Fifteen coveted Peace and Security Council seats up for grabs

The Council will have its work cut out for it in 2022 and beyond.

Published on 03 February 2022 in PSC Insights

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PSC Report

As the African Union (AU) hosts its 35^th summit on 5 and 6 February 2022, a key outcome will be the election of the 15 members of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). The five seats carrying a three-year tenure and the 10 with a two-year term are all due for renewal.

The PSC has grappled recently with crucial situations such as the upsurge in unconstitutional changes of government, violent extremism and climate change. Notwithstanding its important role in managing these and its commitment to resolving Africa’s peace and security problems, the Council has had limited impact on the governance challenges underlying African insecurity.

The election will determine whether the AU’s decision-making body will attract the necessary critical mass of member states with the commitment and resolve to address the continent’s challenges, including governance.

Contenders for seats

Although the PSC comprises 15 members, the contest for membership from different states indicates growing recognition by AU member states and partners of the importance of the Council’s work. Generally, the desire for a Council seat is driven either by a commitment by AU members to participate in decision-making during crises or an attempt to ensure that national issues are tabled for discussion or avoided. 

Will the Council attract member states with the commitment and resolve to address challenges?

Over the past three years, the PSC has delivered crucial decisions on situations in Sudan, Mali and Chad, among others. It has also avoided committing itself to pressing matters such as those of Cameroon. By mid-January 2022, 22 countries had expressed intentions to represent regions of the continent on the Council. 

The east had the most contenders, with seven countries competing for the region’s three seats. Of the current eastern members, Ethiopia and Djibouti intend to remain on the Council, while Kenya is set to exit.

Ethiopia’s willingness to stay on may be partly attributed to its appreciation of the PSC’s potential influence in that country’s current situation. Djibouti would use its term to continue advancing its position as a key diplomatic player in many African multilateral engagements. Other eastern countries seeking a seat are Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Mauritius and Eritrea, while South Sudan withdrew from the race, thus suggesting that PSC seats have become much coveted.

Morocco and Tunisia are set to occupy the northern region’s two available spots. This follows Libya’s withdrawal.

Competition emerged for the West African bloc’s four seats. Three current members ― Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria ― wish to remain on the Council. Nigeria, having occupied the three-year seat uninterruptedly since 2004, owing to an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) internal agreement, will certainly retain its position. Burkina Faso and The Gambia are also contenders.

By mid-January, 22 countries had expressed intentions to represent regions on the Council

However, the PSC’s sanctioning and suspension of Burkina Faso means that the country does not fulfil  Article 5 of the protocol establishing the PSC and cannot contest. The move followed developments that led to the overthrow by the military of then-president Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Thus, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia are therefore expected to occupy the region’s four seats. Should Senegal be re-elected, it will be both an AU chair for 2022 and a PSC member.

Central Africa’s current PSC members are Burundi, Cameroon and Chad, all of which intend to remain. Cameroon and Chad are vying for the three-year term; their motivations are possibly linked to the domestic situations over which they want to retain tight control at Council level. The Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Burundi are contesting the two-year seats, the first two having left the Council in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

Ghana, having tabled Ethiopia despite the latter’s Council membership, has set a precedent that if Council members want to table member countries for discussion, there are ways of circumventing resistance. 

Southern Africa has internally settled on South Africa, Namibia and Zambia to join the Council. This will be a complete rotation of the three southern African seats, consistent with the equitable regional representation and rotation of the protocol establishing the PSC. The southern region has consistently made final decisions regionally on its representatives before the meeting of the Executive Council of ministers, which makes the decision on PSC members. The decision is then endorsed by the summit of heads of state. 

Council dynamics

PSC dynamics will be shaped by its composition and influenced by the internal challenges and regimes of members. The southern region’s regimes appear more stable and open. This means that they should, in principle, not have a problem tabling countries’ internal issues, including good governance and the rule of law, which typically do not make it onto the Council’s agenda.

The PSC will be greatly pressured to be more proactive and decisive in the next few years

West Africa, despite violent extremism and recent military coups in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, is sending to the Council countries seen as addressing internal governance challenges. ECOWAS is, in fact, reviewing its protocol on democracy and good governance, which is expected to lead to amendments to better tackle unconstitutional (civilian and military) changes of government and inadequate governance. Southern and western Africa may, therefore, be less reluctant to place contested matters on the agenda as Ghana did the Ethiopian situation in 2021.

Conversely, the AU and some regional economic communities (RECs), including the Southern African Development Community, have not seen eye-to-eye on several occasions. The possibility that some Council members could table contested issues may be offset by differing views or competition between the AU and a REC. Subsidiarity and the claim to sovereignty may also be raised in a way as to become obstacles to an active, let alone decisive, PSC. 

The equation is also more complex with the eastern, central and even northern regions. Depending on eastern countries elected, the Council may be closer to tabling ‘controversial’ issues, or there may be more of the same as seen at the PSC in 2021. The central and northern regions may continue to counter balance a more decisive and bold Council.

Difficult challenges to tackle

While the above dynamics are likely, the PSC will, in 2022, be greatly pressured to be more proactive and decisive in addressing the continent’s numerous governance, peace and security challenges. It will have to contend with the ‘transitions’ in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. These and the coups in West Africa (four in the past two years) create the fear of more coups in the region, as evidenced by the attempted coup in Guinea Bissau on 1 February.

The Council will have to continue dealing with instability in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya and Somalia. It will also be expected to address the threat of violent extremism across the continent as the need grows to strengthen Africa’s peace and security and governance architectures.

Photo: Gustavo de Carvalho/ISS