Mutiny in Moscow a red flag
Wagner Group’s surprise turn on Russia in late June has raised uncertainty about the group’s role in African conflicts.
The surreal events of the Wagner Group mutiny and march on Moscow in late June – when the mercenary group turned on its creators – were watched around the world, not least by observers in Africa. Following the incident, the Kremlin announced it would take control of Wagner’s troops in Ukraine. Yet it remained uncertain what would happen to the group’s operations in Africa.
In the days that followed, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Wagner military operations in the Central African Republic and Mali would continue. Russian officials, according to United States (US) intelligence officials who briefed Washington Post journalists, reassured counterparts in African countries that Wagner troops would not be pulled out.
Yet what do these events mean for the African Union (AU) and its member states? Wagner has rapidly expanded its operations across Africa since its troops were first documented on the continent in late-2017. This was four decades after the 1977 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa.
The convention called on member states ‘to take all necessary measures to eliminate from the African continent the scourge that mercenarism represents’. Far from being ‘eliminated’, mercenarism – in the form of Wagner – is, according to the Russian official line, here to stay.
Defying definitions of a ‘mercenary group’
Wagner is not purely a mercenary organisation or at least does not exactly fit the traditional understanding of a mercenary group as texts such as the 1977 OAU convention set out. As described in these authors’ recent study for the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, Wagner is not only a provider of troops-for-hire. It is a set of interlinked military, economic and political influence operations now documented in almost a dozen African countries.
Following the June 2023 mutiny, Vladimir Putin told Russian lawmakers that the Kremlin bankrolled Wagner – to the tune of RUB86 billion (about US$1 billion) over the year to May 2023. This suggests it is a ‘state-backed’ mercenary group, as many have long suspected.
Investigations into the group have, for years, documented how it has acted as a ‘proxy’ for Kremlin interests abroad. Yet never before has this been so directly addressed by Russian leadership. State interests have likewise shaped Wagner’s operations in Africa. An internal Africa strategy document leaked in 2019 described how the organisation has two major aims: to make profit and to disrupt Western political interests overseas.
It is, therefore, also operating in some senses as a foreign military actor. In June 2016, the 601st meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed ‘deep concern’ about foreign military bases and oversight of arms flows to these forces. Wagner, which acts as a hybrid of foreign military and commercial actors, operates widely with no transparency over its actions and little accountability even to the African militaries with which it works.
Beyond contracts for military services, Wagner is also a network of other money-making entities, including companies involved in sectors such as mining and logging. Illicit economies form a significant part of this ‘Wagner business model’. The group has used its military presence and companies network to enforce control of resources such as mining and logging concessions and engage in large-scale smuggling of natural resources such as gold.
Footprints in Africa
Recent events have thrown Wagner’s future in Africa into question. However, looking at the first half of 2023 sheds light on its strategy. Since late January, much new information has come to light about Wagner in Africa, much from leaked documents. A hacking group obtained some from inside Wagner itself. The hacking group Anonymous obtained others from a law firm representing Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin. Yet more were leaked via US intelligence documents.
These and other sources show how Wagner has attempted to expand its military, economic and political presence, including its existing military deployments. As of late February, the group was advertising on Russian social media sites for new recruits, specifically for its African operations.
In Mali, Wagner increased its military capability in early-2023. Its troop numbers have increased to 1 645, according to internal messages intercepted by the US in late February. This is from a previous estimate of 1 000. It has also deployed new surface-to-air missile systems near Bamako, which bodies such as the US Federal Aviation Administration and an Air France trade union have viewed as a risk to aviation.
Other sources suggest that before the mutiny, Wagner was looking to expand its military presence to new countries. For example, there are suggestions that it has been attempting to gain a foothold in Burkina Faso. A leaked US intelligence document reported that an Ivorian official (whose message was intercepted) referred to a Wagner presence in the country. This came after similar claims made by Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo in late-2022.
There has yet been no clear evidence of its presence in Burkina Faso, although it has long had eyes on the country. In January 2022, in the aftermath of a military coup, the Community of Officers for International Security, a Wagner front company, publicly offered ‘military instructors’ to the coup leaders.
Before June 2023, Wagner seemed to be expanding and entrenching its presence across Africa. If the Kremlin succeeds in its apparent ambition to wrest control of it in its entirety, it remains in its political interests to expand Russian interests further via the mercenary group. If, somehow, Prigozhin keeps control of Wagner’s military operations, expanding the group’s presence in Africa remains in his economic and political interest.
Reining in Wagner in Africa
The US took advantage of the uncertain moment following the mutiny to ratchet up sanctions on Wagner, targeting four companies linked to its African gold-smuggling operations. This is the latest round of sanctions against the group and its affiliates since the US designated it a ‘transnational criminal organisation’ in January 2023.
Other Western countries have taken different sanctions approaches. The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom have sanctioned the group based on its widespread human rights abuses. France, meanwhile, has called on the EU to define it as a terrorist organisation. This calls into question how the African Union and its member states respond to counter the threat of Wagner’s increased presence in Africa.
The 1977 OAU convention binds all parties to prohibit mercenary activity or the activities of any person or organisation using mercenaries on their territory. However, some countries that have contracted Wagner troops, such as Mali or Mozambique (which previously hosted Wagner troops), are not signatories to the convention. The AU Commission, PSC, the Legal Council, and all relevant actors should regularly table such discussions on the Council’s agenda and encourage member states to ratify the convention. The 1997 convention should also ideally be updated to reflect new forms, definitions, and operations of mercenary groups currently operating in Africa.
The PSC’s sanctions sub-committee has powers to implement sanctions in specific cases and could potentially be used to counter Wagner’s presence on the continent once the committee is operational. Whatever Wagner’s future in Africa, the mutiny showed its African partners how uncertain and volatile a security ally it can be. The AU and other member states could encourage countries associated with Wagner to abandon the mercenary model.
