The Sahel: Is There a Solution to the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali?
The ongoing Tuareg-led rebellion in Northern Mali is a regional security threat. It needs a joint and coherent approach from the main actors to restore peace and save the democratisation process, however territorial integrity of Mali is likely to be a non-negotiable.
David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Pretoria
The Tuareg-led rebellion in Mali continues to rage on. There are
daily reports of defeat and successes on both sides - the side of the rebels
and of the Malian army. At the same time, many questions are asked as to how
some 600 rebel soldiers could pose such a serious threat to a national army? And
what kind of solution is acceptable to preserve both the territorial integrity
of Mali and its democracy?
Beyond the fact that the
demise of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the subsequent proliferation
of arms in the region have fuelled the National Movement for the Liberation of
Azawad (MNLA) insurgency in Mali, as well as the activities of Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), it is essential to locate the on going rebellion within
the complex security web of the Sahel. Past and
current insurgencies of the Tuaregs in Mali emanate from a number of historical
and current circumstances, some of which date back to the pre-colonial era. Since
independence in the early 1960s, there have been a number of phases in the evolution
of the Tuareg question: the period of chronic political instability; the
post-Cold War unfulfilled aspirations to socio-economic and political transformation;
and finally, the US-led war on terrorism in the Sahel region. Each of these
elements has affected the Tuareg problem in one way or another, particularly in
Mali and Niger.
Yet the main factor at play currently seems to
be the perpetual resistance by some communities (mostly radical Tuaregs) to
accept the idea and the authority of post-colonial states, as weak and fragile
as they may be, led by Africans. From the early years of independence, most of
the Tuareg leaders tended to view the new African leadership of their countries
with resentment and contempt. For their part, the new national leaders tended
to view Tuaregs as economically and socially backward, and their subsistence
pastoralism and nomadism as an obstacle to national development. The relations between
the Tuaregs and the rest of the population in other regions of West Africa also
deteriorated with the resurgence of violence, as well as the alleged
master-slave mentality of the some Tuareg communities. It is even possible to discern
elements of a revenge motive amongst some of the MNLA’s current leaders
including Mohamed Ag Najeem, whose father was killed
during the first rebellion in 1963.
Contrary to previous rebellions, the MNLA has raised the stakes by
calling for an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. The fallacious
rationale is that they will be able to fight terrorism in the region if they
became independent. In addition, the weapons brought from Libya and their
experience in Gaddafi’s army continues to sustain their offensive. One of the
main concerns is whether the rebellion will last or fade as the group runs
short of ammunition. At this stage, one thus
needs to focus on the supply channels through which they obtain weapons. Two
hypotheses could be envisaged. Firstly, the MNLA could take advantage of the on
going instability in Libya and exploit the loopholes in the national security
arrangements to continue having access to Libyan weapons. Secondly, the group
could also rely on the informal networks of arms trafficking so well developed
in the region. In this case, collaboration with AQIM, even though officially
denied, would be out of necessity and convenience.
In the meantime, the
insurgents rely on “hit and run” tactics which consist of attacking government
positions and retreating to the desert since they do not have the necessary
means to sustain their military offensive. Some reports however have suggested
that the rebellion has received support and endorsement from former Libyan
high-ranking military officers including General Ali Kanna, Colonels Seid
Intalla and Lech Didi. According to Mali’s Foreign Minister, Soumeylou Boubeye
Maiga these former military officials have access to anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons as well as enough small arms to be able to put up a fight against the
Malian army. There have been both government and civilian casualties in Mali and
more than 195 000 people have fled their homes since mid-January. Recently an
important military base was also taken from the national army in Tessalit.
Neither Mali, nor the MNLA is able to sustain a protracted war and
ways should be found to ease the suffering of the displaced people. Yet calls
for a peaceful settlement are not coherently articulated and the main actors in
the crisis seem to doubt the sincerity of the other’s engagement. Indeed, the
resurgence of the Tuareg rebellion is causing tension among regional and
external actors. While Algeria is opposed to any foreign military base in the
Sahel, there is a fear of the instrumentalisation of the NMLA for the control
of the region and its natural resources. Another factor that fuelled Bamako’s
concern is the alleged claim from the NMLA that France and Qatar ought to be
the preferred mediators in the conflict.
It is not clear what would France’s interest be in an unstable Mali.
And it would be extremely risky to seek the instrumentalisation of the NMLA to
reach out to AQIM, let alone use this strategy for the liberation of the
hostages held by AQIM. It is also important to highlight the fact that key
regional and extra-regional actors need to cooperate and work on a coherent and
medium to long-term regional security strategy to mitigate the security risks
in the Sahel. That dialogue among the key actors still has to take place.
Meanwhile some opposition forces in Mali are of the opinion that the
government should have expected the resumption of the insurgency due to the
evolution of the security situation in the region, but that it failed to devise
a preventive strategy to counter the negative impact of the citizens returning
from Libya with heavy weapons. Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT),
after all, is very familiar with the security problems in Northern Mali and has
given preference to dialogue with the insurgents over the years.
Recently, Mali also launched a special programme for the restoration
of state authority in the region - a programme that sought to address some of
the socio-economic grievances aired by concerned communities. The programme
also aims at reducing the influence of AQIM on the youth by offering them
socio-economic alternatives. As ATT comes to the end of his 2nd term
as president, with no intention to manipulate the constitution of the country
to hang onto power, he hopes to leave a legacy of a peaceful and consolidated
democracy in Mali. This might be compromised if he fails to reach a peace
agreement with the insurgents and to offer enough guarantees that peace
provisions will be implemented by an eventual new president.
Whatever
agreement is reached; the issue of territorial integrity of Mali is likely to
be non-negotiable. The creation of an independent Azawad state with a few
hundred rebels, will certainly be a source of further instability. It is also clear
that while some problems remain, many efforts were made to substantially
improve the integration of Tuaregs into Malian society and various state institutions.
Negotiations and peace agreements should seek to consolidate the implementation
of these efforts.
