Will the latest AU mission in Somalia achieve better results?
The new AU mission holds potential, but only if the UN, the AU and Somalia step up to resolve perennial challenges of past efforts.
Somalia has hosted three African Union (AU) peace support missions over two decades. The first was the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to 2022, followed by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) from 2022 to 2024 and now the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Through these, the continent’s most protracted security engagement has received substantial international political support and military contributions. Yet, the terrorist threat posed by al-Shabaab persists, growing bolder and deadlier.
Earlier this year, al-Shabaab briefly seized key government buildings in Balcad, a town barely 30 kilometres from the capital, Mogadishu. Similar attacks in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle paint a familiar and disturbing picture that, mission after mission, the fundamental threat remains largely uncontained. As AUSSOM begins its mandate, there is growing anxiety that the cycle of militarised engagements with limited results will simply continue unless a radical course correction is made backed by the required resources to address perennial challenges.
Familiar storms
The launch of AUSSOM on 1 January 2025 was intended to reset the AU’s engagement in Somalia. Mandated by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2767 to support Somalia’s transition to full national security ownership, AUSSOM is meant to be a more flexible mission supporting Somali-owned operations. But the early signs are not encouraging. The issues that crippled AMISOM and ATMIS remain unresolved and threaten to undermine AUSSOM’s potential from the start.
At the heart of the challenge facing deployments to Somalia lies the inability to implement a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond battlefield operations. The Somali Security Sector Development Plan, developed with international partners, offered a roadmap to integrate military action with counter-radicalisation measures, urban stabilisation, disruption of the financial networks of terrorists and strategic communications. Yet it remains largely unimplemented.
Despite political and military support to Somalia, al-Shabaab is growing bolder and deadlier
Instead, reliance on military operations continues to dominate, despite evidence that al-Shabaab thrives in environments where governance is weak, communities feel alienated and political actors remain divided. Political discord between Somalia’s federal government and its regional states — especially Jubaland and Puntland, which often refuse to work with the government — has worsened with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s push for constitutional amendment and its formal approval. Without national security consensus, a comprehensive strategy for Somalia’s transition is impossible.
The second challenge is AUSSOM’s financial uncertainties. Currently, the mission continues deploying personnel despite not having paid existing troops for the past seven to nine months. The first phase (six months) of operations may be partly funded, but the future hangs in the balance. While UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) sets the framework for predictable financing of UN-authorised and AU-led peace missions, its application to Somalia’s case is not assured, as the resolution is yet to be triggered. The United States has already signalled its likely veto of 2719’s implementation for AUSSOM during the May 2025 vote.
Even if political will exists, AUSSOM’s continued funding is contingent on meeting milestones in the AU-UN joint roadmap. These span gender mainstreaming, civilian protection, compliance and accountability, development of logistical and operational service models, alignment of joint strategic and operational planning, and monitoring and reporting, all of which are ambitious tasks given the current pace. If funding dries up mid-mission, the AU risks another rushed drawdown, leaving Somalia once again vulnerable and creating a vacuum that al-Shabaab will be quick to exploit.
Successive AU missions have also long struggled to ensure a centralised command and control structure, as the coordination and reporting mechanisms among the contingents of the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) have been weak. Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiqué 1217 underlined the imperative for a more centralised command, control, and coordination structure. The UNSC had also previously stressed the need for the AU to ensure clear command and control, and operational coordination among its contingents. Yet past efforts illustrate how difficult this is to implement in practice.
Without a national security consensus, a comprehensive strategy for Somalia’s transition is impossible
AUSSOM inherits these challenges, now compounded by new geopolitical complexities. For the first time, Egypt has joined as a troop contributor, entering a space traditionally dominated by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti. In such a context, unless proactive coordination mechanisms are implemented, regional rivalry risks hampering the mission’s effectiveness. Without unity of effort among TCCs, no mission, however well designed, can succeed, and AUSSOM will be no exception.
Another key matter has been the slow pace of force generation in the Somali Security Forces (SSF), internal integration and achieving the desired quality of the forces. Despite the PSC’s emphasis on building the SSF’s capacity, progress has been limited. This trend has raised concerns about the SSF’s ability to take over responsibilities from AUSSOM in the future, particularly as the mission plans to start drawing down in 2028.
Moving on
If the AU and its partners want to ensure that AUSSOM deliver a better peace dividend than its predecessors, they must move on from past challenges. First, the PSC and Somalia’s international partners ought to lead a renewed political push. This includes encouraging the Somali government and its federal states to reconcile their differences and work towards achieving national stability.
Secondly, the PSC should be bold enough to encourage structured engagement with moderate al-Shabaab elements, just as other countries have done with insurgent movements elsewhere. Supported by technical expertise in dialogue and demobilisation, this could open new doors to a political solution. This and similar political processes are essential to unlock current bottlenecks and ensure a more comprehensive approach to fighting terrorism.
If AUSSOM is to perform better than its predecessors, it must transcend the challenges of past missions
Thirdly, efforts need to be made to secure AUSSOM funding rather than wait for the UNSC decision in May. The PSC should follow up on the status of the Joint AU-UN Task Team on the Operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 and its progress against tasks outlined in the AU-UN joint roadmap. Without losing sight of obstacles in implementing the resolution, its funding mechanism must be triggered on time. The Council could convene a special session to gauge progress without waiting for May.
The PSC could work with the AU Commission, particularly the new chairperson, to garner more international support for the mission’s finances. Efforts could focus on engaging the United States more directly by lobbying the Trump administration not to veto the application of Resolution 2719.
As indicated in the resolution, the AU must cover 25% of the funding for its peace support operations. The PSC’s leadership is essential in ensuring contributions from its own sources and strategic partners. The pledging conference to be held in Doha shortly could be a start and the PSC, through the AU Commission, could liaise with countries with growing vested interest in Somalia to form a coalition to secure sustainable support to finance AUSSOM. With growing geopolitical interest in Somalia, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia could form a financing coalition. The Doha conference is crucial to lock in alternative support.
Finally, the PSC should continue to monitor closely and evaluate the progress of AUSSOM’s mandate implementation, finding additional mechanisms for overseeing the new mission's command and control structures. Innovative and politically savvy approaches are needed to address this longstanding issue. These include sustained political dialogue among TCCs, enhancing the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU’s powers over units that could enhance the achievement of mission goals.
If AUSSOM fails, the ramifications will echo across the region, embolden extremists, and raise questions about the AU’s capacity to stabilise conflict hotspots. This must not be just another mission, but one with a difference. That begins with recognising that no amount of military presence can replace political coherence, local legitimacy, and international support rooted in a long-term vision. Anything less would be repeating history and expecting different results.
