Cultivating common ground on climate, peace and security
The climate-conflict interplay has been long debated, but a united continental front is needed to address it.
The 774th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2018 discussed the link between climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ and conflicts in Africa. Formal and informal PSC meetings and consultations have prioritised and explored evidence-based solutions to climate-security threats. Recognising the urgency of the situation, the Council asked the African Union Commission (AUC) to conduct a study into the nexus of climate change and peace and security.
Climate change is a pervasive threat multiplier, amplifying weather events' severity and exacerbating vulnerabilities. It poses a risk to human security in Africa due to the intricate links between climate stressors and socioeconomic, environmental and political pathways. This interplay is complex, nonlinear and often unpredictable. The lack of data on climate-induced conflicts limits policymakers’ ability to create tools to mitigate and adapt to climate security risks.
The AUC’s initial study provided crucial empirical data to inform the development of the Common African Position on Climate, Peace, and Security (CAP-CPS). This Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA) was launched in August 2024.. The PSC’s 1 240th session in October 2024 discussed these developments. Communique 1 240 emphasised the need for data-driven and consultative member state positions, underscoring the importance of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.
Tracing CAP-CPS
Numerous PSC meetings have sought to develop a comprehensive continental approach to the climate-conflict nexus. The PSC asked for the study at its 774th meeting and the request was reiterated at the 1 114th and 1 184th meetings.
Links exist between climate stressors and socioeconomic, environmental and political pathways
The resultant report offers insights on key continental climate security risks, including a comparative analysis of north, central, west, east and southern Africa. The findings are the basis for a chairperson’s report and inform the common African position. The document ― an in-depth analysis of key climatic security risks based on assessments of the regions ― recommends emerging good practices.
Launched at the Conference of the Parties 28, ACRA ensured that the common position was grounded in robust evidence on the complex impacts of climate change on peace and security. The AUC held a three-day consultation with member states in August 2024 to discuss the issue ― an event that culminated in the draft common position. The draft:
- Offers a shared framework to prevent and manage climate-related insecurity and to sustain peace despite the shocks and setbacks of climate change
- Facilitates action to prevent or better manage climate-change risks to peace and security
- Allows member states and African institutions to speak globally with one voice to highlight common concerns.
A key objective of ACRA, the chairperson’s report and the Nairobi consultations was a common position informed by and aligned to member states’ positions. This is likely to be adopted during the AU summit in February 2025. Once adopted by the AU Assembly, CAP’s implementation will require extensive resources and cooperation within the AU Commission and among states.
One voice
The common position seeks to bridge policy gaps, integrating climate change into security frameworks to tackle challenges exacerbated by climate change and advance stakeholder collaboration on climate security threats. The current draft outlines key strategies for climate change, peace and security, calling for integration of climate into peacebuilding.
The common position seeks to bridge policy gaps, integrate climate change and boost collaboration
CAP-CPS is more than a policy document. It embodies Africa’s united voice and will strengthen its negotiation in global climate forums. It promotes enhanced collaboration among states for sharing best practices and technical and financial resources for effective response to climate security. It builds on the findings of the ACRA report, which is a comprehensive analysis of continental climate security risks.
Balanced approach
A common position is powerful, yet might inadvertently constrain the agility needed to respond to national and regional impacts. Climate security risks across Africa manifest differently, necessitating context-specific approaches. This inherent tension between localised effectiveness and continental unified policy was referenced in the Nairobi consultations, where a one-size-fits-all approach to policy was acknowledged as limiting in practice. Ultimately, CAP’s success will depend on countries’ willingness and ability to commit to the limitations that bind the 55 member states.
While the Nairobi consultations laid the groundwork for a comprehensive approach to climate, peace and security, member states ought to prepare for implementation. This will involve cooperation among the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, national governments, local administrative bodies and traditional governance structures.
Each stakeholder must play its role to contextualise and implement CAP. RECs will be important intermediaries between the CAP aspiration and local implementation, heeding regional contexts. States must integrate climate security considerations into current peace and security measures, coordinating ministries and aligning national climate policies with CAP-CPS.
Challenges
The lines of responsibility in the draft common position are quite ambiguous, as multiple parties share responsibility. The current climate-security cluster is run jointly by the political affairs, peace and security and the agriculture, rural development, blue economy and sustainable environment commissions. Thus, all departments must work closely to align their objectives and strategies. However, collaboration must extend to health, humanitarian affairs and social development. Given that the PSC has deemed climate change a threat multiplier and that the AU approach should consider the climate-development-security nexus, many other organs and structures in the AU would need to be in concert.
With the number of stakeholders involved, establishing clear lines of authority and priority in resource allocation and strategic focus could be challenging. The lines of accountability for CAP-CPS could also be blurred, as its implementation hinges heavily on member states’ political will.
Member states’ political will is essential to the success of Africa’s shared position
Significant funding constraints, technical capacity gaps and limited data will characterise CAP’s translation from policy to implementation. The initiative must be accompanied by efforts to access funding for risk prevention, early warning systems and resilience building.
Bridging gaps
The AUC needs to better coordinate climate, development, peace and security agenda items to simplify decision-making. This will prevent the fragmentation that may occur when several departments are involved, which dilutes responsibilities. It is also key to maintain regional autonomy for agile, region-specific response while ensuring continental unity. The PSC must position CAP as a baseline, not a ceiling, for response to the climate-security nexus while balancing the need for implementation and report back to the Council.
Lastly, the common position should bolster existing mechanisms such as the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan. This integration should enhance Africa’s drive for climate resilience, but, again, the political will of states will decide success.