The African Union could learn lessons from the Jeddah and Geneva processes
Reflecting on the shortcomings and successes of previous mediation efforts could halt Sudan’s conflict.
International and regional efforts to end Sudan’s war have stalled 19 months into the conflict. The Geneva talks hosted by the United States and Switzerland in August yielded no tangible outcome, with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) declining to attend. The African Union (AU) Committee of Five (C5) heads of state meeting scheduled to take place in Kampala in October was cancelled for a similar reason. These efforts, while commendable, indicate the lack of strategy on how to connect, build on and advance past mediation efforts.
The positioning of the warring parties on the battlefront has also been a stumbling block. However, SAF’s recent territorial gains and slight shift in the balance of power could change its ‘no-negotiation’ stance. It is time to reflect on how the choice of mediators and the location and format of the Jeddah and Geneva talks have influenced outcomes and how they can be leveraged in future.
Mediator selection
Bilateral partnerships rather than trusted and neutral arbiters have driven the selection of mediators. The Geneva process included Egypt and the United Arab Emirates as co-facilitators, whereas the C5 mediation, at heads-of-state level, comprises Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, Angola and Nigeria. The two processes involved countries with vested interests and alleged bias to a warring party . Predetermined mediators imposed on the warring parties have created several challenges, raising questions about the credibility and legitimacy of the entire process. A Peace and Security Council (PSC) Report source quoted a senior SAF leader as stating ‘our enemies should not be designated as mediators. They should accompany the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a joint entity’.
The selection of mediators has raised questions about the credibility and legitimacy of the process
A joint selection by the warring parties would prove difficult given the lack of trust and the likelihood of rejection of proposed mediators from either party. Nonetheless, the parties could together develop a list of mediators for organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, AU and United Nations to vet. The trilateral mechanism developed during the transition struggled to bridge the civil-military divide in Sudan but the comparative advantage of each organisation could still prove invaluable in a trilateral mediation. Experts who served on the mechanism possess technical expertise and knowledge and could provide greater contextual insights into current and ongoing mediation efforts.
Approach
A major faultline of the Jeddah process was overemphasising the humanitarian situation at the expense of political considerations. The approach centred on responding to humanitarian needs, celebrating the ‘Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan’ only a few weeks after the start of the war. The mediators and warring parties agreed that the talks would not be of a ‘political nature’. They insisted that the signing of the declaration would not affect any legal, security or political situation of the signatories, nor be linked to engagement in any political process.
A major faultline of the Jeddah process was overemphasising the humanitarian situation at the expense of political considerations
The Geneva process followed suit and concentrated on securing humanitarian access and aid. However, this emphasis on combining humanitarian objectives with peacemaking leads to failure on both fronts, in this case seven failed short-term ceasefires and the world’s worst displacement crisis.
This is perhaps where the AU’s approach could prove more effective, as humanitarian issues do not serve as a smokescreen to prevent inherently political discussions. The intra-Sudanese dialogues led by the AU’s High-level Panel sought to bring together armed groups, political actors and civilian factions to discuss Sudan’s postwar governance. The June and August meetings tabled for discussion powersharing, constitutional arrangements, elections, security sector reform and justice and accountability. Deliberations were guided by the mediators’ principles of Sudanese ownership and leadership, inclusiveness and neutrality. Despite the limitations in scope and participation of key actors, this could be a more fitting mediation format and approach.
Location and format
The Jeddah and Geneva processes were hosted outside the continent, validating the warring parties’ belief of malign external influence. Talks in Cairo, Kampala and Addis Ababa where mediation has taken place were tainted by the perception of the host states’ alleged lack of neutrality. Neutral African capitals should be sought, rather than selection on proximity and subsidiarity. For example, the Darfur Peace Agreement was facilitated and signed in Abuja, Nigeria while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Machakos, Kenya, neutral mediators of those conflicts.
The AU should lead the political process and expand intra-Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue to include all stakeholders
Premature public announcements further hindered prospects in recent mediations. While such a process is often covert, the Geneva talks, in particular, were publicly announced weeks ahead, which created anticipation and pressure among the parties and raised civilians’ expectations. In contrast, the secret Manama talks in January 2024 were among the most progressive. High-level SAF and RSF delegations attended, leading to a draft political agreement that did not materialise when talks eventually broke down. The nature and format should, therefore, be carefully considered to not raise hope and thrust potential setbacks into the public eye.
Improving future talks
Mediating Sudan’s complex conflict has proved and will continue to be a herculean task. It essentially requires multi-element state- and nation-building processes now and postwar. However, there are several lessons and recommendations for external and African decision-makers to consider.
The first is that the Jeddah and Geneva processes focus purely on humanitarian issues, leveraging comparative advantage. The recent extension of the Adre border crossing on the back of the Geneva talks should maximise gains and increase humanitarian aid delivery. The prospective resumption of the Jeddah process should centre on a humanitarian protection of civilians.
Simultaneously, the AU should lead the political process and expand intra-Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue to include all stakeholders. Expanding the scope and mandate of the talks and designating them the primary platform for mediation would carve out a clear role for the AU to implement the Roadmap for Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. The AU High-level Panel would benefit from adequate finance, expert mediators and a well-equipped secretariat.
The Presidential Ad-hoc Committee requires clarification and connection to entities such as the High-level Panel. While the PSC established the C5, the committee’s membership did not necessarily have to draw from current PSC member states. The PSC, with the AU Commission and High-level Panel, could consider previous experiences and cases in Sudan to draw up a neutral yet effective committee. Infusing these lessons into the design and approach of current and prospective mediation efforts could finally produce a holding ceasefire.
