North Africa could benefit from a functioning regional organisation
Special focus on RECs: North Africa has been without a functional REC owing to the tensions between Algeria and Morocco.
The principle of subsidiarity at the African Union (AU) – the non-written rule that regional economic communities (RECs) should take the lead in solving conflicts in their region – is being put to the test in North Africa.
Attempts at solving the conflict in Libya would arguably have benefited from a strong regional organisation in North Africa; one that could exercise the powers and responsibilities that the principle of subsidiarity bestows. Yet the region is plagued by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco, as well as the absence of Egypt from its only REC, first created in 1989.
Attempts at solving the conflict in Libya would have benefited from a strong regional organisation in North Africa
Following the return of Morocco to the AU in 2017, hopes renewed that the stagnant Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) could be revived. AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, during a visit to Morocco in June 2018, raised the issue during his meetings – a possible sign that North Africa could, in time, get a functioning regional organisation. This would, among other issues, enable the deployment of the North African Regional Capacity (NARC) within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF).
Is there a REC in the North?
The main REC in North Africa is the AMU, founded 30 years ago in Morocco, with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia as members. While it was an attempt to unite the region amid political rivalry among member states, it has been weakened by accusations of meddling in one another’s domestic affairs and power contests over regional hegemony.
The AMU held its last high-level meeting in 2008 and lacks the capacity to take on any responsibilities
The AMU, which held its last high-level meeting in 2008, is inactive and lacks the capacity to take on any responsibilities at this stage. However, some developments in the region, such as Morocco’s return to the AU, could contribute to reviving the AMU. In addition, the change of government in both Algeria and Libya may have the potential to change the dynamics in the region for the better, and help with the reactivation of the AMU.
Still, the AMU faces challenges in terms of representation and legitimacy, as AU member states such as Egypt and Western Sahara are still not members. This will make it difficult for the AMU to represent the AU in the North, as it is not inclusive.
Competing and overlapping membership
AU member states in North Africa belong to multiple and overlapping RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). These include the AMU, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). None of the North African states is a member of only one REC.
AU member states in North Africa belong to multiple and overlapping RECs and Regional Mechanisms
Except for Algeria and Western Sahara, all North African states belong to the 29-member CEN-SAD. CEN-SAD, which was initiated and funded by former Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi, is facing various challenges following his overthrow in 2011.
CEN-SAD and COMESA both have mandates to address peace and security issues. However, many CEN-SAD and COMESA member states are from West, Central and East Africa, and thus are also members of other RECs that are further advanced in addressing these issues. This has resulted in a vacuum, since there is no functioning REC that takes primary responsibility for ensuring peace and stability in North Africa.
Such overlapping membership, mandates and priorities in RECs have also resulted in competition over priorities and stretched financial resources, particularly those collected from member states. This makes it difficult to implement a REC’s vision, especially relating to peace and security.
In this scenario, it is difficult to assign the division of labour not only between the AU and RECs but also among the RECs that operate in North Africa.
Mandate for peace and security intervention
The AMU was initially tasked with setting up the North African Standby Brigade as the region’s contribution to the ASF. However, it was unable to do so because Morocco was at the time not a member of the AU. This led to the establishment of NARC, which is based in Egypt and independent of any REC. It has never been deployed and it is unclear whether the AU or any REC commands NARC.
Morocco is still not a contributing member of NARC because Western Sahara – which is not recognised by Morocco – is a member. Morocco also has a seemingly tense relationship with Egypt. It criticised President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for leading a coup against the elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and is accused of ignoring Egypt’s call to join the AMU.
Thus, NARC will face challenges in getting the political support and commitment necessary to deploy a mission in a region beset with rivalries, and where member states have different political agendas.
Coherence of purpose and action with the AU
The principle of subsidiarity is clearly problematic, especially when the position taken by RECs contrasts with that of either the Peace and Security Council (PSC) or the AU Assembly, or when there is an apparent conflict of interest. These tensions have critical consequences for the coherence of purpose and action within Africa.
The principle of subsidiarity is clearly problematic, especially when there is an apparent conflict of interest
This is most apparent in situations where organisations outside Africa wield undue influence, such as the League of Arab States (LAS) in North Africa. In a move that illustrated the overall divisions in Africa over Libya, some Northern states’ rejection of the AU’s call for an ‘inclusive transition’ in Libya in favour of the LAS’s position, legitimised the military intervention in Libya in 2011.
This divergence is indicative of other challenges ahead. These stem from the diverging goals and aspirations of the AU and the LAS, especially in terms of the AU’s rejection of unconstitutional change of government. The LAS does not share this view, as illustrated by its earlier support for the removal of Gaddafi.
Overcoming the challenge of subsidiarity
The first step in applying the principle of subsidiarity in defining the division of labour between the AU and RECs – one of the aims of the AU reforms – is to define what it means in legal terms, when it can be applied and which organ decides its applicability. Clear policies and action plans should be developed that define which responsibilities RECs can implement independently, on both political and technical levels.
Clear policies should be developed that define which responsibilities RECs can implement independently
Such an articulation should ultimately overcome internal tensions and paradoxes that stem from the PSC Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs/RMs. These give primacy to the AU and RECs at the same time. Modalities on how to apply the principle of subsidiarity in situations where the position taken by a REC is in conflict with that taken by either the PSC or the AU Assembly, or when there is an apparent conflict of interest, should be articulated.
Thus, the division of labour between the AU and RECs/RMs should be defined based on tangible experience rather than hard-to-grasp principles.
The lessons learned so far in terms of AU–REC collaboration should inform the process of defining the division of labour
The lessons learned so far in terms of AU–REC collaboration should inform the process of defining the division of labour. The AU’s role as the lead organisation in policy-level decision-making and coordination should also be clarified in unambiguous terms.
For the principle of subsidiarity to be applied, there has to be a primary REC to take on the responsibility of safeguarding peace and stability. This will help in overcoming delays in responding to crisis situations. The AMU will thus have to take on the primary role as regional representative in North Africa. This will involve becoming more representative by overcoming the intra-regional rivalries that continue to weaken it. This is the only way the AMU will garner the legitimacy to be able to intervene in crises and to coordinate and command NARC in the event the PSC approves a peace mission.
This article is part of a special PSC Report focus on regional economic communities in the run-up to the AU Coordination Summit on 7–8 July 2019 in Niamey, Niger.
