PSC Interview: The G20 comes of age with Africa on board
ISS Executive Director, Fonteh Akum, discusses implications of the African Union’s G20 membership.
What is the significance of the AU joining the G20?
The now ‘G21’ is an important space for coordinated global policy responses to contemporary economic challenges that are increasingly interconnected, poly-causal and complex. These relate to trade, climate, pandemics and inflation. The more-inclusive G21 – comprising countries of different capabilities, levels and paces of economic growth – could advance equitable solutions to global problems with different manifestations and implications regionally, nationally and locally. This is particularly important given that the G20 itself was necessitated by the late-‘80s Asian financial crisis.
The AU enters the G21 representing 55 countries (with South Africa already a member), a combined gross domestic product of US$3.2 trillion and the third most populous region behind China and India. Africa is the youngest continent and a very vibrant one. It demonstrates robust economic growth potential.
According to the African Futures and Innovation programme of the ISS, on their current path, African economies will expand by an average of 4.5% from 2023 to 2043 compared to 2.3% for the rest of the world.
Beyond membership, how will the AU contribute to addressing global and multilateral challenges? What are the possible risks and benefits for the AU?
Africa is committed largely to multilateralism, while recognising the limitations of the current global governance system provides the impetus for its reform. Key benefits would derive from full participation and capacity to contribute to and influence policy debates and foster Africa’s collective and diverse interests.
The more-inclusive G21 could advance equitable solutions to global problems
The AU must contend with complex power dynamics, historical relations and protectionist tendencies that continue to highlight Africa’s economic challenges while investing in human and material resource extractive models that maintain global inequalities.
Therefore, a whole-of-AU approach will be necessary for the organisation to contribute and participate meaningfully at the G20. Since 2002, the AU has developed a normative and structural base (including a commission and network of agencies) well positioned to support the implementation of Agenda 2063 while contributing to multilateral innovation.
The combined capacity of the Department for Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry, Mining and the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat is the largest global free-trade agreement. The picture is similar for climate and macroeconomic issues.
Will the AU be the token of the global south and coordinate its positions?
The concept of the global south remains contested, with six of its countries already part of the G21. This engagement, and the European Union’s involvement as a union of countries, can inform AU participation. The AU would benefit from engaging according to the letter and spirit of its Constitutive Act. Africa’s diversity and the differentiated capabilities of countries in the southern hemisphere should foster more inclusivity in the approach to global problems.
The AU could be an important bridge-builder between inherently oppositional agendas and interests
As solutions might remain trapped in smart power dynamics, the AU would benefit from understanding and developing Africa’s smart power in influencing cooperative and win-win outcomes at the G21. Given the growing importance of and dependence on Africa as a trade, supply chain and human resource partner, the organisation could be an important bridge-builder between inherently oppositional agendas and interests.
Given that it represents 55 states, how will the AU formulate a common position and in which key areas?
A common position is essential for advancing African interests. But it is not unusual for member states to differ in positioning the continent on key global issues – with economic issues often slightly less contentious than security-political challenges. Therefore, formulating a common position is often consultative and coordinated, requiring painstaking negotiation, which the AU has deployed in the past. However, this requires tremendous human and material resources from the AU Commission.
Will G20 membership influence or expedite Africa’s inclusion as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?
There is no indication that it will, despite it being the rational approach to enhancing multilateral representation and fostering effective decision-making in a changing global context. The G20 and the United Nations are different entities birthed in different historical eras and by varying imperatives.
Do you think the G21 will change its positions on key issues such as debt sustainability and development finance?
Twenty-one low-income African countries are currently in debt distress, according to ONE Campaign. Debt servicing beyond the COVID-19 pandemic poses fundamental challenges to African states and societies, including progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. Beyond the G21, there is a need to fully reform the global financial architecture that advances credible and sustainable approaches to development financing for people and the planet.
