Burkina Faso a test for the AU's impact on crises

The way the PSC dealt with the recent crisis in Burkina Faso once again put the AU's notion of subsidiarity of sub-regional bodies to the test.

Published on 02 November 2015 in PSC Insights

On 17 September 2015, less than a month before general elections were to take place, the Regiment de securité presidentielle (the presidential guard, or RSP) in Burkina Faso, led by Gen. Gilbert Diendéré, carried out a coup d’état against the transitional government in Ouagadougou.

The coup was short-lived, thanks to the intervention of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and a steadfast refusal by the majority of the population to accept the coup. However, there is some question about the extent of the PSC’s role in the resolution of this crisis, versus that of the regional leaders.

The events that unfolded in the days following the coup indicate that in this case, the PSC acted on principle, basing its decisions on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, signed and ratified by Burkina Faso in 2010. The PSC rejected any compromise with Diendéré and his RSP and did not entertain any of their grievances. ECOWAS, however, offered the coup leaders a way out in the name of keeping the peace and preventing a further escalation of the crisis. It also called for ‘inclusive elections’, slated initially for 11 October 2015, thereby giving way to Diendéré’s demand that the old guard from the former ruling party, which had been excluded from the polls, be allowed to participate.

Interestingly, four members of the PSC who are also members of ECOWAS took contradictory decisions – first as part of the PSC and then as ECOWAS – in the space of just a few days. This tricky situation is something the AU will have to deal with in more detail in future. The much-acclaimed principle of subsidiarity has again come under severe strain.

ECOWAS offered the Burkina Faso coup leaders a way out in the name of keeping the peace

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It is also pertinent to ask what the people of Burkina Faso think about the AU’s intervention. After all, it was by popular uprising that former president Blaise Compaoré was ousted less than a year before. The coup d’état was thus a blow to the democratisation process.

According to Institute for Security Studies researcher Ibrahim Maiga, ‘the AU definitely gained in credibility among ordinary citizens. The AU’s firm stance reinforced the determination of the civil society to push for the status quo ante.’

AU guided by principles

In dealing with the crisis in Burkina Faso, the AU based its decisions on three principles: supporting the country’s constitution, insisting that the security forces be under the authority of a civilian government, and seeking coordinating international efforts to solve the problem.

When the first crisis broke out in October 2014, on the eve of a vote in Parliament to allow a constitutional change to permit Compaoré to serve a third term, the AU stood by the principle of upholding the constitution. When the popular uprising resulted in a military take-over and the suspension of the constitution – another short-lived coup – the AU strongly condemned this in its statement of 3 November 2014.

The AU gave Burkina Faso one week to appoint a civilian transitional government. It decided not to impose sanctions following the nomination of Michel Kafando as interim head of state.

The Burkina Faso coup was a blow to the democratisation process

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However, it remained concerned about the role of the military in the transitional government, notably because Prime Minister Isaac Zida was among those who seized power after Compaoré had left. In statements in February and July this year, AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma expressed her concern about the role of the military in Burkina Faso.

Finally, several actions by the AU indicate a strong desire to coordinate efforts. Dlamini-Zuma appointed former Togolese prime minister Edem Kodjo as a special envoy to coordinate efforts between the AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations (UN). Kodjo played a supporting role in drafting the constitutional transitional charter that was adopted on 16 November 2014. Two days later the AU created the International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso (GISAT-BF), which it co-chairs with ECOWAS.

Hard line against the coup leaders

The same principles that guided the AU’s earlier actions were adhered to during the September 2015 coup.

Within a few days after the coup, the AU had instituted several strong measures, cracking down on Diendéré and his cohort and sending a strong message that coups would not be tolerated. The pan-African organisation went as far as labelling the coup leaders as ‘terrorists’ – a statement that has far-reaching legal implications.

A few days after the Burkina Faso coup, the AU instituted strong measures

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On the political front it immediately suspended Burkina Faso from all AU activities and imposed a travel ban on the coup leaders if the status quo ante was not restored within 96 hours of the 18 September statement.

It also called for the suspension of all economic, political and military cooperation by international partners and imposed an asset freeze on the coup leaders. The AU also called for consultations with the West African Economic and Monetary Union in order to deny the coup leaders the use of Burkina Faso’s reserves in the Central Bank of West African States.

Clearly, the AU was determined not to make concessions to the coup leaders and to insist on a return to the status quo ante. It also focussed on joint action. Its first reaction to the coup was a joint communiqué with the UN and ECOWAS. However, in practice, the way in which ECOWAS handled the coup was not in line with what the AU and the PSC had in mind.

ECOWAS looking for compromise

Despite the emphasis on joint action and the focus on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the coordinated effort unravelled quickly as regional leaders took a much more conciliatory stance than the PSC.

ECOWAS, as the sub-regional organisation, was naturally in the driving seat in engaging the coup leaders in Ouagadougou. Current ECOWAS chair Senegalese President Macky Sall and Benin’s President Thomas Yayi Boni were sent to Burkina Faso to meet the leaders hours after the coup took place. The focus was thus on finding an immediate solution and a way out of the crisis. ‘Our role is to put an end to the escalation of things in order to prevent the country from descending into violence,’ Sall stated at the time.

Following this visit and discussions with local actors, ECOWAS proposed a draft political agreement that called for the release of the detainees; the restoration of transitional institutions and the withdrawal of the military from the government. So far, so good. However, ECOWAS also wanted to grant amnesty to Diendéré and his men, thereby limiting any action against them.

The Burkina Faso proposals by ECOWAS sharply contrasted with the AU's call

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ECOWAS also called for an ‘open, inclusive, free and transparent process’, which, reading between the lines, meant support for one of the RSP’s main concerns and likely the reason behind the coup: to allow former ruling party members to participate in the upcoming elections. They had controversially been excluded by the constitutional court – a ruling challenged by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. These proposals by ECOWAS sharply contrasted with the AU’s call for the reinstatement of the status quo ante, without any conditions.

In the final communiqué following a meeting in Abuja on 22 September, after Kafando had been released but not yet reinstated, ECOWAS heads of state placed the emphasis on dialogue and national reconciliation, rather than sanctions. ‘At this stage where dialogue is crucial for national unity and stability in Burkina Faso, the Heads of State and Government call for peace, open-mindedness and a spirit of compromise,’ they said.

ECOWAS leaders also in no uncertain terms told the PSC to mind its own business. ‘It [ECOWAS] also emphasises respect for the principle of subsidiarity which governs relations between the African Union and regional economic communities,’ said the communiqué.

Burkinabe opt for the AU solution

What transpired subsequently had very little to do with compromise or a quest for dialogue and reconciliation. In fact, on 25 September the RSP was dissolved and the transitional government was reinstated. There was no more talk of amnesty for the coup leaders.

However, the sanctions against the coup leaders were put on hold, thanks to the happy dénouement that allowed ECOWAS to save face and prevented the PSC from openly contradicting the sub-regional body.

At a meeting of PSC heads of state in New York on 26 September, the PSC welcomed the reinstatement of the interim government and lifted the suspension of Burkina Faso. In its statement the PSC once again quoted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as the legal basis for its decision to lift the suspension. There was no mention of the draft political agreement mediated by ECOWAS and not a word on amnesty. In fact, the PSC underlined Article 25 of the charter, which stipulates ‘that perpetrators of unconstitutional changes shall not hold any position of responsibility in the political institutions of their states’.

Lessons learnt and options going forward

This is not the first time Africa sees a lack of coherence between the PSC and regional economic communities. So what is to be done?

Heads of state of the AU will have to decide on the issue of subsidiarity

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Despite a clear desire to tackle the problem in Burkina Faso in a coordinated fashion when the crisis escalated because of the coup d’état on 17 September, no special envoy was appointed to coordinate the response, as had been the case in 2014. This may have prevented the dissention between the PSC and ECOWAS.

To address such a conflict, a facilitator could also be appointed that is a member of both the relevant REC and the PSC. In the case of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, the Gambia and Guinea were all on the PSC and members of ECOWAS.

Finally, heads of state of the AU Assembly will eventually have to decide on the issue of subsidiarity, which arises time and time again when dealing with crises. Subsidiarity is based on the premise that RECs’ proximity gives them a better understanding of the dynamics of a situation. However, there is a risk that proximity could result in complacency. In Burkina Faso, ECOWAS was flexible in its search for a compromise, whereas the AU was rigid in its approach.

In this kind of situation, the AU could bring distance and impartiality. Fortunately, the dissolution of the presidential guard, which was finally overrun by the army, has put this debate to rest in the Burkina Faso context – for the moment. However, the question will not go away. Is the PSC merely an echo chamber for regional solutions? Or are RECs bound to implement the PSC’s resolutions? African leaders must give guidance in order to ensure a coherent and effective response to crises.

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