Can South Sudan be stabilised ahead of the upcoming election?
With the window for a meaningful election fast closing, can former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete deliver peace?
In December 2026, South Sudan plans an election that could significantly reconfigure the country's future. This will be the third attempt to wind up the transition period outlined in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Given the country's fragile political and economic situation, three peace initiatives have emerged, each aiming to prevent a full-scale war. The key question, however, is not if the election will happen, but whether any of these initiatives can deliver peace singularly or collectively, where previous efforts have fallen short.
Elusive election
South Sudan's first post-independence election was scheduled for December 2015. Then conflict broke out in December 2013, triggering an arduous peace process culminating in the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan in 2015. This agreement collapsed in 2016, triggering another round of negotiations that produced the R-ARCSS, through which an election was initially planned for December 2022 to formally end the transitional government's term in February 2023.
As this deadline approached, the transition was extended to February 2025 due to inadequate preparations, insecurity in the country and lack of funding. In September 2024, elections were postponed again for reasons such as disagreements within the government and among key political groups. The transitional government then faced intense domestic and international pressure to hold an election in December 2026, with no further delays.
Fragile peace deal
In early-2025, concerns about the 2026 election emerged. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, tasked with overseeing the peace process, began warning about rising insecurity nationwide. Ethnic militia groups such as the White Army and organisations including the National Salvation Front increased their armed activities, leading to retaliations from the South Sudan People's Defence Forces.
This escalation culminated in the infamous Nasir Incident, which Uganda's Peoples' Defence Forces used as a pretext for intervention, citing the need to secure the capital of South Sudan and safeguard Uganda's interests. At the same time, the deadlock within the unity government intensified as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition, President Salva Kiir Mayardit's main political ally in the R-ARCSS, split into factions supporting or opposing the detained leader, Riek Machar.
Three peace initiatives are emerging, each aiming to prevent a full-scale war
Political missteps in Juba included Mayardit's unpredictable reshuffling of senior officials, inciting defections within the opposition and failing to effectively implement R-ARCSS. These, coupled with economic decline and worsening humanitarian situation, put the country on a dangerously unstable trajectory and cast doubt on the prospects of an election. By December 2025, the risk of a relapse into full-scale conflict was increasing, as peace attempts such as the Kenyan-led Tumaini Initiative and the African Union (AU) High-level Ad-hoc Committee (C5) had lost momentum and become fragmented.
Conflict persists in South Sudan, destabilising regions such as Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei. In Jonglei alone, recent clashes displaced more than 280 000 people, raising the number of internally displaced persons in the country to more than two million. The South Sudan National Elections Commission, already facing credibility gaps, continues to lack the funds, technical infrastructure and regulatory frameworks to conduct elections. Even if resources were suddenly available, as hinted at the cabinet meeting of 27 March, the December election is unlikely to take place due to seasonal flooding during that month, which will further disrupt logistics.
In this context, R-ARCSS signatories started discussions in late 2025 on how to salvage the now-defunct agreement and conduct elections by December. Mayardit's unity government faction and its allies proposed, among other measures, separating R-ARCSS from the constitution-making process and diminishing its standing within South Sudan's legal framework before elections. This proposal received lukewarm reception both within South Sudan and among its development partners, who saw it as an effort to undermine the R-ARCSS once and for all.
Averting a relapse
The first of the peace initiatives, the Elections Dialogue Committee, was established by Mayardit on 30 January and includes R-ARCSS signatories and other key stakeholders. This high-level leadership group aims to achieve consensus on election issues, building on previous proposals to suspend certain provisions of the R-ARCSS. Although this is widely viewed as compromised and illegitimate, it remains the preferred approach for Mayardit's powerful allies, even if it is not favoured by him.
The Tumaini Initiative, reintroduced in late January 2026, advocates a national consensus charter for peace and democracy. This is based on a framework that intends to focus negotiations on stabilisation, civilian protection, humanitarian access, trust-building, holding elections and ending hostilities. The revitalised Tumaini, which holdout groups have already distrusted, was scheduled for launch on 9 February but was delayed pending the outcome of the 39th AU summit.
C5+ and Tumaini don't tackle the Kiir and Machar rivalry, seeing a political role for both
The third initiative is the AU C5+ process launched during the AU summit and grounded in the primacy of the R-ARCSS. It calls for an immediate ceasefire, urges a leadership retreat in South Africa and involves appointing a former head of state to mediate between Mayardit and Machar.
On 22 March, Mayardit returned from a visit to South Africa, which his office stated was part of C5+ efforts. Others described it as a routine medical visit since the Middle East, where he regularly went for treatment, is now inaccessible. On 27 March, Mayardit's council of ministers endorsed C5+ proposals, combining them with its own, but did not publicly clarify whether Machar would be released or if elections would be funded immediately.
Although each proposal varies in scope, all aim to address political deadlock, insecurity and humanitarian crises. But they share a flaw, namely endorsing an extra-constitutional election and postponing until after the election key R-ARCSS tasks such as unifying militia-led armed forces, drafting a permanent constitution and implementing transitional justice reforms.
Consequently, if the election takes place, the winner could claim a new mandate, which might not include explicit commitments to implement the remaining provisions of the R-ARCSS. The C5+ and Tumaini plans also fail to effectively tackle the country's main fault-line – the rivalry between Kiir and Machar – envisaging a role in political life for both before and/or after the election.
Refreshing change of perspective?
On March 24, the AU chairperson appointed former Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete as the high representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, in line with an AU declaration resolution. He began focusing primarily on South Sudan, seemingly sidestepping Eritrea and Ethiopia, which are also key parts of his mandate but where political negotiations might take longer to gain traction. This prioritisation reflects a preference for 'manageable' situations and highlights the AU's desire for quick, tangible results to deconflict in the already complex conflict landscape in the Horn of Africa.
Kikwete needs to free political prisoners, develop an election roadmap and secure funding
Kikwete's visits to South Africa, Uganda, South Sudan and Kenya also reflect an effort to invigorate mediation, but will unintentionally preserve these countries' interests in South Sudan. Notably, Uganda wields significant influence in South Sudanese politics and maintains a military presence there. This makes Uganda's support for C5+ and Tumaini vital to any agreement, and to the stability of the country, Kikwete hopes to keep it from collapse.
Priorities for Kikwete
As the AU Peace and Security Council prepares for its visit to South Sudan, Kikwete must coordinate and unify the fragmented mediation highlighted in the C5+ declaration. First, he must design and establish a single multilayered mediation or facilitation platform involving the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the international community, with a transparent mechanism for the involvement of South Sudanese communities. This approach should deliberately discourage forum shopping, resolve the deadlock between Kirr and Machar, and prepare to mobilise humanitarian assistance for communities as December nears.
In the short term, Kikwete needs to deliver quick, concrete results, such as freeing political prisoners or, at a minimum, developing a credible election roadmap and securing funding for the election. He should do so, knowing the South Sudanese population has high expectations of him and the elections are still uncertain.
Secondly, Kikwete should take a pragmatic approach that integrates proposals from civil society, opposition armed groups, political parties, and the South Sudanese public into a single text. This approach is essential to preserve his independence and credibility, especially since Kiir's cabinet, which last met on April 18, approved plans to amend the R-ARCSS, subtly aligning Kikwete with their influence.
Without this, Kikwete's efforts risk losing momentum, with the country reverting to the old pattern of political mistakes that lead to violence, mediation and relapse. Indeed, South Sudan's elites are skilled negotiators who have excelled at exploiting mediation loopholes or perceived vulnerabilities of potential mediators. For example, they might prolong discussions over the legality of releasing political detainees, whom they consider criminals. This strategy could be used to justify postponing the election, with Kikwete and his process cited as the reasons.
Nevertheless, Kikwete must avoid South Sudan's total collapse by emphasising stable, incremental progress rather than rushing into elections, which are fraught with challenges. This, unfortunately, might involve negotiating an entirely new agreement based on the R-ARCSS and Tumaini.
