Reviewing AU peace support operations: what to do when there’s no peace to keep?
The PSC is faced with the difficult task of determining the future of its peace operations in Africa.
In May 2019 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) discussed the challenges faced by peace support operations (PSOs) led by the African Union (AU) and how to address them. In the same month, the PSC renewed the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was due to expire on 31 May 2019, for one additional year. The PSC also renewed for one additional year the mandate of the United Nations–African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in June, which the United Nations (UN) Security Council is due to discuss on 27 June.
The renewal of the mandates of AMISOM and UNAMID comes at a time when the number of troops in both missions is being reduced considerably as part of the gradual drawdown and eventual exit of both deployments, in 2020 and 2021 respectively. It also comes at a time when the AU is refocusing on the development of its PSO doctrine, which has been many years in the making.
The renewal of the mandates of AMISOM and UNAMID comes at a time when the number of troops in both missions is being reduced considerably
With these developments in sight, the PSC should not only evaluate the success or failure of these missions in terms of their respective mandates but also consider the lessons learned in each case. This can inform the development of the PSO doctrine and subsequent AU-led deployments.
It is important that the PSC look at prioritising existing political processes that can create an enabling environment allowing missions to succeed and, in these particular cases, be phased out.
In developing the PSO doctrine, the PSC should further consider under which circumstances the AU should get involved in counter-terrorism operations, as in Somalia through AMISOM. Involvement in such operations might make it difficult for the AU to later engage in mediation and peacebuilding efforts, especially after the exit of PSOs.
In developing the PSO doctrine, the PSC should further consider under which circumstances the AU should get involved in counter-terrorism operations
Also important is the need for the PSO doctrine to evaluate the value addition of using neighbouring countries in deployments where their participation is both decisive and a source of additional tension.
The dilemma of neighbours in PSOs
The involvement of neighbouring states in operations has always been a contentious issue in international PSOs in general and in AU-led missions in particular. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, various partners’ reservations about the involvement of troops from neighbouring countries, reiterated by UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006), were one of the main reasons the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) deployment in Somalia (IGASOM) never materialised.
The rationale behind ensuring that neighbours are not involved in such deployments is primarily to eliminate conflicts of interest where neighbouring countries have direct stakes in the conflict. In addition, this might prevent existing crises from spilling over into neighbouring states, as has been the case with Kenya’s deployment in Somalia.
Regardless of the contribution of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops to the overall achievements of AMISOM, it is clear that their presence has been counter-productive in some respects. While finding a viable alternative to neighbouring states is a challenge, it is nonetheless important when consolidating principles and practices in AU-led operations to dispassionately discuss the value addition of deploying frontline states in a theatre of operations next door.
Prioritising political processes
The UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report of 2015 states that ‘lasting peace is not achieved nor sustained by military and technical engagements, but through political solutions’. The biggest challenge PSOs such as AMISOM and UNAMID have faced since their deployment is whether the mission aligns with and works to support a functioning political process on which lasting peace can be built.
To what extent are governments ready to engage with actors that constitute the primary threat to peace and security, in this case al-Shabaab?
In Somalia, UN Security Council Resolution 2461 (2019) urged the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the federal member states to accelerate an inclusive political settlement. Yet, even if the relationship between federal member states and the central government is resolved, to what extent are governments ready to engage with actors that constitute the primary threat to peace and security, in this case al-Shabaab? While AMISOM might have helped to contain al-Shabaab, the mission’s planned exit through the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan means the FGS will have to take over full responsibility for ensuring the country’s security. This has not been possible since 2007, resulting in the repeated extension of AMISOM’s mandate.
This highlights the importance of ensuring political processes create the necessary national consensus on which to anchor peace and security in conflict situations.
While UNAMID has managed to stabilise the area it is impossible to bring about sustained peace without making political progress
Similarly, the government of Sudan and the Justice and Liberation Movement (JEM) signed the Doha Document for Peace in 2011, which was expected to end the conflict in Darfur. However, not all armed groups supported the agreement, which has created challenges for its implementation. While UNAMID has managed to stabilise the area compared to the situation in 2003, it is impossible to bring about sustained peace without making political progress.
As long as the political processes that should facilitate an end to conflicts face challenges, the context for the drawdown of PSOs remains fragile.
Countering violent extremism vs PSOs
AMISOM has morphed into a counter-terror operation. Its original mandate was to protect transitional federal institutions, key infrastructure, installations and equipment, and it had the right to use force in self-defence. Its evolution was necessitated by the nature of the al-Shabaab threat and the fact that the mission was only relevant to the extent that it could ensure the exit of the transitional federal institutions in Mogadishu. Counter-terrorism operations have increasingly become integral to the success of the mission.
The involvement of AMISOM in counter-terrorism operations and the overemphasis on military action have also raised questions about the AU’s impartiality in Somalia. This will affect to what extent the AU can engage in peacebuilding in Somalia following AMISOM’s planned exit in 2021.
Informing the AU’s PSO doctrine
The success of PSOs, as defined by the UN, rests on the core principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in cases of self-defence and the defence of the mandate. Adherence to these principles provides the basis for host communities to perceive the mission as legitimate and credible.
Currently, there is a lack of consensus on whether the AU should follow these UN principles, given that its current missions depart from them. This debate should be resolved in the process of developing the AU PSO doctrine. Clarification of its stand on principles will inform and help outline clear boundaries as to what support the AU is prepared to give peace enforcement and counter-terrorism operations in a way that sustains progress towards peace in a country. The AU’s stance on the UN’s principles will also determine how its PSOs engage neighbouring states in subsequent deployments.
The AU’s stance on the UN’s principles will also determine how its PSOs engage neighbouring states in subsequent deployments
In addition, the AU’s PSO doctrine should ensure that the deployment and exit strategies of PSOs consider the state and achievements of peace processes.
AMISOM and UNAMID have been deployed for more than a decade. Neither was expected to address the root causes of the conflict in the countries where they have been deployed. The cursory inclusion of a peacebuilding mandate in these PSOs is therefore not going to lead to the resolution of protracted conflicts when the missions exit. PSOs are temporary measures that allow the necessary conditions for political processes to be set up and thus must run concurrently with a strategy to put in place a political process.
The AU PSO doctrine should, most importantly, be informed by African realities and the aspirations of host communities facing protracted conflicts.
Picture: AMISOM
