The Security Situation in the DRC Since the Arrest of Laurent Nkunda
Since the beginning of 2009, particularly since the arrest of Laurent
Nkunda of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) on
22 January 2009, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) has experienced in a wait-and-see situation. The surprising
rapprochement between Rwanda and the DRC that led to the joint military
operation “Umoja Wetu” (Our unity) against the FDLR also created space
for the CNDP to abandon its armed conflict. In late February 2009, for
example, reports abounded about the beginning of the disarmament and
integration of CNDP elements into the FARDC, the national army.
International observers considered it a milestone in the greater process
towards restoring stability in the region, as the integration is
susceptible to create a united and integrated national armed forces in
the country, after years of hostilities between fragmented armed groups,
including the FARDC.
However, the masquerades continue as the CNDP soldiers have not gone
properly through the DDR process. They have mainly maintained their
command structures and respond continuously to their CNDP Commander and
successor of Nkunda, Bosco Ntaganda, also called the ‘Terminator’. The
harmonious working relations between the CNDP and the Congolese
government have gone to the extent that all indicators currently point
at Ntaganda as the second in command of the FARDC brigade in South Kivus
fighting the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). A
recent report published by a UN group of experts suggests they are in
possession of evidence of Ntaganda’s involvement in the operations. The
decision of the Congolese government to entrust the position to
Ntanganda of deputy commander for military operations in South Kivus
seems to be informed by the fact that he has experience in fighting this
group. He further proved this experience during the ongoing joint
FARDC-MONUC operation , termed ‘Kimia II’.
But despite the apparent positive impact of this cooperation on the
peace process, this prominent role given to Ntaganda might in the long
run prove very problematic and this has led to both the FARDC and the UN
peacekeeping mission (MONUC) to deny his involvement in this operation.
The problem is that Ntaganda is charged with war crimes by the
International Criminal Court (ICC), based on allegations that he
recruited child soldiers under the age of 15 and for commanding his
troops in the massacres of both Mongbwalu, Ituri district, in 2002 and
in Kiwanja, North Kivu province, in 2008 – killing approximately a
thousand people. The ICC has therefore issued an arrest warrant against
him in 2006.
The issue has led to a great controversy as several sources witness
his appointment at a high-ranking position within the FARDC and the role
he reportedly played in the said joint operation. Yet the national army
– the DRC having ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC and having handed
over other suspects to the Court – and/or MONUC are expected to arrest
and deliver him to the Hague for trial. Not doing so adds to the growing
perceptions that politics – either national or international – seems to
play a role in the timing of certain decisions of the Court,
particularly in relation to the timing of the issuance of arrest
warrants or the emphasis put on the need to arrest a particular
individual.
Returning to the issue of DDR, it is worth recalling the apparent
common practice in the DRC to incorporate former rebel leaders into the
FARDC when their soldiers are integrated. But the problem with most
rebel leaders is that when posted, they refuse deployment away from
their former battleground. The integration approach has proven highly
risky as was seen in 2007 with the failed integration of Laurent Nkunda
and his troops. A short while later Nkunda began recruiting among the
FARDC troops. He eventually pulled out of the integration process and
with him followed thousands of new soldiers, thus increasing his
stronghold, particularly in the North Kivu.
Though this scenario could replay its course, it however seems as if
the greater cohesive concern to peace revolves around the still
non-resolved question of the FDLR. A few factors indicate that CNDP
might not return to armed fighting again:
-
In continuation of the fragmentation of the CNDP, when Nkunda
was ousted as its leader, several members of the movements executive
committee fled the DRC, taking with them their financial linkages, thus
cutting off the external support networks of the CNDP;
-
The CNDP signed a peace accord with the Kinshasa government on 16
January, and meetings between the parties occurred recently in Kinshasa
in an attempt to make sure both parties respect the commitments;
-
The CNDP are seeking political influence and cannot afford further loss of credibility;
-
As peace restoration nears, the CNDP will benefit from having laid down arms voluntarily in contrast to the FDLR;
-
The Government of Rwanda, who faced massive criticism after a UN
Report published in December 2008 brought evidence of its support of the
CNDP and Nkunda, seems to have changed its strategy. By sacrificing
Laurent Nkunda, and restoring diplomatic relations with Kinshasa, Rwanda
primarily wanted to restore its battered external image. In the same
vein, the country also opened new opportunities for peace in the region.
-
Last but not least, the conduct of warfare by rebel groups
has become extremely difficult, as their primary source of income has
been restrained. The rebel groups rely heavily on income from natural
resources in the eastern Congo. Due to the global financial crisis,
global demand for these resources has fallen, and companies increasingly
stop purchasing natural resources from the rebel groups (e.g. the
Belgian giant Traxys), not at least from the pressure posed by the
revealing report of the UN in December 2008.
The recent military-diplomatic rapprochement between Kigali and
Kinshasa as well as the embeddedness of the CNDP appear to be a welcome
step towards peace in the region. However, the lack of consensus on how
to address the question of the FDLR remains the biggest threat to the
new appeasement ,just as political instability in Kinshasa weakens the
bargaining position of the DRC. In the meantime, the FDLR has amply
displayed its spoiling capacity by killing large numbers of civilians,
as repraisals for the joint Congolese and Rwandan operation. Without
sustainable improvement on the humanitarian side no political situation
will survive the short term. Finally, one can say that in the eastern
DRC, plus ça change…
Jimmi Lutete Larsen, Intern, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
