Enhancing the framework on mercenarism in Africa
An effective framework should consider the evolution of private military actors and ensure coordinated implementation.
Over the last decade, Africa has witnessed a resurgence of mercenarism on its soil. It is difficult to establish the number of mercenaries on the continent due to their often-shadowy activities. However, the worsening situation results from the increasing number of member states that have resorted to mercenaries to enhance their capacity to deal with violent extremists.
In December 2020, the acting United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Stephanie Williams, informed the third virtual meeting of the second round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum that the country harboured about 20 000 foreign forces and/or mercenaries in Libya alone.
In 2022, an estimated 1 200 to 2 000 mercenaries supported Central African Republic (CAR) armed forces. Mali has followed a similar approach, with nearly 1 645 contractors as of April 2023. The presence of mercenaries has also been recorded in Mozambique, Sudan and Burkina Faso. Compared to the small groups — between 50 and 500 per intervention — assigned to short and sporadic missions in the early days of Africa’s experience with mercenaries, this has been a steady increase.
More states have resorted to mercenaries to enhance their capacity to deal with violent extremists
The ongoing regional multilateralism crisis and the unreadiness of security mechanisms such as the African Standby Force has led to increasing reliance on ‘private’ military contractors. These contractors’ functions range from training troops and advising in Burkina Faso and Niger to direct combat involvement in Mali and CAR. These functions have made them increasingly attractive to the governments of these nations, where groups such as Wagner are used openly.
While these countries argue that such arrangements offer positive outcomes in their search for peace, recent killings of citizens by mercenaries have raised concerns about disregard for human rights norms during operations. Brutal and indiscriminate use of force has resulted in significant civilian casualties in countries in which mercenaries operate, particularly northern Mali and CAR.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has repeatedly discussed the threat to Africa’s stability and norms posed by the resurgence of mercenaries. It has underlined the pressing need to reinforce the 1977 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. The most recent PSC communiqué on the subject, released following its 1 189th meeting of 1 December 2023, called explicitly for prompt finalisation of the review of the convention. It also expressed ‘deep concern over the grave threat posed by mercenaries to the realisation of the AU peace and security agenda (…)’. This process has generated a workable draft open for input.
Inadequacies of the 1977 convention
The 1977 convention was a framework fit for the challenges of its time. It presented an expanded definition of mercenaries and their activities in keeping with the realities that prompted its adoption. It noted the use of irregular contractors by external actors to remove political leaders considered obstacles to the realisation of the former’s interests. Mercenarism in Africa was treated as an imported phenomenon rather than a homegrown one.
However, amid the outbreak of continental intrastate conflicts, African groups such as Executive Outcomes emerged in the late 1980s and participated actively in conflicts in then-OAU member states such as Sierra Leone and Angola. The definitions of ‘mercenaries’, ‘mercenary activities’ and ‘crime of mercenarism’ provided by the 1977 convention focus on the private nature of mercenaries and established measures to hold both contractors and hiring entities accountable. It was, therefore, fit for purpose from its adoption to the late 2000s.
Unreadiness of security mechanisms such as the African Standby Force has led to increasing reliance on ‘private’ military contractors
The framework, however, did not anticipate state-owned mercenarism in Africa. For instance, the nature of mercenaries nowadays calls into question the ‘private’ status of contracted individuals or groups. Some operate either openly or under the direct or indirect control of other states. This is noticeable with Russian operators acting under the newly formed Africa Corps. The most known ― Wagner, Convoy and Redut ― are associated with Russia’s ministry of defence.
Moreover, the lack of a continental committee on mercenarism has deprived the OAU/AU and member states of a critical oversight and management instrument. This has had dire implications for Africa’s efforts to control mercenarism. It has, among others, prevented follow-up on member states’ compliance with the 1977 convention and support for the domestication of the framework.
Strides and focus of the review
Reviewing the 1977 convention, the AU, through its security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration unit, adopted an inclusive and participatory approach. The review came on the back of the PSC’s repeated discussions on mercenarism. It has mobilised support from pivotal partners that have substantially contributed to developing and strengthening a 40-article draft convention. Numerous physical and virtual engagements with African civil society organisations, thinktanks and international partners have enabled a thorough review of the 1977 framework.
Initially, partners provided strong input to the review through a comprehensive policy brief that discussed the implications of mercenary activities to silencing the guns in Africa. Since the brief’s publication, the convention’s draft has been developed addressing obvious gaps. The new draft provides for the establishment of a committee on mercenarism and foresees a role for civil society actors to assist member states and the oversight committee.
The nature of mercenaries nowadays question the ‘private’ status of contracted groups
Adequate provision is also made for implementation monitoring by member states and reporting practices to ensure effective uptake nationally for the provisions of the revised convention. To achieve a framework reflecting current realities, the draft’s definitions are being expanded, particularly on aspects of mercenaries and their activities.
The way forward
The ongoing review of the OAU convention ― strongly supported by experts and partners ― is a commendable milestone in addressing contemporary mercenarism on the continent. It behoves the AU to equip its member states with a pivotal response instrument, which will go a long way towards shaping continental response.
Establishing a mercenarism committee is crucial, its working relationship with the PSC and its reporting requirements should be clear. It should periodically report to and brief the Council on the state of mercenarism. The PSC should consider discussions on the issue when it compiles its yearly programme. This will enhance oversight and management of the continental response at the highest decision-making level.
As the review committee finalises the draft framework, it should consider provisions for monitoring human rights abuses by mercenaries operating in conflict zones. This will be essential in establishing mechanisms to track such abuses, which could then be leveraged by existing judicial frameworks such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to ensure accountability for violations against civilians.
