Will Kenya investigate and prosecute Sudan’s RSF?
Prosecuting Rapid Support Forces members in Kenya won’t be easy, but will ultimately depend more on politics than on law or capacity.
In June, two non-profit human rights organisations filed a criminal complaint with Kenya’s Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of 12 Sudanese victims. They called on Kenyan authorities to investigate Rapid Support Forces (RSF) members for alleged international crimes committed during Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Kenya is still deciding whether it will investigate.
The filing by Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies concerns torture, unlawful detention, conflict-related sexual violence and killings committed in and around Khartoum between April 2023 and March 2025.
Kenya’s 2009 International Crimes Act, which domesticates the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute, permits the prosecution of foreign nationals when the alleged perpetrator is present in Kenya. This provision may explain why the complaint was filed in Kenya rather than Uganda or Ethiopia, both of which recognise universal jurisdiction and have experience prosecuting international crimes. The filing says some RSF suspects have ties to Kenya and travel through the country. It doesn’t identify them or their whereabouts.
Kenya has no sustained record of prosecuting international crimes, so it lacks the institutional practices of countries with specialised universal jurisdiction or international crimes units.
Credible investigations of RSF members would require expertise in international criminal law, command responsibility, conflict-related sexual violence, digital and financial evidence, witness protection and mutual legal assistance. Establishing the responsibility of RSF leaders, when needed, would require reconstructing command structures and linking direct perpetrators to those who ordered, enabled or failed to prevent their conduct.
The complaint poses legal, evidentiary and institutional challenges, but they aren’t insurmountable
The complaint raises difficult legal, evidentiary and institutional questions. Can Kenya build a case without access to Sudanese crime scenes? Will testimony and documentation gathered by victims, refugees and civil society satisfy criminal evidentiary standards? Kenyan investigators cannot independently inspect facilities, seize records, exhume graves or compel witnesses in Sudan. Continuing insecurity and uncertain cooperation from Sudan’s authorities make conventional investigation difficult.
Nevertheless, these challenges are not insurmountable. Kenya’s technical and institutional limitations could be mitigated through cooperation under its 2011 Mutual Legal Assistance Act or through a regional body like the African Union, which may need to establish an MLA team.
Such cooperation could enable investigators to interview victims and witnesses outside Sudan and obtain medical, digital, travel, financial and other records. Germany’s al-Khatib trial concerning Syria and the Netherlands’ prosecution of Eshetu Alemu for crimes in Ethiopia prove the value of refugee and diaspora testimony. To gain access, Kenya would need host-country cooperation along with authentication and witness-protection safeguards.
External funding and specialist expertise could reduce the cost and institutional burden of a universal jurisdiction investigation, making Kenyan authorities more willing and able to proceed despite competing criminal justice demands.
The more decisive obstacle may be political rather than legal or technical. Would Kenya investigate an armed movement whose leaders and associates have reportedly enjoyed political access, residence and protection in the country? The complaint tests not only Kenya’s laws and capacity but also its willingness to use them when accountability carries a political cost.
Kenya’s close ties with the UAE, the RSF’s main benefactor, blur diplomatic and accountability interests
President William Ruto has condemned Sudan’s war, criticised both SAF and RSF commanders and called for international action. Yet his remarks emphasise dialogue and conflict resolution rather than justice. Even his 2025 statements did not demand accountability despite calls for justice following atrocities in El Fasher, which a United Nations Fact-Finding Mission found displayed ‘hallmarks of genocide.’
Ruto faces competing considerations. His experience with the ICC may shape his approach to international justice. Following Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence, the court accused him of co-perpetrating crimes against humanity and other inhumane acts. This ended in 2016 with ‘no case to answer’ after witness tampering.
Ruto’s alleged ties to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) and Kenya’s close relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the RSF’s primary benefactor, further blur personal, diplomatic and accountability interests.
Proxy conflicts in the region are also a factor. An anonymous Kenyan legal expert told ISS Today that LAW’s focus on the RSF could be seen as selective justice, obscuring alleged SAF crimes and interpreted as part of wider efforts to counter the UAE.
The complaint also strays into Kenyan politics by rekindling the country’s history with the ICC. The filing could encourage further civil society litigation that expands access to justice, but would also be influenced by domestic political considerations.
The complaint strays into Kenyan politics by rekindling the country’s history with the ICC
Opposition figures are already exploiting the controversy. Democracy for Citizens Party leader Rigathi Gachagua accused Ruto of profiting from Sudan’s conflict. Wiper Patriotic Front leader Kalonzo Musyoka, without directly criticising Ruto, asked Sudan to lift its ban on Kenyan tea imports, imposed after Kenya hosted RSF-aligned meetings in 2025.
Banning a key export item, alongside disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, has increased the cost of living for Kenyans and is unsettling Gen Z ahead of the 2027 elections.
Ruto’s administration nevertheless maintains that Kenya is committed to facilitating a negotiated settlement to the war in Sudan. But unless complemented by accountability mechanisms, this position will revive the damaging peace vs. justice debate that Kenyans know well.
What began as an attempt to hold the RSF accountable is now morphing into politics. Without a strategy sensitive to local civil society and political realities, the litigation could affect Ruto’s electoral interests and undermine Kenya’s mediation ambitions and the objectives of civil society organisations pursuing justice.
On the plus side, the case could create an official record of victims’ allegations, affirm their ability to seek justice beyond Sudan and inspire complaints elsewhere. Its greatest legacy may be catalytic rather than prosecutorial: testing Kenya’s universal jurisdiction framework, exposing the politics shaping its application, and expanding avenues for Sudanese victims to challenge impunity.
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