Strengthening the outcomes of the Oran process
Despite nine high-level seminars, several challenges need to be addressed to achieve the goals of the Oran process.
From 17 to 18 December, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) will host the Oran seminar on peace and security in Africa. This 10th annual edition will bring together the 15 members of the PSC, the African members (A3) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), partners and ‘friends of the seminar’. The last mentioned are states or entities wishing to support the process. Delegates will discuss continental concerns under the theme ‘Enhancing cooperation between the PSC and A3’.
Initiated in 2013, the seminar seeks greater collaboration and cooperation between the PSC and A3 in promoting African peace, security and development. In addition to capacitating incoming African members, it is a reflection platform. Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia and Niger participated in the 2022 event as ‘friends’, while Chad was invited as a guest. The PSC may invite member states to join. However, the distinction between friends and guests remains unclear.
Over the last decade, the Council has institutionalised the seminar as a statutory annual meeting. This offers it and the A3 a platform for regular consultations, crucial for formalising the collaboration and cooperation enshrined in the first conclusions of the seminar. However, despite its stature and advantages, the initiative has achieved mixed results and must address numerous challenges if its purpose is to be completed.
Achievements
The nine seminars since 2013 have shared similar objectives and formats, involving the PSC and A3 on one hand and the UN and friends of the seminar on the other. Given the confusion this may cause about the seminar’s ownership, nature and objectives, there’s doubt that it has achieved its initial goal to ensure an African common position at the UNSC.
Since 2013, the seminar has sought greater PSC-A3 collaboration and cooperation
At the outset, the seminar identified 20 issues and challenges of coordination, information and analysis, and human and financial capacity. The conclusions of the last event, held in December 2022, indicate commendable progress in addressing the three categories.
A draft manual on engagements and coordination between the PSC and African UNSC members was developed and submitted to member states for input. The consolidated draft will be resubmitted to the Council for adoption ‘as soon as possible’. Although the timing may indicate ongoing negotiations on the text that might further delay its adoption, a draft is considered progress in formalising PSC and A3 collaboration.
The meeting commended the AU permanent observer mission to the UN for its pivotal secretariat and repository role in preserving A3 institutional memory. The role focuses on the pen-holding and inadequate coordination channels identified ten years ago.
The decade has produced five tangible results, including the draft manual, AU observer mission designation as A3 secretariat and repository and the troika. There is also the African diplomatic caucus in New York and a platform for permanent engagements with A3 embassies in Addis Ababa.
Challenges
However, several persisting and emerging challenges limit the seminar’s impact and hamper coordination. Even though the draft manual is commendable, it remains a draft with no binding power and no indication of when it will be adopted. Adopting it during the upcoming seminar is essential to consolidate PSC and A3 collaboration. However, almost a decade of seminars and no adopted manual raises questions about the political will of both parties.
A draft manual on engagements and coordination was developed but has not yet been adopted
Progress in conveying a single, coordinated message to the UNSC on Africa’s peace and security concerns is commendable, but using the A3 as a channel has challenges. The political nature and role of the group of three African UNSC members is yet to be clarified against the seminar's objectives. It remains unclear whether the rationale is to use the A3 as an extension of the AU. Achieving such an objective would be daunting for several reasons.
Reaching an African common position has proved complicated since African leaders committed to it in 1999. Adopting the Sirte declarations (1999 and 2005) and the 2005 Ezulwini consensus has neither defused divergences among African states nor tempered African states’ interest-based engagements in multilateral circles.
In Africa’s quest for UN-assessed contributions to support AU peace support operations, A3 members such as Côte d’Ivoire acted against the AU-A3 agreement, pushing for a UN resolution that did not reflect African views. This was done during its UNSC tenure from 2018 to 2019. Although such behaviour might be seen as isolated, it showcases the fragility of the PSC-A3 agreement, subject to member states’ shifting interests.
The continuous commitment of A3 members to support and convey the African position has been noticeable over the last five years. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, in his statement closing the previous seminar, lauded Kenya for its exemplary and effective representation of Africa at the UNSC while an A3 member. He also mentioned the exemplary PSC-A3 collaboration during negotiations for the communique of the 16th annual joint consultative meeting with the UNSC, which was led by Gabon and Morocco in 2022.
This might indicate A3 members’ growing eagerness to support the AU’s UNSC agenda, requiring them to report to the former on their UNSC activities, as in the first conclusions of the seminar.
Given the goal of African common positions, participation should be limited to African actors
However, despite being part of the AU, A3 members are on the UNSC as sovereign states and are accountable only to their capitals, not the AU. Thus, the organisation’s call for the countries to report back on their UNSC activities is diplomatic heresy based purely on an assumption of a moral pan-African obligation rather than a codified responsibility.
The challenge of limited funding and capacity of state missions and the AU observer mission was underlined by the conclusions of the last seminar. Although Nigeria and Morocco have been commended for deploying support staff to the AU observer mission at their own cost, this is neither viable nor sustainable in the long run.
Another contentious issue is the potential participation of Gabon, a suspended member of the AU and part of the A3. Article 23 of the AU Constitutive Act and the 2009 Ezulwini framework decree that suspended states shall not participate in AU activities. Despite being suspended from the AU, Mali was allowed to attend the previous Oran in 2022. Thus, Gabon, a suspended country, may well participate in the upcoming meeting.
Yet concerns remain about Gabon’s participation in closed sessions of the A3, partners and friends, which would further dilute the AU’s norms and principles. In either case, allowing or denying Gabon’s participation in these sessions would set a precedent. It would send a strong signal, as Gabon is the first A3 member affected by a coup and suspended by the AU since the seminar’s inception. An alternative to Gabon’s participation would be inviting incoming A3 members Algeria and Sierra Leone.
The way forward
For Oran, the meeting should be thoroughly conceptualised and participation limited to African actors, given its goal to foster frank discussions to enhance coordination and collaboration in conveying African common positions. To achieve this, the AU and A3 need to own the seminar financially and politically and ensure total control of participation and agenda-setting.
Coordination could also be strengthened by continuous capacitation of AU missions in centres such as New York, Brussels and Addis Ababa. Continuous upskilling would fill the void since a knowledge gap in PSC and UNSC working methods initiated the seminar. Training could be provided by African security and peace think tanks, which would minimise seminar discussions on training, freeing time for more crucial topics.
In the spirit of the continental zero tolerance to coups policy, the PSC should insist that Gabon shouldn’t be admitted to closed sessions. This would signify the Council’s commitment to and consistency in implementing democratic norms. It would set a precedent for the treatment of defaulting African states sitting on the UNSC.
Image: UNOAU
