Coup culture returns to Africa
Several factors have turned dwindling coup numbers since the 1990s into surges from the 2020s
The 30 August 2023 coup in Gabon was the 100th successful military coup in post-colonial Africa. In the 71 years between the first coup, in Egypt in July 1952, and this latest one, the continent has experienced only 25 coup-free years. Of the 55 member states of the African Union (AU), only 20 have not been affected by military coups.
The Gabon putsch was also the ninth unconstitutional change of government (UCG) in Africa since 2020. The continent has not seen so many coups in such a short time since the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. This recent upsurge has come against the backdrop of dwindling coup numbers since the 1990s.
From a high of 15 successful coups in the 1990s, the number dropped to eight from 2001 to 2010 and further to six between 2011 and 2020. What explains this upsurge in the occurrence of military coups despite the existence of several normative continental and regional instruments?
Reasons for resurgence
To justify their actions, military actors behind recent coups have cited three ‘unpardonable’ mistakes of overthrown leaders. These are bad governance and authoritarianism, widespread corruption and nepotism combined with a bad economic situation, and deteriorating security. Indeed, at least one of these is often present in coup situations.
However, experience shows that seldom are these the true or only concerns of soldiers who stage coups. It may be their genuine concern initially but often they quickly change course, their untold motivations being personal or related to the interests of a segment of military establishment.
Foreign interventions against the backdrop of geopolitical interests and/or rivalries also accounted for a good number of coups, particularly during the Cold War era. While it might be difficult to establish this in the current wave of coups, the possibility of international geopolitics as part of the calculus of coup-makers in some countries cannot be discounted.
Regardless of the sincerity or lack thereof of coup-makers, the presence of ‘favourable conditions’ of coup-making should be considered red flags for activating proper preventive measures. While condemning military coups, the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections (the two main continental anti-coup frameworks) acknowledge several factors that may reduce the threat.
|
Successful military coups in Africa per decade and region: 1952-2023
 Source: Issaka K Souaré, 2023 (click on the graph for the full size image) |
In particular are strict adherence to ‘the principles of good governance, transparency and human rights and ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. These, the two maintain, would considerably reduce the risk of UCGs including military coups on the continent.
Why the change?
If these factors can explain the occurrence of coups, what explains the changing trends? The downward trend observed in the three decades from 1990 can be explained by several inter-related factors. One was the (re)establishment of multiparty democratic systems after decades of military and single-party dominance.
This meant that military rule was largely discredited. Another connected factor is the departure of many longstanding leaders following ‘founding’ elections at the beginning of the 1990s and in the new millennium, which gave hope for true democratic renewal in many African countries.
Although some still question its rationale, a third factor is said to be the presidential term-limit provision included in most new constitutions on the continent. This began bearing fruit in the 2000s. So far, some 33 African heads of state have so far left office after serving their constitutional terms. The latest two to do so are Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria (2015 to 2023) and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya (2013 to 2022).
Regular electoral defeats of sitting leaders and prospects of power alternation after a maximum of consecutive four- to seven-year terms arguably created hope for power change. They may have removed a key pretext of coup-makers. Most importantly, anti-coup norms and frameworks were adopted in the same period. They were also applied with consistency and loopholes corrected over the years.
A reverse trend began to take hold in the same period. This coincided with several African leaders scrapping the term-limit stipulation in their constitutions. This practice has taken two forms over two generations. The first form and generation began in Burkina Faso in January 1997. Then, about a year to the end of his first seven-year term, then-president Blaise Compaoré modified the term-limit provision in the 1991 constitution.
Guinea followed in 2001, Tunisia and Togo in 2002, Gabon in 2003, Chad in 2004, Uganda in 2005, Cameroon and Algeria in 2008, Niger in 2009 and Djibouti in 2010. All but Cameroon, Gabon and Djibouti have reversed the changes.
The second form and generation of term-limit provision reforms has been general constitutional modification or adopting a totally new constitution accompanied by the claim of the birth of a new political dispensation. In this case, the term limit is often not touched.
But because a nouvel ordre politique (new political order) has been born, the term-limit clock is set to zero on the basis of the classical legal principle of non-automatic retroactivity of laws. This was used in constitutional reforms in countries such as Rwanda and the Republic of Congo in 2015, Côte d’Ivoire in 2016, Egypt in 2019 and Guinea in 2020.
Reversing the trend
How can the current trend of military coups be stemmed and constitutional rule restored and consolidated? Without being naïve about the declared motivations of coup-makers, there is surely a need for concrete preventive actions to deter constitutional manipulations by sitting leaders and to ensure credible elections. These actions are likely to restore the trust of disillusioned African citizens in the political systems of their countries.
Regular alternations of power can not only benefit countries through new ideas and more energised and fresh governing teams, but can reveal to citizens the dynamism of their democratic governance systems. Abolishing term-limit provision or bypassing it through controversial constitutional reforms have proven important arguments by many African citizens who charge African institutions with ‘double standards’, as they consider these ‘constitutional coups’.
True, countries cannot be prevented from ‘reforming’ their legal texts, including the constitution. However, while respecting this legitimate prerogative of sovereign states, experience shows that targeting term limits in such reforms is mainly a desire to prolong a stay in power. Rarely is there a genuine concern for imperative adaptation to new social realities. Therefore, preventing the abuse of this crucial aspect of constitutions and mechanisms for peaceful alternation of leadership will be key in the immediate- and medium terms.
The AU and regional economic communities should redouble efforts to help member states tackle security challenges facing their countries, holistically and not by focusing only on kinetic military approaches. These efforts should include social-economic development and promotion of social cohesion and peaceful intercommunal co-existence, without discarding dialogue with dissident groups to understand their legitimate grievances.
Communication channels should also be kept open with de facto authorities of military transitions despite their suspension from regional and continental institutions. International contact groups between 2008 and 2015 served this purpose. The newly launched AU and United Nations Development Programme African Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions could be a credible communication platform, assisting cooperating authorities to restore constitutional order. This should be based on a clear and credible transition roadmap agreed with the AU and/or the regional economic community.
