Dealing with coup transitions competently and with consistency
To better manage post-coup transitions, the African Union (AU) must address political and operational challenges hindering its interventions.
On 18 March 2025, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) informally consulted at the ambassadorial level with countries in post-coup transition, including Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan. The meeting was part of the PSC’s ongoing efforts to restore constitutional order in AU member states suspended after military coups. Since 2019, the Council has faced several difficulties in managing transitions. While some, such as Sudan’s, have been interrupted by the surge in violence, the Council has struggled to reinstate constitutional order in others.
Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali and Niger juntas remain in control of state institutions. Leaders such as Gabon’s General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema are running for election despite continental prohibition and behaviour contrary to the spirit of frameworks such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Many have concluded that the current situation in which coup leaders entrench themselves stems partly from the AU’s inconsistencies in treating coup situations and other unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs). Even though such affirmations might not be absolutely incorrect, they tend to overlook the AU’s stepped-up efforts over the last six years to manage transitions resulting from the 2019 to 2023 coup wave.
Some leaders run for election despite continental prohibition and behaviour against the ACDEG spirit
Among other things, the AU has responded through the use of good offices, field visits, informal consultations with countries under military rule and tailored roadmaps for reinstating constitutional order. However, these efforts are yet to yield results principally because of the inability to compel coupmakers to abide by AU decisions, limited operational capacity and response-hindering political stumbling blocks. As the AU continues its attempt to find answers to complex political transitions, it ought to address these challenges.
Managing transitions
After defaulting countries were suspended, the AU maintained ties with them to facilitate transitional roadmaps to restore order. The main approaches have been the use of the good offices of important AU actors behind the scenes, field visits by AU officials and PSC committee members and informal Council consultations. These efforts are in line with ACDEG article 25(3), which requires the AU to maintain diplomatic contacts with suspended countries. Field visits were conducted to Burkina Faso (2023) and Gabon (2024), while informal consultations, as happened on 18 March 2025, have taken place with all suspended countries, according to AU sources.
The organisation has also partnered with the United Nations Development Programme to develop the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions. Through the facility, established on 15 July 2023, the AU has sought integrated programmatic assistance to affected countries. It is a pivotal instrument in assessing these countries’ needs to facilitate the provision of support towards restoring constitutional order, stability and democracy.
Post-coup struggles
Despite these efforts, operational and political challenges persist. The former are coordination issues and limited follow-up capacities. AU organs and agencies, including the PSC, Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), rarely coordinate their initiatives. As demonstrated in previous Institute for Security Studies analyses, the three entities tend to work in silos, creating a disconnect that fosters forum shopping and prevents strong commitment from transition authorities. Internal coordination matters do not permit the AU to present a single plan and harmonised message to countries in transition.
The AU and RECs struggle to provide harmonised transitional support and must deal with subsidiarity
Furthermore, coordination problems exist with the regional economic communities (RECs). In the light of their disjointed responses to coups, the AU and RECs still struggle to provide harmonised support and have had to deal with conflicts of subsidiarity. In recent times, this has triggered longstanding divergences between regional and continental structures.
The lack of fully capacitated monitoring structures is an additional major operational obstacle. The AU Mission for the Sahel, which could have been central to supporting post-coup transition in the Sahel, for example, remains deprived of financial and human resource capacity. Moreover, even though the newly established PSC Subcommittee on Sanctions against UCGs could follow up on transitional roadmaps’ execution and the monitoring of the actions of external actors, it has yet to be capacitated.
Despite agreed transition charters and roadmaps in Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso, the PSC struggles to monitor and evaluate progress as field missions are often denied access to affected countries. Politically, de facto authorities often object to AU assistance as part of efforts to serve their own interests. Thus, the PSC is prevented from collecting firsthand data and engaging with transition authorities to identify the support needed. Of the four countries officially in transition, the PSC has so far visited only Burkina Faso and Gabon. Apart from resource constraints, the dearth of field visits, according to AU sources, reflects partly the Council’s struggle with states’ growing unwillingness to permit regional and continental interventions in their crises. De facto leaders use non-interference and sovereignty principles to shield themselves from REC and AU engagement.
Coup-affected countries dismiss AU authority, changing agreed roadmaps in line with political agendas
Furthermore, most countries in post-coup transitions have disregarded the AU’s authority by amending agreed roadmaps to align with narrow political agendas. Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali have all unilaterally extended their transitions without consulting the AU. It is also evident that coupmakers in these countries intend to vie for presidential elections, imitating Oligui, who has already made a move despite ACDEG article 25(3). Niger has still not proposed a transitional roadmap despite the AU’s repeated calls.
Addressing existing challenges
For the AU to navigate post-coup transitions, there is the need to address the operational and political hurdles undermining its efforts. It should consider harmonised actions and voices among its agencies and organs. Even though they all have a say in managing post-coup transitions, effectiveness relies on harmony becoming the norm. The PSC, ECOSOCC and APRM, for instance, should establish a permanent consultation platform to coordinate and present a synergised support package to defaulting countries.
A viable solution to the AU and REC coordination struggles is the finalisation of the division-of-labour documents and clearly defining the subsidiarity principle and application modalities. With the AU Commission chairperson and PSC secretariat, the political affairs, peace and security commissioner should encourage discussion on coordination during the 2025 mid-year summit and extraordinary heads of state and government meeting on AU reform. Doing so would address a longstanding stumbling block to continental peacemaking and facilitate harmonised and robust support during transitions.
Political dialogue with defaulting countries must continue, as should informal consultations. Permanent contact must be maintained with capitals through existing AU Missions, the PSC Subcommittee on Sanctions against UCGs and concerned RECs, context allowing. Some success could be achieved through the abovementioned robust capacitation of entities to enhance their follow-up and implementation abilities. However, dialogue does not mean allowing the violation of norms. The AU must openly call out coupmakers’ participation in elections and consider targeted sanctions as a means of safeguarding existing continental norms.
