Can international mediation break Sudan’s political deadlock?
A year after the coup, a trilateral team seeks consensus between civilians and the military on a transition.
October marks the first anniversary of Sudan’s second military coup, which removed the transitional government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and triggered a state of emergency. Mediation efforts to overcome the political impasse between the junta and civilian opposition groups have thus far failed to reach a political settlement and negotiated plan for a transition.
In the absence of a legitimate government, Sudan continues to face the significant challenges of an economic downturn. Inflation is at an all-time high and there is a shortage of basic supplies, including bread and fuel – factors that triggered the 2019 revolution. The economic situation is exacerbated by the fact that international partners discontinued development assistance, and foreign currency is scarce due to fewer exports from Sudan.
Beyond the economy, Sudan faces significant humanitarian emergencies due to flooding in many parts of the country and intercommunal conflict in Darfur, Blue Nile and Kassala states. Thus, resolving Sudan’s political impasse and installing a legitimate government are crucial.
A trilateral mechanism comprising the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has mediated among Sudanese stakeholders since June for a negotiated transitional agreement. To date, the UN has engaged in shuttle diplomacy among stakeholders through the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. The AU and IGAD have enlisted the special representative and head of the AU office in Sudan and the IGAD peace envoy.
Major negotiations are expected to cover the appointment of a civilian-led government, setting the timeframe for elections and defining the role of the military in the transition. Although the trilateral mechanism has garnered support from national, regional and international actors, obstacles have hindered its success.
Without a legitimate government, inflation is at an all-time high and there is a shortage of basic supplies
Negotiations need to achieve consensus on the formation of an inclusive transitional legislative council and national constitutional dialogue. These processes should address outstanding issues that have led to conflict since Sudan’s independence. For this to happen, stakeholders must agree on a vision for a transition that will lead not only to a civilian-led government but to a peaceful Sudan following the transition.
Mediation challenges
Sudan’s 2021 coup took place a month before the military, headed by general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, was scheduled to hand over power to the civilian component of the Sovereign Council. The council is the joint military-civilian body that had governed Sudan since the fall of former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019.
Civilians accuse the military of never intending to cede power to a civilian-led government. Violent repression of anti-coup protests over the past year has further hardened civilian anti-military sentiment, particularly among resistance committees that are calling for ‘no negotiation, no legitimacy, no partnership’ with the military. Civilian opposition groups accuse the military of trying to consolidate its economic and political grip on power over the past year, while ostensibly being open to negotiating with civilians.
Following the coup, the military announced it would disband the Sovereign Council and form a security and defence council. This is expected to take over the powers and responsibilities of both sovereign and legislative councils. In addition to control over the security forces, it would also have a broader mandate over foreign affairs, judicial appointments and management of the central bank.
Despite collectively opposing the military, civilian actors cannot agree on a transition among themselves
According to civilian opposition groups, including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and resistance committees, the military supports the gradual return to power of al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP). In addition to appointing former NCP members to foreign affairs and intelligence, it is accused of releasing NCP leaders from prison. This has led civilian actors to refuse to participate in efforts to mediate between them and the military. The alleged alliance between the military and Islamist groups has made the civilian opposition even more wary of negotiating with the military.
Divided opposition forces
Despite being united in opposing the military, civilian actors continue to be divided among themselves and unable to agree on a transition plan. The FFC – the civilian alliance established in 2019 to oppose al-Bashir’s government – contributed significantly to the revolution’s success. But it has since split into at least three groups: the FFC Central Council, National Consensus Coalition and Forces for Radical Change.
These groups have been further fragmented based on their stance on the October coup. While groups such as the FFC Central Council, made up mainly of political parties, are open to negotiating with the military, the Forces for Radical Change and resistance committees strongly oppose it.
The military, on the other hand, has garnered support from some members of the Sudan Revolutionary Forces, former armed groups as well as the civilian Call of Sudan's People initiative. These groups include parties who were excluded from the transition process on grounds that they collaborated with al-Bashir’s government before the revolution. The Call of Sudan's People initiative has expanded the civilian component of post-coup negotiations, adding a new dynamic of civilian actors that support the military.
Opportunities for building consensus
The trilateral mediation team faces the challenge of having to unite actors with sometimes diametrically opposing positions to reach a negotiated plan for a political transition. Despite this, there are opportunities that can be exploited. In July, the military undertook to hand over power to a civilian government and withdraw from the political arena if civilians could reach a negotiated agreement on a transitional plan.
Negotiations will cover appointing a civilian-led government and setting the timeframe for elections
Although the military’s sincerity has been questioned by political parties and resistance committees, the call has put the onus on civilians to overcome their differences and move ahead. The FFC Central Council, National Consensus Coalition, Forces for Radical Change and the Call of Sudan’s People initiative recently formed an alliance. Each has developed proposals for a transition, which will be submitted to the trilateral mediators facilitating negotiation among civilians.
The resistance committees are also submitting their proposals. In the past, they lacked political direction and did little beyond organising demonstrations and rallies because of the diversity in their ranks. The recommendations are reflected in a draft constitutional framework developed by Sudan’s Bar Association. Internal and international pressure has also made military leaders reiterate their willingness to engage in the trilateral process.
The way forward
The trilateral mediation is expected to bridge the divergent positions of civilian groups and the military, and help them negotiate an agreement for a transition. Immediate issues on the table include the appointment of a civilian-led government, setting the timeframe for elections and the role of the military in the transition.
While these are important and urgent issues, the trilateral process should also help parties set a timeframe for the national constitutional dialogue. This engagement will help the Sudanese address major issues that have caused conflict in the country since independence. The dialogue should ideally take place before elections to ensure the process is independent and inclusive, rather than be dictated by a government that comes to power following elections.
The trilateral process should also try to achieve consensus on the formation of a legislative council inclusive of all parties. Failure to form a representative council was a major shortcoming of the transitional period before the October coup.
