MINUSMA withdrawal: an opportunity to showcase African Union leadership
A holistic approach to restoring stability using military and non-military measures could fill mission gap in transitional Mali.
On 30 June, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to end the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 31 December 2023. MINUSMA was deployed in July 2013 in response to the 2012 occupation of armed groups in northern Mali. The vote followed a request by Mali’s transitional government for the mission to be withdrawn ‘without delay’.
In May 2022, before the request, the country withdrew from the G5 Sahel regional response framework. Soon after, French-led Barkhane and Takuba forces departed the country. The end of MINUSMA, therefore, seen as a separate occurrence, is another step in what seems a systematic move to dismantle the international security response to insecurity in Mali and the Sahel.
Malian dissatisfaction
Cracks between Mali’s capital, Bamako and Paris over the liberation of Kidal appeared as early as January 2013. After jointly liberating the towns of Gao and Timbuktu and surrounding areas, which had been occupied by armed terrorist groups, the French army prevented Malian troops from entering Kidal. The Malians perceived this decision as support to the Tuareg rebel groups.
But the active deconstruction of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms was triggered by Mali’s realignment with Russia after the country’s second coup, in May 2021, and the ensuing diplomatic crisis with France. Mali’s decision to explore new military alliances reflects dissatisfaction with partnerships forged over the past decade.
The withdrawal of MINUSMA paves the way for more assertive leadership in addressing the Sahel crisis
Diplomatic and geopolitical tensions – exacerbated by polarisation between the West and Russia over the Ukraine war – have also tested Mali’s regional partnerships. Most affected were relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and G5 Sahel. Mali’s transitional authorities perceive both bodies as being under French influence. This is due to strong French involvement in G5 Sahel’s set-up and functioning and the proximity between key ECOWAS heads of state and French authorities.
France’s lead in the UN mission’s political and military set-up and its position as the UN Security Council penholder on the Malian situation have fed successive Malian governments’ suspicions about the mission. As a result, the transitional authorities denounced the West’s politicisation of human rights issues after civilian deaths and abuses by Malian Armed Forces since 2022. Also in play are limitations in MINUSMA’s military mandate, which provided mainly for stabilisation and didn’t meet the country’s counter-terrorism objectives.
Implications of withdrawal
Mali’s demand for the withdrawal of MINUSMA carries significant political, security and humanitarian risks for the country and the region. Although the government seems confident in its ability to assume full control post-MINUSMA, a clearly defined alternative strategy is needed.
At this stage, enhanced military cooperation with Russia and bilateral collaboration with some immediate neighbours seem to be at the heart of Mali’s strategy. However, the authorities must remember that solutions from outside Africa entailing financial or technical dependency come with constraints that could affect their durability and effectiveness.
The withdrawal of MINUSMA paves the way for more assertive leadership of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS in addressing the Sahel crisis. It allows for constructive redefinition of multilateral relations in a region that has seen damaging institutional rivalries among the UN, AU, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel and, to a lesser extent, the Accra Initiative.
The Sahel region is at a crossroads and will find it hard to withstand the shock of another decade of instability. These African organisations must act on the lessons learnt from 10 years of intervention and from their actions when the crisis started.
In the early days, the AU and ECOWAS effectively steered political dialogue among Malian actors and mobilised troops to recover the country’s occupied regions. But they were sidelined in the organisation and management of the political and military response in 2013. Amid a leadership struggle, the UN Security Council favoured MINUSMA over the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).
Tripartite committee
Strategically, the AU should set up a tripartite committee with ECOWAS and the UN to jointly manage the post-MINUSMA transition and optimally distribute tasks among the organisations. The committee should also proactively preempt regional consequences in Burkina Faso, Niger and coastal countries. It could be supported by a technical secretariat and consider the participation of existing ad-hoc security support structures such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission, G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative as needed.
AU and ECOWAS must listen to Mali’s needs despite its suspension from these organisations
Aligned with the African Peace and Security Architecture – hinged on subsidiarity, comparative advantages and circumstances – the AU should work closely with ECOWAS, with its appropriate framework for tackling regional challenges. Managing recurring coups and insecurity linked to violent extremist groups has taken a toll on regional and multilateral cooperation. Now might be the last opportunity to get it right, considering upcoming high-level panel report recommendations and Sahel security and development led by former Niger president Mahamadou Issoufou.
Political will required
Building on 10 years of lessons from international intervention in the Sahel, it is crucial that both the AU and ECOWAS assist as they engage with Malian authorities on the way forward. They must listen to Mali’s needs despite its suspension from these organisations. Military transitional authorities in Burkina Faso and Guinea, which have common borders with Mali, should follow suit.
In supporting regional efforts, the AU, through its Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), should prioritise a political approach to stabilise the short-term political and security situation. MISAHEL does, however, need financial and human resources and a clear mandate from the AU’s Peace and Security Council.
This political approach should be twofold. First, the AU with ECOWAS should muster diplomatic resources to support international mediation by Algeria. The goal would be to resume the 2015 Algiers peace and reconciliation agreement. Algeria’s election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council as of January 2024 will facilitate these efforts.
Secondly, the AU should aid in resuming Mali’s high-level dialogue with its neighbours, designating an African political figure to further this. This could restore confidence among West African states and revitalise their regional security cooperation.
Should Mali consent to deploy the ECOWAS Standby Force, the AU could share its experience and lessons in the AU Mission in Somalia or Lake Chad Basin regional stabilisation strategy. This would be ECOWAS’s first counter-terrorism and stabilisation operation since AFISMA and may include providing military and political advisers who have served in or contributed to similar processes. Regional military operations should be planned and undertaken jointly and legally with Malian Armed Forces. Building and maintaining trust are key.
Early warning and information sharing
The AU should advocate a holistic approach to the fight against terrorism and consider using the AU Inter-regional Knowledge Exchange platform or setting up a framework for exchanging experiences to improve counter-terrorism responses beyond kinetic operations.
In addition to military interventions, non-military measures are needed, such as incentivising combatants to disengage from violent extremists, which can also be weakened by targeting their supply and funding chains. To this end, the AU could revive the Nouakchott process, a collaborative mechanism for intelligence agencies and more efficient pooling of military and security resources.
Image: © MINUSMA/Harandane Dicko
