Leveraging FOCAC for regional connectivity in Africa
The AU and RECs could collaborate to drive forward and ensure equal benefits from the China-Africa partnership.
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4 to 6 September, President Xi Jinping declared that China-Africa relations are at their ‘best in history’. This bold statement was accompanied by a US$50.7 billion pledge to unlock regional infrastructure, trade and security opportunities.
However, the forum underscored the need for more robust African agency and regional coordination. The crucial questions remain: who drives regional coordination and how does African agency look in infrastructure development?
Multilateral institutions
In the initial years of FOCAC, African countries primarily engaged with China bilaterally, while African Union (AU) involvement was minimal and largely symbolic. Many projects were country-specific, with limited cooperation across countries and regional economic communities (RECs). However, by 2011, the AU Commission (AUC) had formally joined FOCAC as a full member, marking a turning point for Africa's continental-level engagement with China.
Regionally, the story still looks a little different. RECs are not formal members of FOCAC, but their chairpersons often attend summits. China and African countries have yet to find a suitable way to involve RECs, which are a key element of African multilateralism. Particularly when creating regional value-chains, African countries could benefit from aligning China’s plans with REC programmes.
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Chart 1: Key FOCAC outcomes
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This year once again highlighted the alignment between China’s global initiatives and AU Agenda 2063, including its second 10-year implementation plan and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These initiatives include the Belt and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative. The synergy between China’s capabilities and Africa’s needs, at least on the surface, remains evident. This was reaffirmed in the Beijing Action Plan (2025 to 2027).
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Chart 2: China’s global initiatives
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Balancing bilateral and continental priorities
There is a continuous balancing act between continental development priorities that will be most beneficial in the long run and short-term economic gains by individual states. Although there were positive developments at FOCAC, much remains to be done to ensure that the relationship is conducive to the continent’s long term goals.
For example, one key focus at this year’s summit was cooperation in national and regional infrastructure investment. China's pledge to 30 new infrastructure projects aligns with the needs of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. These pledges include railways, roads and energy projects to enhance regional connectivity and promote cross-border trade.
Many projects were country-specific with limited regional cooperation
Developing a sea-rail transport network linking Africa’s east coast ports with China’s inland regions is set to reduce transportation costs and boost exports for East African Community (EAC) member states. Similarly, a memorandum of understanding was signed at FOCAC to upgrade the Tanzania-Zambia railway, a crucial transport corridor linking the EAC and the Southern African Development Community.
These infrastructure projects will develop regional value chains to unlock Africa’s potential. At the same time, they will generate some rivalry between China and other external partners that want to maximise their share of the African market.
Growing debt burden
The flipside of infrastructure investment is accompanying debt for African countries. Although China is not the primary cause of African states’ debt distress, the Chinese lending model has negative consequences on the continent’s fiscal health. Although there have been promising steps toward more sustainable financing – such as China's ‘small is beautiful’ initiative, which focuses on smaller, high-impact development projects – these efforts alone aren’t enough.
At FOCAC 2024, Beijing committed to waiving intergovernmental interest-free loans due by the end of 2024 for least-developed African countries with diplomatic ties to China. While this is a welcome gesture, interest-free loans represent a relatively small fraction of China's total lending to Africa.
The former’s financing comes through concessional loans, credit lines or commercial loans, which often carry significant interest and repayment obligations. The relatively concealed nature of this debt poses a problem of accountability, particularly during power alternation when new authorities are appraised of the nature of China’s loans.
The AUC formally joined FOCAC as a full member in 2011 marking a turning point for Africa's engagement with China
The China-Africa trade relationship saw a similar balancing act at FOCAC. While China’s trade facilitation measures, such as zero tariffs on agricultural products, are positive, much remains to be done to lessen the US$64 billion China-Africa trade deficit.
Similarly, FOCAC saw a pledge to create one million jobs for Africans over the next three years. Although this is an encouraging development, it has to be weighed against local discontent at job losses due to Chinese firms displacing African competitors.
Leveraging FOCAC
The AU's collective bargaining power is directly linked to the division of labour between member states and the AU Commission. It is also related to the autonomy governments are ready to lend to RECs and the Commission on regional infrastructure and trade. As with Africa’s relations with external partners, governments and regional organisations are often at the receiving end of other actors’ ambitions.
China has its China-Africa Vision 2035 and while African stakeholders were consulted on this, it is not uniquely African, nor are African perspectives fully represented. The AU and most African countries do not have a similar strategy for China.
Much remains to be done to lessen the US$64 billion China-Africa trade deficit
However, strategies are no silver bullet and the AUC has developed many that remain poorly implemented. The AU’s entry into the G20 and the increasing demand for AU involvement in international matters require strategic thinking and operational finesse backed by substantial political will.
Institute for Security Studies research suggests that it is in the long-term interests of African countries to navigate global power shifts by partnering with all big and medium powers and leveraging comparative advantages. The AU and RECs can increase Africa’s bargaining power only if they are properly mandated and adequately resourced by member states.
FOCAC is one of several partnerships in which the AU has been involved. The Executive Council, through the Permanent Representative Committee sub-committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation, has played an important role in guiding the AUC on how partnerships should be managed.
The difficult development of the AU Partnership Strategy and Policy Framework reflects the complex articulation of national, regional and continental interests, which are at stake in the FOCAC framework. The good news is that both the committee and the AUC have vowed to create a foreign policy role for the AU through a learning-by-doing approach.
For the AUC and member states, the most important challenge is to break the donor-recipient relationship that has created complacency among African actors. This will require going beyond a general partnership strategy to formulate more case-specific strategies.
The PSC must guide the evolution of the China-Africa security relationship in the coming years
Currently, the AU is subject to its partners’ strategies, so far having failed to create its own. This lack of strategy development capacity is equally present among RECs and even nationally. This reflects an African structural weakness that distorts the three layers of African multilateralism and seriously increases the risks of duplication, competition and conflict.
Implications for the PSC
As the highest decision-making body of the AU on peace and security, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) should increase its involvement in the conflict-prevention role of economic development and trade. In light of expanding security ties through FOCAC and the GSI, it’s important that the PSC guide the evolution of the China-Africa security relationship in the coming years.
This could ensure that peace and security efforts complement infrastructure projects, fostering not just economic growth but long-term regional stability.
Progress requires national, regional and continental evidence-informed action. While maintaining the short-term economic gains of bilateral negotiations with China, African countries should increasingly consider building the long-term regional value chains envisioned in PIDA.
RECs could broaden their role in FOCAC, while the AU must leverage its bargaining power to secure more equitable outcomes rather than settling for partial wins or initiatives driven from outside the continent. China benefits significantly from its partnership with African countries, which deserve equal gains. The key lies in empowering regional organisations to drive a unified, strategic approach to these relationships.
