Steps to avoid the spread of Sudan's crisis
Amid confrontation and with the sword of civil war hovering overhead, regional consensus is essential.
Sudan has reached breaking point in its decades-long creation and use of paramilitary armed groups to perpetrate wars across the country. On 15 April 2023, fighting broke out in Sudanese cities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The latter, a paramilitary group, was used extensively by Omar al-Bashir’s regime to quell armed resistance in Darfur.
Al-Bashir formalised the RSF by decree in 2013 and gradually transformed an ethnic militia into an auxiliary protection force akin to the state’s security apparatus. Its entrance into Khartoum and its key role during the transition in 2019 created a ticking time bomb for a power struggle in Sudan’s centre.
An embattled transitional period culminated in SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his RSF counterpart General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) teaming up to stage the 25 October 2021 coup. The coup truncated Sudan's first civilian government in years and effectively stemmed the driving incentive behind the SAF-RSF partnership. However, rallying around a common goal of keeping the military in power has not been a sufficient panacea to longstanding unresolved issues between the army and paramilitary entities such as the RSF.
Urban warfare is now unfolding in Sudan with two warlords at the helm, more or less equally balanced in armaments and combat readiness. The zero-sum stance and repeated claims from both leaders that they will achieve an ‘all-out victory’ leave few options to prevent Sudan from plunging into a full-scale civil war. To add to the plethora of challenges, the United Nations (UN) has warned against ‘a catastrophic conflagration within Sudan that could engulf the whole region and beyond’.
Urban warfare is unfolding in Sudan with two warlords at the helm, equally balanced in combat readiness
A looming humanitarian and refugee crisis is already visible in the number of Sudanese displaced internally or seeking refuge in Egypt, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Ethiopia. Regional implications including spillover are dire in a region that is still recovering from the war in Ethiopia and protracted instability in Somalia.
Since the outbreak of conflict, regional and international efforts have been swift and urgent yet largely ineffective. A day after the outbreak, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) issued a communiqué condemning it and calling for a cessation of hostilities. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) responded similarly and appointed the leaders of Djibouti, South Sudan and Kenya to lead a regional peace process.
The UN’s demand for a ceasefire has been robust, and added pressure has come from the United States (US)-United Arab Emirates (UAE). While these were quick, commendable first steps, they highlighted two major issues if international action is to achieve its goals, contain the situation and prevent spillover into the region.
The first is that unless convergence and coherence are achieved in the multiple peace processes, progress will be hampered. While several factors have contributed to Sudan’s stillborn transition and status quo, a major catalyst has been the proliferation of actors and peace processes. The past few years have seen an influx of initiatives and actors. These include the UN-AU-IGAD mechanism; the US, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and UAE group; Sudan’s ‘group of friends’ and the Arab League.
Each actor brings its strategic interests, engagement approaches and ideas for resolving the crisis
Each actor brings strategic interests, engagement approaches and ideas for resolving the transitional crisis. While all the processes contribute to the quest to stem the tide of the worsening humanitarian crisis, consensus and alignment of engagements are urgent to prevent duplication of efforts.
Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate General Abbas Kamel attempted to mediate among Burhan, the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC), the FFC-Democratic Block and some of the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement signatories. To many Sudanese, this February 2023 event created a separate peace process with deadly consequences.
The ‘Cairo track’ created outside the AU-IGAD-UN mechanism and favouring the Sudanese military, while sidelining the RSF from talks, sowed further mistrust between the two generals and heightened risks for confrontation. Such parallel processes ultimately prolong the crisis and undermine efforts to find a lasting solution.
To move forward, a critical reflection and assessment of the engagement of international and regional actors since 2019 is much needed. Also important is achieving robust and collective consensus among global, continental and regional efforts to ensure that the comparative advantage of each actor is tabled.
Parallel peace processes such as the ‘Cairo track’ undermine efforts to find a lasting solution
Second is the need for regional consensus. Since fighting erupted, some countries have been accused of meddling in the conflict. The military has claimed that two of Sudan’s neighbours support and delivered ammunition and supplies to the RSF.
Some Ethiopian separatist forces have reportedly taken advantage of the lack of security oversight to attempt to retake control of the disputed al-Fashaga area on the Sudan-Ethiopia border. Though Ethiopia has refuted the allegation, such absence of regional consensus and commonality of direction have always allowed shrewd warring parties to exploit multiple processes and play different political processes against each other. Simultaneously they also either arm themselves through neighbouring territories or regional friends, or buy time to reorganise.
Since the fall of al-Bashir, Sudan's neighbours have demonstrated varying preferences towards different factions and actors at crucial junctures in the transition. Given their diplomatic visits, it is no secret that Burhan and Hemedti are close to certain countries. Apart from their visits to Gulf nations, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, African countries such as Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda have received these generals.
While this is not proof of support, it shows that both generals have regional relationships that could be exploited when needed. In a long, drawn-out war where international goodwill might dwindle, the chances that such states may lean towards one side or the other cannot be discounted.
Given Sudan's complex history and relations with its immediate neighbours, it is inevitable that geopolitical preferences, interests and alliances will underlie the choices of neighbouring states. Historically, proxy influences have only prolonged Sudanese crises and made it more challenging for citizens to resolve issues on their own.
Avoiding proxy power struggles and support for current warring factions is a feasible approach to managing the situation and preventing its evolution into a full-blown civil war. Thus, efforts must be made to contain engagement that risks reinforcing the hard stance of the warring sides and exacerbating the conflict.
Sudan and the region’s peace and stability are mutually reinforcing. Unless an effort is made to prevent further fragmentation and regional actors from tipping the scale, dire consequences and destabilisation will derail any attempts to garner lasting peace. Thus, the need for regional consensus is indispensable in managing the way forward.
Image: © Amelia Broodryk/ISS
