Constructive collaboration key to advancing common continental objectives
Strengthening the AU-SADC relationship will accelerate achievement of the subsidiarity and complementarity goals central to peace and security.
On 30 August 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security held their inaugural joint consultative meeting in Gaborone, Botswana. This meeting, coinciding with Botswana's chairship of the PSC, was crucial in reinforcing the AU's cooperation with regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms. The engagement followed a similar meeting with the Mediation and Security Council of the Economic Community of West African States in April 2024, signalling the AU’s growing focus on aligning regional and continental security efforts.
Through these efforts, the PSC aims to harmonise responses to continental peace and security challenges within the framework of subsidiarity and complementarity. Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the 2008 memorandum of understanding between the AU and RECs emphasise these principles. However, recent responses to peace and security crises have revealed deepening fractures in coordination, hence the need for renewed engagements. This account examines lessons to be drawn from the relationship between the PSC and the SADC organ to enhance their operational effectiveness and collective action.
SADC and AU synergy
The organ is important to the attainment of PSC goals given SADC’s role as the primary body managing and coordinating regional political and security efforts. However, despite similar purposes, the organ and the Council differ substantially in form and function. The latter is structured around the major levels of the AU’s member composition ― ambassadorial, ministerial and heads of state and their associated sub-committees. The former has a three-member troika at heads of state and ministerial level, an early warning structure, a regional mediation structure and a counter-terrorism structure. This gives it a blend of elements of the PSC and AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) department.
Responses to security crises emphasise the need for coordination and renewed engagements
Perhaps the most visible difference is the organ’s use of the troika of three member heads of state empowered to make decisions on its behalf when urgent matters arise between regular meetings. This enables it to respond quickly to regional conflicts, political instability and security challenges, and distinguishes it in many ways. This implies that as much as the PSC might want to engage it directly and find it a natural fit for its engagements, the organ is useful for the purpose but not necessarily in form. This is the first challenge in finding synergy as it complicates the ability of the two organs to interlock seamlessly for decision-making, implementation and complementarity at the unit levels of decision-making.
In practice, the structural differences allow assessment on two levels. First, although the director of the SADC organ may appear to have a counterpart in the PAPS commissioner, the executive authority of the latter in engaging similar continental entities significantly surpasses that of former. While the director’s mandate is largely regional, the commissioner’s is continental. The director also functions more as a coordinator, with most decisions reliant on the troika, which meets annually at the heads of state summit. In contrast, the commissioner holds greater executive and administrative capacities in spearheading efforts to realise peace and security goals.
While the PSC deliberates mostly at ambassadorial level and sometimes ministerial and heads of state levels, the troika typically addresses matters directly through heads of state or foreign ministers. This leads to a disparity in engagement levels. Furthermore, the PSC draws its membership from 15 countries across Africa’s five regions, whereas the SADC organ represents only southern Africa and is led by a rotating troika of three states. This regional focus and limited membership allows the organ to make quicker decisions due to geographical proximity and alignment of interests. In contrast, the Council typically navigates multiple regional dynamics and diverse national interests, which can hinder consensus-building, particularly on issues that do not affect all regions equally.
The SADC organ’s troika facilitates rapid response to conflicts and political instability
For the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, the SADC organ nimbly secured consensus and swiftly deployed forces. Decisions of the PSC. which met more than 1 200 times at ambassadorial level between 2004 and May 2024, often take longer to reach member state capitals for higher-level approval. They also often require greater agreement among the regions, thereby delaying implementation. The organ’s less-frequent but more-senior meetings enable quicker decision-making and action due to its closer linkages with state capitals in both geographic proximity and authority. This gives SADC an advantage over the PSC in approving rapid troop deployment.
Regional relations
The SADC organ has demonstrated some strength in responding to regional challenges in recent years, particularly through its SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This mission followed the withdrawal of the East African Community regional force and positioned SADC as a key player in stabilising the DRC. While the PSC made several weighty policy pronouncements ― including the communique of its 1 203rd meeting stressing the need to implement the outcomes of a quadripartite summit ― the implementation relied heavily on the REC’s operational capacity.
SADC also deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Although it received support from the African Standby Force logistics base, the PSC’s involvement remained largely approving and endorsing the mission. This also highlights the AU’s dependence on regional mechanisms for on-the-ground implementation. Rwanda’s bilateral intervention in Mozambique, committing 2 000 troops with financial European Union backing, further exemplifies the ease with which strong member states can lead and/or fund regional security efforts ― contrasting with the slower, more bureaucratic continental processes.
Better alignment of mandating processes and their implementation between RECs and AU is essential
South Africa, for example, has financed much of the SAMIM mission through the SADC Peace Fund, contributing US$41 million to SAMIM in 2024 and US$117 million for 2 000 South African National Defence Force troops for the DRC mission. This dynamic allows powerful states to shape regional priorities, which can sometimes undermine collective decision-making processes and skew deployment strategies and their interests.
SADC learnings
Overlapping PSC and REC mandates often cause friction and the experience is similar in SADC. During the August 2023 Zimbabwean elections, the SADC electoral observer mission led by Dr Nevers Mumba issued a scathing critique stating that the election ‘fell short of the requirements of the constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021)’. The joint AU and COMESA statement of former Nigerian president Dr Goodluck Jonathan offered a more measured response. This highlights the differences in assessment criteria, divergences of outcomes and complexities of coordination between regional and continental bodies, especially amid heated regional political dynamics.
More robust subsidiarity ― wherein the PSC provides broader oversight and RECs manage regional responses ― could minimise friction and enhance operational effectiveness. Ensuring that each body operates within its mandated roles without undermining others is key to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts across the continent.
Achieving greater alignment
The relationship between the PSC and the SADC organ is complex yet crucial to managing peace and security in Africa. While the former plays a strategic role in endorsing regional operations, the latter’s ability to act swiftly and deploy troops underscores the importance of subsidiarity in security interventions. However, better alignment of mandating processes and their implementation between RECs and AU decision-making structures is essential to enhance collaboration and alleviate duplication.
Achieving this rests hugely on the extent to which the AU and RECs can use task forces to facilitate rapid decision-making and coordinated responses to emerging crises. It also depends on the provision of clearer subsidiarity and leadership guidelines through mutual ownership of the memorandum of understanding between RECs and the AU and through frequent PSC and REC consultations. Strengthening the AU-SADC relationship, while challenging, will accelerate the achievement of subsidiarity and complementarity goals, which are central to the implementation of PSC decisions and the pursuit of peace and security.
