Will South Africa bridge the AU–SADC divide?
Special focus on AU RECs: South Africa could play a role in mending fences between SADC and the AU over tricky issues such as elections in the DRC.
On 29 April 2019, during a media briefing in Pretoria, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) launched its observer mission to the general elections in South Africa. A few days later the African Union (AU) also announced its own team of 30 observers, led by former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete, to the 8 May elections.
This joint effort between the AU and the regional economic community (REC) is nothing unusual. The two organisations have worked together in similar circumstances during elections in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Lesotho and elsewhere.
The AU and SADC, however, do not always see eye to eye on how to deal with the aftermath of disputed elections. The two organisations have also disagreed strongly in the past few months over the post-Cotonou negotiations and certain crucial elements of the AU reforms. Ironically, part of the AU reforms is to find greater synergy between the AU and RECs – a process it aims to start during the upcoming AU summit in Niamey, Niger in July 2019.
The AU and SADC do not always see eye to eye on how to deal with the aftermath of disputed elections
Going forward, South Africa is likely to be at the centre of the relationship between the AU and SADC. The Southern African powerhouse is chairing the AU from January 2020 and will have to take the lead if disputes arise. This will also be an opportunity to mend fences.
Divisions over the DRC
At the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, SADC and the AU were sharply divided over the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following the disputed elections on 30 December. SADC and the AU were the only organisations permitted by the government of the DRC to send an observation mission to the highly charged polls, which had been postponed for two years.
The SADC observer team of fewer than 100 observers left the country directly after the vote and before the announcement of the results. It stated that the elections were ‘relatively well managed’. After initial dissention within its own ranks, SADC’s chairperson, Namibian President Hage Geingob, announced that SADC strongly supported the DRC government. He accepted the results on behalf of the organisation.
The attempts by Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, then chairperson of the AU, to send a high-level mission to the DRC on 18 January 2019 and to ask for a delay in the publication of election results, owing to ‘serious concerns’ over the outcome, was a low point in relations between SADC and the AU.
After first accepting the mission, SADC allegedly prevailed upon the Congolese authorities to publish the results that, contrary to expectations and to estimates by other observers, gave the victory to President Felix Tshisekedi.
SADC held its own pre-summit of heads of state in Addis Ababa where it affirmed its support for the newly elected Tshisekedi
At the February 2019 AU summit, SADC held its own pre-summit of heads of state in Addis Ababa where it affirmed its support for the newly elected Tshisekedi. In the end, the AU had to accept the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and that without the support of SADC, attempts to intervene in the post-electoral crisis would be unsuccessful.
The situation was made more complicated on a continental level because the DRC is a member of both SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States – the latter’s members staying largely silent about the crisis plaguing their big neighbour.
A more structured approach?
The question is whether a more structured relationship between SADC and the AU could contribute to greater synergy, and whether there is a need for a clearer division of labour between the AU and RECs when it comes to SADC. Could the DRC case have been handled better by the continental leadership if it was clear at what stage the AU could intervene and how joint mediation between the AU and RECs should be structured?
Historically, the issue of intervention in crises in SADC has been handled on a case-by-case basis. SADC with its 16 members is the organisation’s biggest REC in terms of numbers, and it usually takes the lead when it comes to crises in its region.
In 2018 SADC took the lead during the highly disputed elections in Zimbabwe. However, it was accused of being biased towards the government of President Emmerson Mnangagwa and not pointing out the flaws in the process.
In Madagascar, in the run-up to elections in 2013 and again at the end of 2018, SADC also played an important role. It did so, however, in conjunction with the AU’s special envoy Ramtane Lamamra, who was sent to the island to ensure pre-election protests did not spiral out of control.
The PSC rarely tables SADC issues
With the exception of the DRC, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) has shied away from tabling security issues in SADC during its meetings in Addis Ababa. The crisis in Zimbabwe, for example, never made it onto the PSC agenda despite the upheaval that followed the contested elections, political repression and economic woes from the early 2000s.
Former South African president Thabo Mbeki was appointed SADC mediator in Zimbabwe and oversaw the transition to a government of national unity that lasted from 2008 to 2013. Subsidiarity, i.e. leaving conflict mediation to the region, has considerable support in SADC.
At the moment Zimbabwe, Angola and Lesotho are the three SADC members on the PSC. It seems unlikely that Zimbabwe’s current political tensions, with an opposition still refusing to accept the outcome of the polls, will be discussed by the PSC.
At the moment Zimbabwe, Angola and Lesotho are the three SADC members on the PSC
In August 2018 the PSC launched a rare field mission to Lesotho, a country that has suffered from political instability and attempted coups at several junctures since independence. The PSC ambassadors recommended that SADC maintain its protection force beyond the cut-off date of November 2018, but the mission left the country as planned. It was clearly up to SADC to decide the limits of its mission in the country.
Following the field mission, the PSC stated its support for SADC efforts in the country. Lesotho has not been on the agenda of the PSC since then.
One exception to the rule of subsidiarity between SADC and the AU has been the Comoros, currently plagued by tensions following a controversial referendum to change the constitution. SADC seems to have left the problems in the Comoros to the AU, which has been involved in the country for some time.
What can South Africa do?
Taking over the chairpersonship of the AU next year is a huge challenge for South Africa. It will have to forge strategic partnerships with heavyweight countries on the continent and do as much as possible to steer the continent towards its goal of ‘Silencing the guns by 2020’.
To achieve this, ensuring that the AU is united when dealing with crises will have to be a priority. Various peace and security issues are likely to remain a concern, such as Zimbabwe and Lesotho. The situation in the Comoros is also far from being resolved. New threats such as the continued attacks by armed groups in northern Mozambique will also have to be addressed by SADC and the AU.
Ensuring that the AU is united when dealing with crises will have to be a priority
While it is likely that crises will still be handled on a case-by-case basis, a more structured approach, with more regular interaction on key issues, will create greater synergy. South Africa can contribute to this synergy by ensuring dialogue between the decision makers in the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and SADC ambassadors.
Taking forward gains made during the Niamey summit to institutionalise the AU–RECs relationship will also fall on South Africa’s shoulders in 2020. This is no easy task given its dominant position in the region. The challenge for South Africa will be to get the buy-in of its fellow SADC members in order to succeed in leading from the front in Addis Ababa.
This article is part of a special PSC Report focus on regional economic communities in the run-up to the AU Coordination Summit on 7–8 July 2019 in Niamey, Niger.
