The PSC should put Sudan on its agenda
The ongoing protests in Sudan warrant closer attention from the PSC.
A government committee investigating the ongoing protests in Sudan admitted, in early February, that the body of Ahmed El Kheir, a teacher who had died in the custody of the dreaded National Security Service, showed signs of torture.
Ahmed's death is one of only a few since the beginning of the protests to make the news, but it is not an isolated incident. The Sudanese government has used brute force in an attempt to suppress protests that have rocked the country since mid-December 2018.
The protests began in the north-eastern Sudanese city of Atbara over bread and fuel price hikes on 19 December 2018. They have since snowballed into weeks of widespread anti-government protests demanding regime change and the fall of President Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade rule.
While this is not the first time Sudan has seen popular street protests, the significance of these lies in their underlying economic and political drivers, and the fact that they are led by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) rather than Sudan’s perennially weak opposition groups.
According to human rights groups, more than 50 people have died in the 56 days between mid-December 2018 and early February. The number of fatalities translates into almost one death a day during this period.
More than 50 people have died in Sudan between mid-December 2018 & early February
Is it just about al-Bashir?
On the lips of the protesting masses is a chant for freedom, demanding that al-Bashir goes. This suggests that most people see the president as one of the reasons for the country's problems, if not the biggest. The demand that he step aside encapsulates layers of discontent that must be situated within broader overarching questions on reforming the underlying structural issues driving the country's current problems.
The protests, in that context, are therefore not an attempt to subvert the Sudanese state but an avenue to draw attention to the prevailing discontent in the country. They apportion blame to those who the masses believe have been key in creating those problems. The upheaval is also an urgent call for structured engagement on the political and security future of the country.
Unwillingness to look at underlying drivers of the protests
Al-Bashir has characterised the protests as an attempt to subvert his power and undermine the state. He has described the protesters variously as ‘infiltrators’, ‘outsiders trying to infiltrate and destabilise Sudan’, ‘people getting orders from outside the country’, ‘international and regional countries trying to obstruct the use of Islamic laws in Sudan’, and ‘a copy and paste of the Arab Spring’ amplified by the media, among others.
Al-Bashir has characterised the protests as an attempt to subvert his power and undermine the state
More recently, however, he has described the protests as the work of mostly youth with poor prospects. Does this mean dialogue is an option? If so, how will the protestors induce a leader who is politically paranoid and has stayed in office for so long, to agree to talks? Since the International Criminal Court's indictment of al-Bashir in 2009, his response to emerging political issues has been one of self-preservation.
The current characterisation of the protests and subsequent use of force raise questions about the government's appreciation of the seriousness of people’s demands and the existential nature of the agony of the common Sudanese.
Missing the call for reforms
The government is missing the real message of the Sudanese people’s call for comprehensive reforms that could make their lives economically bearable within a democratic space characterised by freedom of speech, political tolerance and respect for human rights.
Instead, it has prioritised the use of force. Yet, contrary to expectations that the crackdown will deter protesters, it has rather drawn more people onto the streets. It has also further eroded the government's popularity and increased tensions between the state and citizens.
The hardliners in al-Bashir's government benefit from a misrepresentation of popular demands
The SPA, the leading organisation behind the protests, has also been denied an opportunity to fully articulate the totality of the protests’ agenda. At the same time the hardliners in al-Bashir's government benefit from a misrepresentation of popular demands, as it enables them to rally their support base and use the state's instruments of force.
Clearly, the protests warrant closer attention from the Peace and Security Council (PSC).
Options for the PSC
The government’s use of force in the face of popular resolve for change is bound to continue to affect the stability of Sudan. And notwithstanding the threatening stalemate, the crisis is yet to be appropriately prioritised by the PSC. To help de-escalate the situation, the PSC should consider tabling Sudan for discussion. That would register the importance of Sudan’s crisis in the quest for peace and security on the continent.
To help de-escalate the situation, the PSC should consider tabling Sudan for discussion
Such a move could be followed by deploying a fact-finding mission to independently interact with various stakeholders, giving the council first-hand information on the situation. On the basis of the fact-finding mission, the PSC could then draw attention to and condemn the use of excessive force when suppressing protests, as other stakeholders such as the European Union have already done.
Finally, the PSC could consider facilitating a visit by a key member of the council to reinforce concerns about the excessive use of force against citizens and highlight the need to initiate dialogue as a non-violent response to the demands for comprehensive reforms in Sudan.
