South Sudan's Referendum and Its Possible Implications
On 9 January 2011, Sudan, Africa's largest country by territory, faces a decisive moment. Its semi autonomous South goes to a referendum to decide whether to remain part of a united Sudan or to secede.
Published on 01 December 2010 in
ISS Today
By
Emmanuel Kisiangani, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria office
On 9 January 2011, Sudan, Africa`s largest country by territory, faces a decisive moment. Its semi autonomous South goes to a referendum to decide whether to remain part of a united Sudan or to secede. In a separate plebiscite, the people of the oil rich Abyei region, located at the North-South border, will choose to either join the South or remain with the North in the event of a Southern secession. In a country where, in geopolitical terms, the idea of the ‘State’ seems to be in perpetual conflict with that of ‘ethnic and religious’ identities, the upcoming plescibite will be significant, not only for the future of this benighted country, but also for the strategic and security interests of its neighbours and the broader international community. The referendum, regardless of its outcome, promises to alter the face of Sudan and the question of what will happen after, remains key at this point in time.
With less than eight weeks to go, tensions have been rising with the two sides, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), exchanging recriminations over, among others, the voter registration process and allegations over attempts to manipulate the outcome of the referendum. The final decision on the referendum requires a simple majority of 50 per cent plus one vote cast, contingent upon 60 per cent of registered voters casting their votes. The leadership in the North and the South, however, remain divided on a number of issues, including the North-South border demarcation, ownership of the disputed Abyei region and post-referendum arrangements relating to security, liabilities and assets, oil revenue sharing and citizenship, among others.
While the voter registration process began on 15 November after a three-month delay, the turnout in the North, where hundreds of thousands of Southerners live, has been extremely low. The NCP has attributed this to what it sees as the South’s covert calls for boycott and variously threatened not to recognise the referendum outcome. And whereas the South Sudan governmen’t estimates the Southern population in the North at some 1.5 million, the North has put the figure at between 2.5 and 5 million, in what the South sees as Khartoum’s attempt to register ghost voters so as to make the 60 per cent voter turnout unachievable.
Indeed, both parties bear a share of responsibility in the deterioration of their relationship. Despite President Omar Al-Bashir pledging to respect the will of the people of Southern Sudan should they choose to secede, it is quite evident that the NCP does not see much benefit in the referendum unlike the SPLM which sees a vote for separation as a vote for ‘freedom’. The absence of a common vision over a number of CPA provisions, including the referendum itself, has resulted in a ‘cold war’ mentality that is not conducive for peace and stability in the Sudan. For instance, with regard to the Abyei referendum, the two sides have not agreed on the composition of the referendum committee and remain at loggerheads over who has the right to vote. In reality, overcoming the adversarial approach to resolving issues is the real challenge for local, regional and international stakeholders as the country approaches the referendum vote.
Given the politically defining nature of the two events, it is important to ask whether Sudan is sufficiently prepared for the vote and the implications of its outcome on both the North and the South. Most analyses on the referendum have not focused on its potential implications for the North. Assuming the South secedes, the North will have to deal with the issue of diminished resources (given that it gets much of its revenue for oil from the South) and will also have to reconfigure its governmental structures and its constitution to reflect the new realities.
Concerning the South, the question has been the viability of the independent state in the event of secession. In a region with only about 65 kilometres of tarmac, and amid claims of corruption and nepotism in the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), there are genuine fears that an ‘indepenent South Sudan’ is likely to face serious, although surmountable challenges to bring about programmes that willl fulfill the socio-economic expectations of the people. There are also concerns, whether misplaced or otherwise, that secession may lead the SPLM to consolidate power and repress local opposition voices to its rule, like has been the case with various other African countries. Some reports have also alleged divisions within SPLM and in view of previous inter-ethnic clashes that have claimed about 2,500 people and displaced thousands of others, instability in the SPLM could possibly stir up ethnic tensions in South and further threaten the region’s social fabric. South Sudan, however, is a region richly endowed with large oil reserves, good fertile soil and many other minerals such as uranium, gold, and cooper, and if it can manage these resources well, it has the potential to become a viable state and important actor in the region and beyond.
As the referendum date draws near, however, the road to lasting peace in Sudan remains precarious and uncertain. After years of conflict, the signing of the CPA was more or less like a road map to rescue the country from the chronic cycle of conflict and to allow the people of the Sudan an opportunity for reasonable democratic transformation. However, with both parties playing a game of brinkmanship, the fears of the consequences of a fresh conflict have to be put into perspective. The current fragile context, therefore,calls for robust engagement from local and international stakeholders to avoid any relapse into armed conflict. So far a number of actors including the United States and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, have done relatively well to minimise overt hostilities and to facilitate the negotiation of post-2011 referendum issues, despite not reaching consensus on a number of them.
The United States has outlined a number of incentives towards both the North and South Sudan should they facilitate the successful conduct of the referendum.These include the prospect of lifting sanctions (that involve restrictions on trade and investment and the freezing of assets of certain Sudanese government officials, among others), the possibility of removing Sudan from the list of ‘states sponsoring terrorism’ and re-engaging economically, if Sudanese leaders made progress in resolving the outstanding issues towards the referendum and improving the situation in the troubled Darfur region.
In a country characterised by insidious conflict and political fragmentation that have, for long, been a focus of much concern on the continent, the upcoming referendum, if it occurs on schedule, will be a fulfillment of the last key pillar in the implementation of the CPA. Depending on how it is managed, Sudan’s upcoming referendum could mark a milestone in the positive transformation of the country. But if badly managed, it could unravel the relative peace seen in the North-South relations since the signing of the CPA in 2005. Ultimately, however, it is the people of Sudan who understand their problems best and who should be allowed to chart their destiny. What the international community should do is to facilitate the processes and not seek to impose solutions.
