Libyan talks raise hopes of reunification
The recent talks in Bouznika, Morocco have laid the foundations to kickstart the reunification of Libya.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), on 15 September 2020, renewed the mandate of its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This followed talks between the two rival Libyan administrations – the Tobruk-based Parliament led by Aguila Saleh and loyal to Khalifa Haftar, and the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli.
The negotiations, held from 6–10 September in Bouznika, Morocco, resulted in a compromise between these two main factions, and are therefore touted as a success. However, it remains to be seen whether the Bouznika talks will have a positive impact, unlike the Skhirat Agreement, which saw the formation of the GNA and the advent of Sarraj as prime minister.
Many hurdles still to clear
Libya today is back where it was before Haftar launched a crusade in April 2019 to conquer Tripoli and take over the reins of the country. While this is preferable to the fighting that has lasted more than a year, much remains to be done to allow the country to heal.
Libya today is back where it was before Haftar launched a crusade in April 2019 to conquer Tripoli and take over the reins of the country
The Bouznika talks have laid the foundations to kickstart the reunification of Libya. The compromise seeks to usher in a transitional period where the Tobruk administration and the Tripoli GNA will work together. In addition, the new transitional authorities will have representatives from the country’s three main historical regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.
A similar proposal had been made following the signing of the Paris Accord between Libyan belligerents in May 2018, which aimed for a speedy move towards elections by December 2018. At the time Prof. Moncef Djaziri of the Lausanne Institute of Political Studies recommended a two-year transition period that would address all outstanding issues and set the country on a path to durable peace.
The proposal included a two-year political transition whereby Libya would be run by a dual executive power consisting of a triumvirate of respected figures from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. This presidential council would be supported by a government of technocrats.
Their mission would be to reunify state institutions; rebuild a professional national army; secure the country’s natural resources; finalise the constitutional reform process leading to a new constitution for Libya; prepare and pass a new electoral law; and plan and conduct an electoral process that would ultimately lead to a transfer of power to elected authorities.
This executive power would be supported by consultative institutions such as an assembly of ethnic groups and an assembly of civil society, Djaziri said.
These are, in essence, the main outstanding issues all Libyan sides must agree to work on.
This is particularly pressing in a context where the Libyan people have grown increasingly frustrated with the protracted instability and fighting, in the face of a state that has disintegrated and is failing to provide basic services.
Citizens have had enough of long-running blackouts, the rising cost of living and a hard currency shortage in a substantially cash-based economy
Citizens have had enough of long-running blackouts, the rising cost of living and a hard currency shortage in a substantially cash-based economy. They are running out of patience with the seeming inability of either the Tobruk or the Tripoli government to respond to their needs while embroiled in a war that is causing or exacerbating these ills.
Protests have erupted in Tripoli and Tobruk against the governments in each city. As a result, the Tobruk government has resigned. On 16 September Sarraj also announced that he would be leaving at the end of October to allow transitional institutions to begin their tenure.
Controlling the country’s resources
The Libyan situation has been complicated by two factors: the battle for access to and control of the country’s resources; and the internationalisation of the civil war.
The issues around access and control of resources are best illustrated by Haftar’s eight-month blockade of Libya’s oil installations and ports in the east of the country. Oil exports were effectively halted and the economy crippled, with the local currency weakened, revenue losses of nearly US$ 10 billion, and dire consequences for energy generation and provision for the Libyan people.
On 18 September Haftar announced an end to the blockade, but demanded that certain conditions be met for it to be effective: oil revenues (controlled by the GNA) must be distributed equitably and the money not used to support terrorism. This followed negotiations in Russia between GNA representative Ahmed Miitig (vice-president of the Tripoli presidential council) and Capt. Khaled Khalifa Haftar (Haftar’s son).
The question of resources is central to the emerging transition, since internal and external interests in terms of accessing and controlling Libya’s resources do not always align. In addition, the war economy that has developed in the country, with transnational organised crime and terrorism taking centre stage, further complicates the restoration of state authority over the whole territory.
Problematic internationalisation of the conflict
The internationalisation of the Libyan conflict is well documented and poses a serious threat to its resolution. This is demonstrated not only by the military and/or armed support Libyan belligerents receive from their various allies, but also from whom they seek services.
A good example is the existence in Libya of what Djaziri qualifies as two de facto central banks, with Sadek El Kebir the bank’s governor in Tripoli and his counterpart Mohamed Al-Shukri in Benghazi. Tripoli’s bank notes are printed in the United Kingdom and Benghazi’s in Russia.
The vested interests of external actors in the Libyan status quo are an obvious issue when those same actors take part in the international forums meant to resolve the crisis. Similarly, the multiplicity of platforms aiming to broker peace in Libya has fragmented the peace process through competing initiatives.
The contradictory – if not irreconcilable – interests of external actors add to the country’s internal divisions, to the detriment of peace, stability and prosperity for the Libyan people.
Even discussions at the UN, and its resolutions, are interfered with, given these conflicts of interest. This is why the African Union (AU) has been striving for a little over a year, without much success, to take the lead in the political process in Libya.
The recent Bouznika talks under Moroccan stewardship should be part of or followed by a more global African initiative
The recent Bouznika talks under Moroccan stewardship, although beneficial in many respects, should be part of or followed by a more global African initiative. Such an initiative should put an end to the many parallel peace processes on Libya in order to minimise the resultant fragmentation.
At the same time, the AU should only get involved if it is with the consent of the Libyan parties, which will also have to free themselves from external influences that do not act in the best interests of Libyans. From this perspective, collaboration between the AU and the UN on the Libyan dossier is crucial.
Ultimately, it will be up to Libyans themselves to overcome their grievances in order to rebuild their country and put an end to years of suffering.
