orders in South Africa that entitle them to seize any assets which belong to the DRC located in any one of at least eight countries. These countries are South Africa, the US, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, the UK, Namibia and Zambia. A Falcon jet and cobalt ore have already been sold by auction in realization of these court orders. Several aircraft in Zambia and wine farms in South Africa have also been identified for seizure.

<<< More in Sunday Times of 20 June 2004 >>>

In March this year it was reported that the Zimbabwe finance minister, Chris Kuruneri, was facing charges of violating foreign currency control laws. This was after Bonny Schoonakker and the Sunday Times Foreign Desk revealed that Kuruneri had acquired up-market property in a Cape Town suburb to the value of ZAR30 million (US$4 615 384.60). It was alleged that Kuruneri had unlawfully withdrawn ZAR5.2 million (US$800, 000) from a bank in Zimbabwe and passed on the money to a firm of attorneys in Cape Town, to invest in the city’s residential property market.

<<< More in Sunday Times of 21 March 2004 >>>

Anecdotal evidence abounds about the transmission of disposable funds between countries in the region that occasionally circumvents the formal system. It has emerged that, since the 1980s, significant quantities of money have been transmitted and used in South Africa. Source countries noted include Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique (from the 1970s, especially around the advent of Frelimo rule), Zambia and Zimbabwe. The trend does not seem to have abated, even with the advent of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (1998) and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (2001) in South Africa. Part of the reason is that the factors that encourage the trend have remained virtually intact. In certain cases developments in the source countries have increased the flow. Asset flows to South Africa are influenced by:

-- The scope for investment in residential property. With the exception of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the average price of good quality residential property in South Africa is relatively lower than in other parts of the region. This oddity is probably attributable to the creeping dollarization of economies in Southern Africa. In addition, the prevailing security of property rights in South Africa is rather less fragile than it is in some other parts of the region.

-- The existence of educational facilities. South Africa has a variety of institutions offering tertiary education and training in English, which is internationally marketable. On account of shifts in funding policies, some institutions are desperate for patronage by foreign students. This creates a niche that can be exploited by illicit investment in education.

-- Imbalances in the availability of essential commodities, such as medical drugs, construction equipment and materials. This provides opportunities for the conversion of illicit funds into re-saleable assets in countries such as the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

-- The abundance of hard currency, and the ease with which it can be obtained beyond the borders of South Africa, which is in turn attributable to the lack of faith in state capacity or efficiency. This translates into a lack of faith in local currencies, low use of local financial institutions, and a predatory relationship with the local economy. The ubiquitous bureaux de change open up numerous opportunities for the acquisition of hard currency in an unregulated manner, or by false pretences. These practices have been reported in Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe on a continuing basis.

-- The presence in South Africa of a relatively developed financial system and safe investment climate/environment. This factor is self explanatory, and related to the last.

-- The presence of migrant communities across national borders enriches the environment for the transmission of resources between the respective countries, often informally and with no recourse to the financial institutions and regularly in violation of currency movement control laws. An example is the spread of the Lundas in Angola, the DRC and Zambia, the Tutsi in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC, the Venda in South Africa and Zimbabwe, or the Chewa-speaking communities on either side of the Malawi/Zambia border. In addition, dual nationality eases movement between the countries, and makes it difficult to regulate currency transmission.


... AND IN KENYA - THE GOLDENBERG SCANDAL

Evidence of high- level corruption has emerged in the on going judicial Commission into the Goldenberg scandal in Kenya. The Goldenberg scandal revolves around ghost mineral exports and allegations before the Commission implicate former President, Daniel Arap Moi in the scandal. The Goldenberg scandal comprised a series of financial scams apparently masterminded by a Nairobi entrepreneur, Kamlesh Pattni. The Goldenberg scams of the early 1990s are believed to have caused the state approximately US$500 million. Those implicated in the scam included the country’s vice-president, a governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, the Commissioner of Geology and Mines, a permanent secretary, the head of national security intelligence and Pattni. A commission of enquiry was established to enquire into the scam. Mr. Pattni told the commission how he gave President Moi 11 Million Shillings (US$ 152,000) in cash from Goldenberg profits. Mr. Pattni also revealed how documents were falsified to hide Former President Moi’s shareholding in the Grand Regency Hotel. The full extent of the amount of money involved in the Goldenberg scandal has not yet been established.

<<< Money Laundering Patterns in Kenya >>>

ARABS CREATE REGIONAL GROUP TO FIGHT MONEY LAUNDERING

The first regional organization in the Middle East and North Africa to fight money laundering to be called, MENAFATF, is to be formed at a Ministerial meeting to be held in Bahrain on 29th-30th November 2004. It is said that the organization could be a vital tool to pursue terrorist money that flows outside traditional banking channels through an ancient system known as hawala, which is also important in sending money from workers scattered around the globe to relatives in the region.

FATF ISSUES SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION IX

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has passed a new measure, Special Recommendation IX at its meeting of 20th-22nd October 2004 held in Paris. The new measure calls on countries to put in place measures to detect cross-border movement of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Countries are urged to ensure that competent authorities are enabled to stop, freeze and confiscate currency and bearer negotiable instruments linked to terrorist financing or money laundering.

<<< FATF Web Site >>>

BOTSWANA

The Proceeds of Serious Crime Act of 1990 criminalises money laundering related to all serious crimes. The Act authorises the confiscation of assets linked to terrorist financing. In terms of the Banking Act of 1995, the Bank of Botswana may revoke the license of a bank that has been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of an offence related to the use or laundering of illegal proceeds. Botswana has also enacted the Banking (Anti-Money Laundering) Regulations, which prohibit the keeping of anonymous accounts, require verification of customers’ identities and the reporting of suspicious transactions.

Botswana licenses offshore banks and businesses. Applicants for offshore banking and businesses, as well as their directors and senior management have to undergo background checks. Directors are further subject to the ‘fit and proper test’‚ as required under the Banking Act of 1995. Bank supervisory standards applicable to domestic banks apply to offshore banks as well. Anonymous directors are prohibited as well as offshore trusts.

Relevant Legislation:

+ BANKING ACT, 1995

+ MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, 1990

+ PROCEEDS OF SERIOUS CRIME ACT, 1990

<<< Organized Crime in Botswana >>>

KENYA

Kenya is regarded as an important trans-shipment and repackaging centre for narcotics trafficking by virtue of its geographic position between Asia, which is a major source of narcotics and Europe and North America.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act of 1994 criminalizes money laundering related to narcotics trafficking. Money laundering offences are punishable by imprisonment for up to 14 years.

Kenya has a draft anti-money laundering bill. The Central Bank of Kenya issued regulations in 2000 that require financial institutions to verify the identity of their customers and to report suspicious transactions and maintain records of large cash transactions involving amounts greater than 100,000 Shillings (US$1,400). The regulations do not cover non-bank financial institutions, such as money remitters, casinos, or investment companies.

Relevant Legislation:

+ ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC CRIMES ACT, 1994

+ DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES (CONTROL) ACT, 1994

<<< Money Laundering Patterns in Kenya >>>

LESOTHO

Lesotho currently has no legislation criminalising money laundering or terrorist financing. The country has a draft Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Bill, which is expected to be tabled before Parliament in 2005.

The Central Bank of Lesotho issued Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines in 2000 that require banks in Lesotho to verify the identity of their customers, to report suspicious transactions and to report all large cash transactions exceeding 100,000 Maloti (approximately $16,000) to the Central Bank of Lesotho. The Government of Lesotho has created a multi-sectoral committee to assist in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

Relevant Legislation:

+ PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC OFFENCES ACT, 1999

MALAWI

Malawi does not specifically criminalise money laundering or terrorist financing. The country has a draft Money Laundering and Proceeds of Serious Crime Bill. The Reserve Bank of Malawi has the legal authority to identify and freeze assets suspected of involvement in terrorist financing. Financial institutions in Malawi are required to record and report the identity of customers making large transactions and such records have to be maintained for seven years. Banks in Malawi are allowed to, but have no obligation to submit suspicious transaction reports to the Reserve Bank of Malawi. The banks also sell bearer certificates which factor makes them susceptible to money laundering.

Relevant Legislation:

+ MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, 1991

MAURITIUS

Money laundering is an offence in Mauritius. The Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2002 provides for the establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that became operational in 2002. The Act also imposes penalties for money-laundering offences, provides for cooperation with FIUs of other countries and establishes suspicious activity reporting obligations for banks, financial institutions, cash dealers and relevant professions. The FIU collects and analyses suspicious activity reports and forwards them to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the police. The ICAC has the power to investigate money-laundering offences and to freeze and seize assets related to money laundering.

Mauritius has an active offshore financial sector. The Financial Services Development Act of 2001 established the Financial Services Commission (FSC), which is responsible for the licensing and regulation of the non-bank financial sector. The FSC reviews all applications to form offshore companies and supervises their activities. In 2002 Mauritius enacted the Prevention of terrorism Act to criminalise terrorist financing. In terms of the Act, the Government of Mauritius has power to track and investigate terrorist-related funds, property, and assets.

Relevant Legislation:

+ PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT, 2002

+ FINANCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2001

+ FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002

+ PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 2002

NAMIBIA

The country’s Prevention Of Organised Crime Bill was passed in the National Assembly on 12 October 2004. The Bill aims to criminalize money laundering, to combat organized crime and criminal gang activities. Namibia also has a draft Financial Intelligence Centre Bill. Banks in Namibia are required to report suspicious transactions to the Central Bank and to record and report the identity of customers undertaking large transactions. Banks and other financial institutions are required to maintain records related to large transactions and to make them available to government authorities for use in narcotics-related and other criminal investigations.

Relevant Legislation:

+ BANKING INSTITUTIONS ACT, 1998

<<< Money Laundering Control in Namibia >>>

SEYCHELLES

Seychelles has a developed offshore financial sector that is dedicated to increasing foreign exchange earnings. Seychelles allows the registration of non-resident companies that do not pay tax in Seychelles, are not subject to foreign exchange control and do not have to file annual reports. It also permits the issuance of bearer shares which can facilitate money laundering, as it is difficult to identify the beneficial owners. Seychelles also permits offshore trusts, offshore insurance companies, and offshore banking.

The International Corporate Service Providers Act regulates all activities of corporate service providers as well as the trustee service providers. It further strengthens existing legislation regarding due diligence and know your customer rules. The Anti-Money Laundering Act criminalises the laundering of funds from all serious crimes and requires financial institutions and individuals to report to the central bank transactions involving suspected money laundering. The law also imposes record keeping and customer identification requirements for financial institutions and provides for forfeiture of proceeds of crime. Money Laundering controls under the Act are applied to non-bank financial institutions, including exchange houses, stockbrokers, casinos and insurance agencies.

Relevant Legislation:

+ INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE SERVICE PROVIDERS ACT, 2003

+ ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 1996

+ MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, 1995

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa has a relatively sophisticated banking and financial sector as well as a large cash-based market. Crimes related to money laundering in South Africa are narcotics and abalone smuggling, corruption, fraud, vehicle theft, currency speculation, illicit dealings in precious metals and diamonds, arms and human trafficking and smuggling. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998, criminalizes money laundering in South Africa. A fine of R100 million (US$15m) or imprisonment for up to 30 years may be imposed upon violation of the Act. The Act also provides for criminal and civil forfeiture.

The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) established the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), and the Money Laundering Advisory Council to advise the Minister of Finance on policies and measures to combat money laundering. The Financial Intelligence Centre receives, analyzes and disseminates suspicious transaction reports. It also acts as a centralised repository of information and statistics on money laundering. FICA requires accountable institutions, which include a wide range of financial institutions and businesses to identify customers, maintain records of transactions for at least five years, appoint compliance officers to train employees to comply with the law, and report suspicious and unusual transactions. Accountable institutions include companies and businesses considered vulnerable to money laundering activities, such as banks, life insurance companies, foreign exchange dealers, casinos, real estate agents, lawyers and accountants.

South Africa has a pending Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Bill of 2004.

As regards international co-operation, the International Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (1996) sets out the framework.

Relevant Legislation:

+ FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE ACT, NO 38, 2001

+ PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT, NO 121, 1998

+ INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, NO 75, 1996

<<< Organized Crime in South Africa >>>

<<< Money Laundering in South Africa >>>

SWAZILAND

The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act of 2001 criminalizes money laundering for specified predicate offences. The penalty for money laundering is six years‚ imprisonment or a fine amounting to approximately US$3,500, or both.

The Act establishes a currency reporting requirement, requires banks to report suspicious transactions to the Central Bank of Swaziland and sets out conditions under which assets may be frozen and forfeited. The Act also requires banks to retain records for five years to improve the ability to trace suspicious transactions and patterns.

Relevant Legislation:

+ MONEY LAUNDERING (PREVENTION) ACT, 2001

+ PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ORDER, 1993

<<< Organized Crime in Swaziland >>>

TANZANIA

The Proceeds of Crime Act, 1991 criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering but focuses on corruption and drug trafficking more than on money laundering. Financial institutions are required to maintain records of financial transactions in excess of 10,000 shillings (approximately US $109) for 10 years. Reporting of suspicious transactions is not mandatory, and may be communicated to police where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a transaction relates to money laundering. Employees of financial institutions are protected from liability for reporting of suspicious transactions.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 criminalizes financing of terrorism. Tanzania has established a multi-disciplinary committee on money laundering and a drafting committee that are preparing a review of existing laws and developing comprehensive money laundering legislation.

In the absence of specific legislation against money laundering, the Bank of Tanzania uses Circular Number 8 (2001) to regulate commercial banks.

Relevant Legislation:

+ PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT, 2002

+ MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, 1991

+ PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT, 1991

+ CIRCULAR NO 8 (2001)

<<< Organized Crime in Tanzania >>>

<<< Money Laundering in Tanzania >>>

UGANDA

Uganda has no specific anti-money laundering legislation. The Bank of Uganda has issued ‘Know Your Customer’ guidelines in terms of which banks are required to verify customers’ identities, report suspicious transactions and cash transfers of at least $100,000. Alternative remittance systems and foreign exchange bureaus are however widely used in Uganda and are generally unregulated. Uganda has prepared a comprehensive anti-money laundering bill that will criminalize money laundering for all serious crimes, and this bill is expected to be passed by Parliament in 2005.

Relevant Legislation:

+ THE INSPECTION OF GOVERNMENT ACT, 2002

+ TERRORISM ACT, 2000

ZAMBIA

Major sources of laundered funds in Zambia are said to be proceeds of narcotics transactions and public corruption, as well as bulk cash smuggling. The Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2001 criminalizes money laundering. The Act increases penalties for financial crimes, requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions and retain transaction records for ten years. It also allows seizure of assets related to money laundering and increases the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC). The Act establishes the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Authority that is responsible for formulating, overseeing and implementing policies to prevent and detect money laundering. The Authority is chaired by the attorney general and includes the heads of principal law enforcement agencies, the Revenue Authority, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Central Bank. An anti-money laundering investigations unit was established under the DEC and is responsible for investigating money laundering offences and acts as the enforcement arm of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority.

Relevant Legislation:

+ NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT, 1993

+ MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT, 1993

+ DANGEROUS DRUGS (FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY) ACT, 1989

+ PROHIBITION AND PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2001 >>>

ZIMBABWE

The Serious Offences (Confiscation of Profits) Act criminalizes money laundering and provides for confiscation and forfeiture of assets. A person convicted of money laundering can be imprisoned for up to 15 years. The Central Bank of Zimbabwe issued the Money Laundering Guidelines for Banking Institutions in 2002, to provide for verification of customers’ identities and the reporting of suspicious transactions to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The Prevention of Corruption Act empowers the Minister of Justice to freeze bank accounts linked to money laundering.

Relevant Legislation:

+ BANK USE PROMOTION AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2003

+ CRIMINAL MATTERS (MUTUAL ASSISTANCE) ACT, 1990

+ SERIOUS OFFENCES (CONFISCATION OF PROFITS) ACT, 1990

+ PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1990

<<< Organized Crime in Zimbabwe >>>

<<< Money Laundering in Zimbabwe >>>

• 8-10 December 2004: ISS Seminar on Money Laundering in Eastern and Southern Africa - Nairobi, Kenya.

To have details of money laundering meetings, conferences, seminars, publications and other developments included in future issues of the Monitor, please send an e-mail message with details of contact persons to Nomzi Gwintsa:

<<< [email protected] >>>

This publication is sponsored by the Royal Norwegian government. The scope and content should not however, be attributed to the government.

ABOUT THE ISS
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an applied policy research organisation with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the human security debate in Africa.

The Money Laundering Monitor is produced by the Money Laundering component of the ISS Organized Crime and Corruption Programme based in Cape Town, South Africa.
<<< Visit the ISS Web site >>>