African Union’s 37th summit: little about a lot
The summit clarified the African Union’s strategy for G20 engagement, but offered no solutions for challenges.
The 37th African Union (AU) summit took place in Addis Ababa on 18 and 19 February 2024. As with previous summits, it brought together numerous African delegations and leaders to find answers to the pressing issues facing the continent.
Unlike previous summits, however, this year’s gathering was characterised by a cluster of urgent dynamics. These included the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and interstate tensions, the worsening Sudan crisis and demands by three Economic Community of West African States countries to exit the block.
There were also calls for clarity following the AU’s admission to the G20 and ongoing discussions on the outcome of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719. Of the many priorities, 18 made it to the executive council agenda, while 16 were discussed by the AU Assembly.
Clarifying the AU’s G20 engagements
The discourse following the AU's G20 admission initially focused solely on its significance and the AU's rise as an independent international actor. This has now moved to a deeper examination of what tangible contributions the AU brings to the table, given the specialised role of the platform. Consequently, the summit needed to address the need for clear engagement mechanisms and how the AU will optimise its membership to advance the interests of Africa.
Among competing priorities, the AU Assembly discussed sixteen agenda items
The summit provided clarity on these issues in two ways. First, it addressed representation by establishing structures for organising African positions and technical engagements. It was decided that the AU chairperson, assisted by the chair of the AU Commission, represent the AU at the leaders’ summit. Additionally, the executive council chairs for technical portfolios are to be accompanied by appropriate commissioners (Table 1).
These high-level structures will be supported by a sherpa and sous-sherpa to coordinate technical component efforts, and the AU Commission and the AU chair in formulating common African positions. The summit also addressed six priorities for shaping and funding Africa’s engagements. These outcomes provide clarity and guidance for partner engagements and establish clear entry points for actors involved in programming around the AU’s G20 membership.
 Sources: PSC Report Table 1: AU structure for G20 participation Table 2: Named priority areas for AU G20 engagement (click on the tables for the full size images) |
Bringing order to leadership changes
As the tenure of AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki nears its end, competition for his successor intensifies. Pre-summit, there was uncertainty about which region would be next, although speculation went the way of East Africa. In line with the 2018 AU Assembly decision, the summit discussed maintaining inter- and intraregional representation based on English alphabetical order. Discussions also highlighted the implications of the format in determining regions’ eligibility to nominate candidates for specific positions in the next elections.
However, it remains uncertain whether this rotation will be implemented immediately, given its potential impact on the commission’s next leadership structure. Key unresolved questions include the fate of possible second-term bids by current commissioners and the importance of technical capacity for effectiveness versus adherence to rotation. Under the proposed format, for instance, West Africa may not be able to nominate a candidate for the Political Affairs, Peace and Security commissioner position. Only Central Africa would be eligible to do so.
Since the incumbent is West African and might be interested in a second term, there are questions about how the regions and member states might work around this. Similar concerns apply to the deputy chairperson’s position. The summit's deliberations represented only initial discussions on this issue, as continental consensus is still needed.
New members for the Peace and Security Council (PSC)
The summit also saw the inclusion of new members in the PSC. Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tunisia and the Republic of the Congo exited the Council, but Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Egypt, Angola, DRC and Botswana joined. Doubts are being raised about whether this new composition can rejuvenate a council that has come under extreme pressure in the last couple of years through the changing nature of continental threats.
The selection of commissioners based on regional rotation will affect the AU's effectiveness
But the inclusion of DRC, for example, may hinder the tabling of the eastern DRC crisis for Council deliberations. This is unless the country prioritises the use of the Council to address the international dimension of the crisis.
With these new entrants, the PSC is dominated by ‘small states’. Whether this will be a weakness is yet to be seen, but it depends on new members’ priorities. What is clear, however, is that filling the Council with embattled states makes it difficult to discuss these countries unless other countries dare to lead such discussions at the risk of bilateral tensions.
Failed reform or opportunity for renewal?
At the summit, the leadership of AU reform changed from President Paul Kagame to President William Ruto. While it is still not clear how Kagame’s successor was decided, Ruto’s raving criticism of the AU’s inability to fund itself after decades of independence suggests he might have some new ideas. In his final report to the AU Assembly, Kagame pointed to the need for member states to address political will to improve the AU.
The new champion’s work is, thus, cut out for him as the implementation of most AU reform milestones rely on the political will of his peers. The process faces considerable obstacles, not least resistance by member states, and the change of guards will bring new perspectives to the table but likely no change in outcomes.
Summit of little about many crises
Despite many peace and security issues, only Libya was tabled as a major issue for discussion. Many other crises were lumped together in the annual statutory state of peace and security report. For many concerned about Sudan and similar situations, the attention on crises was inadequate and not commensurate with the enormity of threats. Most significant were the DRC mini-summit that took place on the summit's sidelines and the prominence of pronouncements on the Gaza war.
Sparse attendance at the event prompted inquiries about African leaders' commitment
However, although both Kagame and President Felix Tshisekedi were in the same room, the summit failed to move beyond expression of hard stands, tough talks and trading of blame between the neighbours. The mini-summit, however, opened the lid covering the simmering tensions between the two. Short of swift regional action to de-escalate the situation, there is heightened risk of deterioration with major consequences for the region and the eastern DRC crisis.
Enhancing summit effectiveness
The summit failed to provide definitive leadership on crisis management. This leaves the continent questioning when the DRC, Sudan and Sahel crises will receive the high-level attention they deserve and what the AU Assembly should focus on amid competing interests. For many Africans, the increasing lack of strong leadership on crisis handling suggests a fatigue in conflict management or a waning of the search for stability in the context of ‘the Africa we want’ ideal.
Low participation of heads of state is another reality to be improved if the summits are to be effective. An Institute for Security Studies seminar revealed that 26 heads of state, six prime ministers, seven vice presidents, seven foreign ministers, five non-African delegations and 14 international organisations participated in 37th summit.
The absence of many heads of state raised questions as to whether Africa’s leaders are giving its many challenges the needed attention. Is apathy emerging among even heads of state, especially when those leaders often attend meetings organised by other partners?
Furthermore, most heads of state fly back to their capitals by the end of day one of the summit. Members of Africa’s apex decision-making body, the AU Assembly, should, at the barest minimum, participate in an annual two-day decision-making meeting. Instead, it has become the norm that summit sessions, which often run late into the night, are often attended by ambassadors rather than presidents. This delays decision-making, resulting in late finalisation of summit outcomes.
Many argue that ambassadors or foreign ministers sitting in for their heads of state does not imply a lack of participation. However, given Africa’s desperate need to manage several peace, security and governance issues, the presence of heads of state symbolises seriousness and commitment to addressing issues of prime concern to Africa’s citizens.
