The Uncertain Future of Libya After Qaddafi's Fall
The Libyan people deserve better governance, but the NATO forces' many violations of international law and the not-so-national character of the rebels do not augur well for the uncertain future of the country.
Published on 26 August 2011 in
ISS Today
By
Issaka K. Souaré
Regional Adviser, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin
Issaka K. Souaré, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
In countries where governance is very personalised, the political regime often crumbles quickly when that person has been removed from power. The rebel advance into Tripoli and reported control of the main symbols of Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s power suggest that Qaddafi’s rule over Libya is all but over. After many years of democracy on the continent, Qaddafi’s Libya and King Mswati’s Swaziland were now the only African countries with no multi-party political systems. Qaddafi’s Libya was everything but democratic, and while he did many good things for his people and for the African continent both during and after his ‘arsonist years’, he could have done far better for the former. After almost 42 years (September 1969 to August 2011) of unrivalled rule, the Libyan people deserve a better system of governance. Qaddafi’s departure from power is therefore both desirable and overdue. But there are concerns with the way he left and the potential consequences of this situation.
These concerns are based on at least two considerations, namely a normative and a teleological one. The normative one is that his fall was made possible by powerful states in flagrant violation of the mandate initially conferred by the UN Security Council (UNSC) through resolutions 1970 (26 February 2011) and 1973 (17 March 2011). While the UN had authorised an international force to ensure the ‘protection of civilians’ and initiate political dialogue, the NATO countries that decided to implement the resolutions sided with the rebels and refused to consider the option of political process unless on their condition of regime change. In retrospect, it is clear now that some of the countries engaged in the campaign never intended being bound by the UN mandate, unless they had it their way. In an article by Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams in the June issue of the journal International Affairs, it is clear that NATO began moving ships to the Libyan coast at least a week before the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 ‘ a tactic that the Americans used in Iraq in 2003.
In this process NATO forces became culpable of what they were meant to prevent, namely the killing of civilians. In fact, NATO may not be exonerated for the deaths of some of the more than 1 000 people reported to have died in Tripoli in the rebel offensive on the capital, as their aerial bombardments continued throughout. In one instance, the Director-General of UNESCO was so furious about a NATO airstrike that killed three journalists at the Libyan television station on 30 July that she described it as unacceptable. She found it to be in violation of UNSC Resolution 1738 (2006), which condemns acts of violence against journalists, and ‘contrary to the principles of the Geneva Conventions that establish the civilian status of journalists in times of war, even when they engage in propaganda’.
The points made above relate to the norms and principles of international law. But international relations being what it is, if one were to adopt a teleological approach, which is concerned only with finalities and outcomes, one could justify a course of action that violates the norms but leads to the desired outcome, the ends thereby justifying the means. However, the way in which Qaddafi was overthrown does not guarantee the declared desired outcome either. The declared desirable outcome is to ensure peace and stability in Libya in a climate of participatory democracy and equal prosperity for all Libyan people. It should be acknowledged, however, that the way in which Qaddafi fell may be in conformity with some other outcomes. One such outcome could be that the countries engaged in the campaign will have in power some fairly malleable people who can be manipulated in order to get certain benefits from the very rich North African country.
These benefits include oil and lucrative contracts in rebuilding infrastructure or supplying weapons. Given that the US Africa Command (Africom) was very active in the early days of the military campaign in Libya, as confirmed by Jonathan Stevenson in his article on ‘AFRICOM’s Libyan Expedition’ (Foreign Affairs, 9 May), would it not be a success for the Americans to negotiate the establishment of the military unit’s African base in Libya? After all, the country is strategically located between Egypt, Tunisia and the Sahel. It should be recalled that in 1970 Qaddafi had closed the American Wheelus Air Base, which had been located near Tripoli since the country’s independence in 1951.
Returning to the declared objective of the campaign, one could fear an Iraq or Somalia-type of situation in Libya in the short term. Already there are pockets of resistance by Qaddafi loyalists in both the capital and other cities, which may not be subdued easily. This view is based on the contemporary history of the country and the regional and tribal composition of the rebels. It should be remembered that Qaddafi’s overthrow of King Idris Sanusi in September 1969 was a blow to the eastern domination of the country. Libya had been colonised by Italy until the defeat of the latter in 1943 during the Second World War. The country was then composed of three distinct regions: Cyrenaica with its capital in Benghazi in the east, Tripolitania with Tripoli as its capital in the west, and Fezzan in the south with its capital in Sebha. France then occupied Fezzan, while Britain occupied the other two regions. When Libya became an independent state in December 1951, it did so as the United Kingdom of Libya, amalgamating the three regions. The then Emir of the British-controlled areas became the king and maintained good relations with the West, particularly the UK and the US, throughout his reign.
The rule of King Idris was characterised by widespread corruption and nepotism, which extended to his tribesmen and people from his eastern region. When Qaddafi gained power, he started off espousing a revolutionary national agenda with the support of people in the east. But he soon fell out with many people in the region, some of whom were killed, while others fled the country. Political dissidents during Qaddafi’s rule came mainly from the east, while Qaddafi promoted his own tribesmen. It is not therefore surprising that the overwhelming majority of Libyan rebels are from the east, where the uprisings-cum-civil war started. If anything, the flag of the kingdom being used by the rebels is a stark reminder of these historical fault lines. Also, almost all 13 known members of the rebel Transitional National Council (TNC) are from the same region, which is likely to fuel instability in the country, particularly when the TNC leadership insists on trying all those who were associated with Qaddafi, as though its head was not Qaddafi’s Justice Minister for many years. So Qaddafi has genuine supporters, at least from his Qaddafah tribe, as well as supporters by default, namely those who fear rebel reprisals.
Besides this ‘external threat’ to Libya’s ‘new rulers’, instability is also likely to emerge from within their own ranks, now that their common enemy has fallen. It is not a secret that the TNC is not a homogenous force. Battle lines are likely to be drawn between those who had served Qaddafi and others, on the one hand, and eastern Libyan intellectuals in the diaspora who may want to take part in the post-Qaddafi Libya and believe they are better educated, on the other. It is also not clear whether the various foreign backers of the rebels will be unanimous on the future political and economic directions of the country, which could lead to each siding with their favoured factions.
All of these factors lead to the conclusion that the African Union’s road map for political dialogue had been the best solution for the country, as the continental body did not insist on implementing it alone, and Western countries could have joined forces with it to ensure that it led to the declared desired outcome. As this was not the case and the recognition of the rebel entity by the AU is now on top of the agenda, the AU should use that card to strategically position itself and ensure that the sections of the proposal that are still relevant can be implemented.
