Electoral crises: lessons from 2024
Election observations indicate that stronger early warning integration is needed in the African Union electoral engagement strategy.
Given the number of people and countries involved in elections globally, the United Nations Development Programme described 2024 as a ‘super election year’. In Africa, 15 countries held general, presidential or legislative elections. AU election observer missions (EOMs) were deployed in 13 of these countries (see Figure 1) in line with the mandate to assess the quality and integrity of electoral processes.
However, in Tunisia and Mozambique, the missions did not anticipate key electoral challenges. This failure, particularly in Mozambique, where post-electoral violence occurred, drew some criticism. It raised questions about the value of observations and the extent to which missions can effectively serve and/or use existing early warning systems to predict and prevent electoral violence. Such action could strengthen the quality of electoral processes and enhance conflict prevention on the continent.
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Chart 1: Elections and AU Observer Missions in 2024
This figure utilises data from the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the AU |
Early warning links
AU electoral observer missions are mandated to observe, monitor, mediate, assist technically, supervise and audit pre-election, election and post-election periods. To this end, the assessment team must assess pre-existing conditions to evaluate whether forthcoming elections will be free, fair, accessible and transparent.
This offers a key early warning and preventive diplomacy function for missions, which, in the past, provided a practical link between the AU’s long-term electoral observers and the continental early warning system. This was intended to entrench democracy while preventing election-related conflicts. In recent times, however, the inherent link between the AU’s continental early warning system and its elections engagement strategy has waned as a result of the ongoing AU reforms process. Furthermore, long-term electoral observation has also ceased owing to resource limitations.
EOM challenges
Apart from structural challenges in the link between observation and early warning, three key weaknesses arose in the Tunisia and Mozambique elections pertaining to observer missions’ ability to anticipate and prevent major conflicts. The first was the missed opportunity for pre-election engagements to anticipate potential post-election violence. Issues in Mozambique received continental attention through a Peace and Security Council (PSC) field mission in July. This was followed by a pre-election assessment mission in August 2024 and a discussion on the field mission report at the PSC’s 1 231st meeting in September. These efforts, however, failed to anticipate possible post-election violence that could have led to engagement with Mozambican authorities.
Before the elections, in September 2024, a survey report by Afrobarometer pointed to declining trust in elections as an effective tool for holding leaders accountable. While not conclusive, this indicated that a section of the population would not trust election outcomes and could pose a major challenge to stability. Consequently, the European Union’s preliminary statement observed that the elections were happening amid mistrust that tainted the credibility of the process. While the AU EOM report raised the possibility of bias due to the electoral management structure, an early flagging of this could have led to early response, which could have prevented post-election violence.
Electoral assessors must evaluate whether elections will be free, fair, accessible and transparent
In addition, the strategic deployment of the EOM’s limited resources would have maximised its impact. During Tunisia’s October 2024 presidential election, the AU deployed 40 short-term observers across 17 of the country’s 24 governorates, covering about 70% of the country. Similarly, in Mozambique, only 42 such observers were deployed to monitor 265 of 25 000 polling stations, making it the smallest observation group among international bodies.
It is not possible for electoral observers from any group to be present at every polling station. However, limited AU presence significantly hampered its ability to provide a more comprehensive overview of the situation and, in turn, a more representative assessment of the outcome. In Mozambique – a country grappling with serious democratic backsliding and authoritarian tendencies – only 1.06% of polling stations were observed by the AU EOM.
In 2024, the average deployment was 42 observers, regardless of the size, complexity or fragility of the electoral environment. This reality, attributed to limited resources and logistical constraints, dilutes the AU's capacity to monitor and identify structural issues in remote areas and, therefore, its ability to address risks through early response.
In Mozambique, only 42 AU observers were deployed to monitor 265 of 25 000 polling stations
Also important is the persistent weakness in reporting accountability in mission reports. Although AU guidelines stress the need for comprehensive and candid reporting, successive reports downplay crucial issues. For instance, the AU Commission chairperson’s report to the PSC on elections (July to December 2024) described Mozambique’s electoral process as having ‘reflected Mozambique’s democratic progress’ despite acknowledging significant post-electoral violence.
The preliminary report also took a reserved approach, presenting concerns with a concurrent commendation of the electoral commission's responsiveness rather than pointing out gaps. The closest critique in the mission report was a note that the electoral management structure could ‘fuel perceptions of bias’. For reports meant to inform continental policy response, such gaps invariably tone down the urgency expected to accompany the use of existing institutional mechanisms for prevention or management of emerging challenges.
Looking forward
While Africa’s electoral experience in 2024 was comparatively less problematic, the 2025 electoral landscape (Figure 2) is likely to produce a different outcome. This is because most countries involved in elections in 2024 were within the Freedom House categorisation of ‘free’ to ‘partly free’.
With numerous countries considered within the ‘not free’ zone in 2025 (Figure 3), elections may be expected to be susceptible to manipulation, institutional bias and post-election violence. With fewer robust democratic safeguards, this year is likely to record fewer peaceful transitions and more choreographed elections designed to maintain ruling political establishments.
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Chart 2: Overview of elections in 2025
Source: Data from AU PAPS, Democracy and Elections Unit |
The AU should enhance the preventive capacity and strategic impact of its EOMs. Missions’ predictive function must be strengthened by improved collaboration with the continental early warning system and by integration into pre-election assessments of data from credible sources such as Afrobarometer, civil society organisations and digital sentiment analysis. A formal mechanism should link electoral assessments to the AU’s broader preventive diplomacy architecture.
Secondly, the AU should reinstate long-term electoral observation, particularly in fragile and high-risk environments, for sustained monitoring and deeper engagement. Thirdly, the current uniform deployment model should give way to a risk-based approach that tailors the size and focus of missions to the political and democratic context of each country. More resources should be deployed to ‘not-free’ countries or those with a history of electoral manipulation and post-election violence.
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Chart 3: Freedom status of African countries holding elections in 2025
Source: Freedom House, 2025 |
The AU must also improve the quality and candour of its reporting by enforcing adherence to its guidelines, which call for comprehensive and evidence-based assessments. Reports should be clear, timely and honest about structural and procedural deficiencies, even when such observations may be politically sensitive, to ensure that early crisis signs trigger appropriate responses.
Strengthening partnerships with international observation bodies and local civil society groups is crucial to extend observation reach and enhance contextual understanding, particularly in remote or contested areas. Finally, EOMs must be firmly linked to AU preventive diplomacy mechanisms so that electoral findings directly inform timely political and diplomatic action, including pre-and post-election follow-ups to support peaceful transitions and address lingering tensions.
