Should regional peace and security councils mirror the PSC?
The Peace and Security Council and regional economic communities should harmonise and align to improve collaboration and ensure fruitful outcomes
On 24 April 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council (MSC) held a joint consultative meeting. Held at ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, the meeting was the first between the PSC and a regional counterpart. The MSC makes decisions on peace and security in West Africa on behalf of ECOWAS’s Authority of Heads of States. The maiden meeting allowed the two entities to deliberate on and propose strategies to address key challenges in West Africa.
Collaboration between the PSC and the regional mechanisms (RMs) is an integral part of the African Peace and Security Architecture and is further emphasised in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. Although the Protocol acknowledges the primacy of the AU, particularly the PSC as its highest decision-maker, competing interpretations of subsidiarity and complementarity have severely limited consultations between the PSC and its regional economic community (REC) equivalents.
Disparate structures, mandates and capacities limit the consultations between the PSC and its REC equivalents
Beyond these challenges, different institutional structures, mandates and power relations have further prevented meaningful AU-REC engagements. Disparate structures, mandates and capacities, not only between the PSC and RECs but among RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), mean that as the Council turns 20, only one consultation has taken place recently. It’s important to dig deeper to uncover why it took the PSC two decades to engage with one of the key regional peace and security policymaking organs. Are there structural and institutional limitations on the PSC to engage with the regional guardians of peace and security? And where these limitations exist, should the regional structures mirror the PSC?
Tracing the engagement
Even though the PSC Protocol is explicit about the role of RECs/RMs as the building blocks of continental peace and security, the practical implementation of this has not extended beyond rhetoric. Not only do relations between the AU and RECs remain unclear, there is no definite division of labour between the PSC and RECs. These factors have resulted in major challenges around subsidiarity and complementarity, with adverse effects on, and sometimes tensions in, relationships between some RECs and the AU.
Although AU statements and communiqués have called for enhanced AU-REC consultations and engagements, practical implementation is negligible. To date, three major retreats ― Dakar (2007), Swakopmund (May 2015) and Abuja (September 2015) ― have examined and sought to strengthen AU-REC relationships.
Other avenues and modalities exist for the AU to engage RECs/RMs. These include the annual mid-year coordination of the AU and RECs/RMs and use of liaison officers. In addition, the PSC can extend invitations to RECs/RMs. Alternatively, the AU could participate in PSC meetings or the AU Commission chairperson could be part of REC/RM meetings. However, these engagements are not at the level of policymaking bodies.
The inaugural PSC-MSC meeting pointed to several structural challenges on the form and function of the two organisations
The PSC held a meeting with all the RECs/RMs policy organs in 2019 to reflect on harmonisation/division of labour on joint decision-making processes. However, the first bilateral meeting between the PSC and a regional community was the PSC-MSC meeting in April 2024. The meeting points to several challenges in enhancing the PSC-RECs relationship, particularly alignment of decision-making processes and structures.
Obstacles to meaningful collaboration
The inaugural PSC-MSC meeting pointed to several structural challenges on the form and function of the two organisations. First the PSC and MSC are composed of and include representation at different levels. Whereas the PSC often meets at the level of ambassadors, the MSC ― although it has an ambassadorial arm ― often meets at the level of ministers of defence and foreign affairs. At the April meeting, the MSC was represented at ambassadorial level to allow for engagements on an equal footing with the PSC. This could be challenging given the knowledge gap among the ambassadors in Abuja who do not frequently attend MSC meetings, and where information flow between ambassadors and their capitals is hindered. Therefore, the trade-off to have ambassadorial representation could have had implications for the meetings’ discussions and outcomes.
Secondly, the PSC and MSC wield different powers and decision-making abilities. The PSC is the continent’s primary decision-making peace and security body. However, Article 6 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) declares the Authority of Heads of State and Government the highest ECOWAS decision-maker. Although the Authority mandates the MSC to take decisions on its behalf, it’s unclear to what extent it can do this, as the Authority is the final arbiter on peace and security issues in West Africa.
This could have significantly influenced the outcomes of the PSC-MSC meeting. Regardless of whether the MSC is represented at ambassadorial or ministerial level, concrete decisions on agenda items would have to be retabled at the Authority of Heads of State and Government sessions. This hampers both the MSC and PSC, which, despite being policy organs, sometimes depend on their capitals for decision-making.
As the PSC increases its engagement with regional actors, thematic issues and structural challenges must be considered
A third factor is permanent membership of the councils. The MSC, unlike the PSC, uses permanent members. Of the nine MSC member states, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Liberia are permanent. Whereas the MSC has a comparative advantage as there is continuity and central member states that drive its long-term agenda against the backdrop of protracted crises, the 15-seat PSC changes membership every two years. This changes the dynamics in both councils and alters the relationship among member states. In addition, given that the PSC includes representation from all five African regions, a deep and thorough situational and actor analysis of the West African region may be a further challenge for some PSC members.
The different structures, mandates and composition of the continental and regional policy regions could have significant implications on the frequency and outcomes of PSC-REC engagements. While it’s not entirely necessary for REC/RM structures to mirror the PSC, acknowledgement and mitigation of existing structural challenges are important. Where certain RECs/RMs may not have decision-making organs such as the PSC, they will have to grapple with modalities to collaborate meaningfully.
Moving ahead
The PSC and AU Commission should undertake a study to outline and map REC/RM structures to better understand differing compositions, functions and decision-making powers between the PSC and its regional equivalents. Thereafter, further engagement may lead to harmonised and aligned structures and, ultimately, decisions and outcomes.
As the PSC increases its engagement with regional actors, seeking to engage the Southern African Development Community policy organ next, thematic and substantive issues and structural challenges must be considered prior to the August meeting. After all, form and function are integral to successful substantive PSC-REC engagements and aligned decision-making processes and response.
