Multilateralism takes centre stage at 36th AU summit
During the African Union summit in February, leaders sought consensus on a raft of global and continental concerns.
The 36th African Union (AU) summit, on 18 and 19 February 2023, was staged on an increasingly polarised global landscape due to the war in Ukraine. It also followed a year of intensive vying by international actors for Africa’s support and was set against multiple continental crises and conflicts.
Ahead of the summit, expectations were raised of a possible pronouncement on several African states’ ‘non-aligned’ stance on the Ukraine war. The AU managed to avert robust discussion about the Russian invasion that has seen African countries divided at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Instead, the focus was on the economic impact of the war. African countries have been heavily affected by the scarcity of grain and other agricultural products normally imported from Russia and Ukraine.
Many African countries are looking to the AU to coordinate responses, as it did in 2022. AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and former AU chairperson Macky Sall travelled to Russia to discuss the blockade of goods exported from the region.
Among the issues debated were the instability and uncertainty caused by the crisis and how Africa can confront this in an unfair global financial system. There were calls for ‘a new debt relief moment’ for Africa and the accent was placed on the African Continental Free Trade Area, the AU theme for 2023. While countries shied away from taking sides on the war, summit decisions strongly reflected Africa’s role in the international system.
Bid for a greater say
Africa’s bid for G20 membership and its renewed call for reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) indicated the continent’s quest for a greater say in world affairs. According to the draft decisions of the summit, the outgoing chairperson is to continue efforts to secure the G20 seat. Several countries, including South Africa – which is already a member – support this. If it is granted, the AU Commission Chairperson and the rotating AU chair are likely to represent the continent.
Summit decisions strongly reflected Africa’s quest for a greater role in the international system
Membership is not without its challenges. While the continent has been able to find common positions on issues such as the fight against COVID-19, climate change and migration, it doesn’t have a continental foreign policy. This remains the domain of national governments.
AU reforms, led by Rwandan President Paul Kagame, aim to streamline Africa’s foreign engagements and ensure that the AU takes charge of co-organising engagements with outside powers. AU membership of the G20 would arguably be a successful outcome of these efforts, since it would show that member states are behind the AU as Africa’s voice in the world.
However, it would be difficult for the AU to speak on behalf of the continent about issues on which member states are divided. At best, it can coordinate and attempt to find common positions where African countries are in agreement.
Calls for permanent African representation on the UNSC have been ongoing since the time of the Organisation of African Unity. This year, however, with renewed recognition of Africa’s numerical advantage in the UN General Assembly, the campaign to grant Africa a permanent seat gained new impetus.
The summit decided to give the Committee of Ten Heads of State, led by Sierra Leone President Julius Maada Bio, more means to lobby. Mention was made by some of the speakers at the summit that Africa should try to gain at least one permanent seat. This might be more realistic if the current UNSC configuration of permanent seats with veto rights is to remain. However, the AU’s official position, the Ezulwini Consensus, is that Africa demands two permanent and five non-permanent seats.
Africa's push for UNSC reform, however, needs the buy-in of current permanent members and agreement in Africa on who will hold the seats. Change has not advanced sufficiently to entice the AU to take a position and make clear its preference for a seat. It might be necessary for a vote, which the AU has rarely done in the past. Most other issues are resolved – or not resolved – through consensus.
A third seat for North Africa?
Consensus has, in fact, been impossible to reach at certain junctures. The AU started 2023 with a bureau limping along because of the impasse on the deputy chairship and on who will be the 2024 AU chair. The deputy chair of the bureau usually becomes the chairperson in the following year.
It is the turn of North Africa after East Africa to chair the organisation. However, both Morocco and Algeria are contesting the position and have been unable to compromise. Egypt was chair in 2019, but has also been mentioned as a compromise candidate. Another option would be to shift the chairship of Southern Africa, planned for 2025 to 2024.
West Africa is unlikely to relinquish a PSC seat, which would mean increasing the number of seats
Another outstanding issue is the reform of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). North Africa, which has only two seats on the 15-member council, is claiming its rightful third seat. West Africa currently has four seats and eastern, Southern and Central Africa each have three seats.
When the PSC was founded in 2004, not all North African countries had ratified the PSC Protocol and Morocco was not a PSC member. The summit couldn’t reach agreement on whether West Africa would cede its fourth seat to North Africa or whether total membership should increase to allow for a more equitable regional distribution.
Consultations will now be ongoing until the next meeting of the executive council in July this year. West Africa, however, is unlikely to relinquish a seat, which would mean increasing the number of PSC seats is the more likely of the two scenarios.
Funding peacemaking
African countries’ commitment to multilateralism and to their own organisation, the AU, is tested by funding. The 2015 self-funding decision committed member states to fund 100% of operations, 75% of programmes and 25% of the continent’s peacekeeping budget. However, more than 66% of the 2023 budget of US$655 million will be funded by donors. This means the AU is not fully in charge of decisions on its own activities, which tarnishes its credibility among citizens.
There has, however, been some progress, with the AU Peace Fund having reached close to the US$400 million target. Member states must now see the fund being used. At the summit, a decision was made that the Peace Fund’s crisis reserve facility be made available at US$5 million and constantly replenished.
Over 66% of the 2023 budget is funded by donors meaning the AU is not fully in charge of its activities
The first disbursement requested by the PSC at its meeting on 17 February will co-fund the East African force in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The facility will also bridge this year’s gap in salaries for the African Union Transition Mission for Somalia.
It is important for the AU to have the means to solve crises and conflicts, with international partners such as the UN. It is essential that citizens see that member states are financially committed to the organisation.
Having enough funding for peacemaking activities would assist the AU with crucial interventions such as beefing up the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement on Ethiopia, supporting UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily and the reconciliation conference for Libya. It would also help coordinate the many parallel peace efforts in the Great Lakes region and send the Panel of the Wise to the Central African Republic and Chad, in line with the decisions of the summit, to investigate possible mediation.
Stricter deadlines
Member states are also setting stricter deadlines. The PSC has given the AU Commission six weeks to finalise access to the Peace Fund. The AU Assembly has given its reform unit only six months to wrap up its activities, which is rare for an organisation that tends to let things slide from year to year.
While these major aspects of the summit clearly show continental leaders’ commitment to multilateralism at a time when this is under pressure globally, this has to be matched by concrete action. This includes paying dues and ensuring the AU is financially self-sustainable.
More decisive action is needed to solve conflicts on a continent where people are yearning for the peaceful and prosperous home envisaged in Agenda 2063. While leaders are committed to finding answers through multilateral relations, citizens are asking tough questions on the utility of continental institutions amid worsening economic and security situations.
