The North African Revolutionary Train
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have profound implications for all of North Africa. The African Union should actively get involved, firstly by establishing contact groups to engage with Tunisia and Egypt.
Issaka K Souaré, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
Friday is the most symbolic day in the Islamic calendar. Two Fridays of 2011 – perhaps more to come – shall be remembered as historic days in the contemporary history of North Africa, which is predominately Muslim. The first one, 14 January, saw the downfall of Tunisian dictator, Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali, while the second one, 11 February, brought down his Egyptian counterpart, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak (82).
Mubarak’s forced resignation came after three decades of autocratic rule and 18 straight days of mass protests across the country and the death of some 300 people. The former Egyptian ruler handed power to a Supreme Military Council (SMC), led by Defence Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (75). Unlike the widely despised police and Mukhabaraat (intelligence) services, the army largely managed to maintain the confidence of the majority of the populations throughout the years of Mubarak’s regime. The benign stance of the army vis-à-vis the protesters added to this sense of respect for and popular confidence in them.
As in the case of Ben Ali, Mubarak’s downfall can be explained by the reaction of the Egyptian masses to the combined effects of political oppression, grand corruption of senior government officials, huge gaps between those close to power and ordinary people, and growing levels of poverty and unemployment among the majority of the populations, particularly the educated youths. A recent report in the British Guardian newspaper estimated the stolen wealth of Mubarak and his family at between 40 and 70 billion US dollars, deposited or invested mainly in some Western and Arabian capitals. A further factor that sets the Egyptian case apart from the Tunisian one were the widely suspected plans of Mubarak to have one of his sons, Gamal, succeed him at the helm of the country.
The departure of Mubarak is only one element of the Egyptian revolt, which will only become a true revolution when other demands of the protesters have been met. In its fifth communiqué issued on 13 February, the SMC announced the dissolution of the National Assembly (both chambers), the suspension of the constitution, and the eminent establishment of a constitutional review committee. It also announced that new elections would be organised within six months, indicating that they have no intention to remain in power. While these are encouraging signs, it will be more reassuring for the success of the revolution that opposition movements are closely associated with all the transitional arrangements, from the new government that the junta has promised to appoint soon, to the various reform committees, particularly that of the constitution. But one thing is almost certain: the new authorities in Cairo must be conscious of the fact that the popular wind that lifted the firmly rooted Mubarak tree may not take long to do the same to them if they did not respond to their demands.
The international handling and potential implications of the Tunisian and Egyptian ‘revolutions’ beg two important questions. The first one relates to the probable next stop of the North African ‘revolutionary train’ and who will be its third famous passenger after the Egyptian halt. The other question seeks to establish the position of other African countries and the AU in particular with regard to what is happening in the North.
Concerning the first question, it should be acknowledged that while there are many similarities between the various North African countries, there are also differences. Of the six countries in the region, Algeria and Mauritania are perhaps most vulnerable to the current wind than any other one, which does not imply any immunity for the latter. Although both countries had elections in 2009, there are more pronounced pockets of resistance than elsewhere. In Mauritania, the racial question is still a problem and the putschist-cum-elected resident Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz is yet to win the hearts and minds of the hundreds of thousands of Mauritanians that have not come to terms with the way in which he overthrew the first democratically elected president of his country. For President Abdoulaziz Bouteflika in Algeria, his re-election in April 2009 followed a controversial constitutional amendment in November 2008 in which he abolished the term limit provision, as he approached the end of his second and last term. The high unemployment rates in the two countries and an Egyptian-like state of emergency in Algeria since 1992 constitute elements of popular uprisings. However, the protests in these countries may not necessarily lead to the departure of their leaders, but they must carry out significant reforms.
The grip of Colonel Muammar Kaddafi seems very much firm on Libya to allow any risky popular revolt. The very generous patronage system of the powerful clans of the Jamahiriyah that Kaddafi operates might still keep him afloat for sometime, albeit not be forever. Morocco is in a better posture with regard to the revolutionary train, but it is not entirely immune. There is still oppression in the country, and corruption is rampant, but there have also been many incremental steps to open up the political space, particularly since King Mohamed VI succeeded his deceased father in 1999. The very neglected northeastern Berber countries under his father have also benefited from increased attention in terms of development projects. Berber identity is also being widely recognised. Most importantly, the Makhzen (monarchy) still retains some political and religious esteem by a significant majority of Moroccans, who are likely to focus their protests on the government led by an elected prime minister than to target the king. Perhaps the Achilles’ hill of the Moroccan regime is the Western Saharan question, for whose resolution it must take serious steps. The king will also be well advised to devolve more executive powers to the Prime Minister and make parliament more independent.
Regarding the position of other African states and the African Union (AU) as the continental body, there seems to be total silence, at least in public. While it is understandable that individual African countries could not be involved in any pronounced way, the AU could do better than issuing two communiqués, stating its preoccupation about what is happening in the two countries. The AU should seize the opportunity offered by the departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak to accompany the people of the two countries so that anti-revolutionary forces do not recuperate their gains. So far, Europeans seem to be taking the lead in Tunisia while the Americans might be the scene setters in Egypt.
Simply put, what happened in both countries are unconstitutional changes of government, albeit welcome ones. The AU could thus set up an international contact group on each of the two countries whose task will be to accompany or put pressure on the new authorities so that they respond to the demands of the people, by carrying out the necessary structural and constitutional reforms and by organising free, credible and inclusive elections. By doing this, the AU will not only have played a natural role of a continental body; it might also counter some of the tendencies that seek to divide the continent between ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ Africa.
