Post-election Violence in Uganda Unlikely
The conduct of elections is becoming challenging on the African continent. The upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda, on 16 February could lead to post-election violence, however, the participation of many parties is likely to divide and neutralise the opposition
Sandra Adong Oder, Senior Researcher, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
On 16 February Uganda will hold its second multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections since1980. The results of the previous elections, in 2006, were disputed, but though a Supreme Court judgement on the presidential elections confirmed that there had been significant irregularities, it declined to invalidate the outcome.
Since 1980, election periods in Uganda have been characterised by escalating tensions along ethnic and political lines. Predisposing factors for violence in this month’s poll are historical in nature, broadly revolving around legal concerns that include issues relating to the primacy of state institutions, allegations of fraud and electoral malpractice, and an argument about legitimacy that addresses the transparency and fairness of the electoral process. And although none of these will alone determine whether or not violence occurs, the failure to address them may lend strength to forces that may well result in political violence.
Are there good reasons to believe that the results of this month’s Ugandan polls will also be disputed? Uganda’s electoral laws provide clear mechanisms for resolving disputed election results. Since the 2001 elections, the validity of electoral results has consistently been a matter of controversy, fraught with allegations of malpractice and instances of violence. A significant cause of contention for opposition and civil society organisations is that the new election-related laws were not passed in time for the relevant institutions to implement reform measures. It therefore takes no imagination to anticipate violence.
What will be important is how an increasingly despondent opposition will react to defeat for what will effectively be a third time and not be tempted to direct its frustrations against the state apparatus. One could argue that the participation of so many political parties in this month’s poll will divide and neutralise the opposition, fragmenting court challenges and thus distracting the population from concerted action. This would make open post-election violence far less likely.
Ugandans know when they are badly ruled and will, given the chance, eject corrupt and ineffective leaders. To them, elections matter a great deal – even more than the people in the country’s leadership. They know that if there are periodic elections, the chances are that new leaders with vibrant pro-people policies will come into office. Given the trends in Uganda electoral history, however, two facts are inescapable: first, next month’s elections will be more competitive than those held in 2006; and, second, despite elections offering an opportunity for change, this month’s poll will bring to the fore existing tensions and underlying social grievances, but will result in the incumbent winning with an overwhelmingly majority.
This is not in itself a problem; what is cause for profound concern, however, is whether the losing side will have faith in the judiciary to decide any disputes without fear or favour. Whatever the judgments handed down on disputed results, the very involvement of the judiciary can be seen as a positive development, for it will support the process of democratisation in Uganda and represents a major shift from how power has historically been exercised in the past, with a clear move towards a further institutionalisation of political power and a rejection of unconstitutional means to access such power. It is not so much about promoting elections, but rather making certain that leaders adhere to constitutional limits and, in the process, ensuring the continued contestation of such elections.
How will the opposition react to defeat? First, since there is certainly a general lack of cohesion among African opposition forces, and the middle class is generally inimical to democratic radicalism, one would be foolish to expect a mass upheaval. The Ugandan middle class, though small, is quite vocal, but remains trapped in its own survival mode, making the prospect of its members playing a more assertive role in radical democratic experiments very remote.
Second, the opposition has narrowed the issues for debate and confrontation, failing to move away from conservative approaches to political engagement. One positive outcome of this election is that it may lead to opposition reorganisation along more effective lines. In the meantime the opposition parties have to be realistic in confronting their likely failure at the polls, preparing their supporters for a disappointment that appears all but inevitable. This will also contribute to avoiding futile violence.
Thus, the real test for the opposition will only come in 2016 when the fundamentally transformed national political landscape will yield opportunities for genuine engagement. Fundamentally, this is good timing, as the aging leadership of the country will have given way to the Young Turks (both within the ruling party and in the opposition) who are ready to lead. They have advocated a new framework for genuine engagement, have discussed real issues that affect the country, and are not shy to point out weaknesses in the current political dispensation. Their courage, sharpness and hands-on approach will endear them to the masses, but they will have to face the tougher task of selling their ideas.
Fortunately, then, after this month’s election, Uganda is unlikely to experience violent post-election conflict or a fragile power-sharing arrangement in which the electorate is blackmailed into accommodating defeated leaders. What will be of concern for the new leader after the February election will not be matters of a domestic nature, but rather the unravelling of a hitherto robust foreign policy. In this case, the primacy of Uganda’s role in the region as an interlocutor for American interests will be a difficult one for the population to accept, since they are no longer prepared to make sacrifices for the well-being of others.
In order to get domestic policy right, the new leader will have to prepare Ugandans for further austerity measures within its domestic environment, but also guard against adverse external threats. A failure to do so could undermine urgent national priorities and make Ugandans hostage to external disturbances, further alienating the country from the positive windfalls that will accrue as the East Africa region heads towards a common currency by 2012 and political federation by 2015. Also, eastern Africa will continue to face a problematic Great Lakes region in which Uganda will continue to play a prominent role, primarily because it intrudes on, and may even sustain, the political and economic agenda of the region’s leaders. A Uganda that has made progress and has become stronger will be a better neighbour, because, ultimately, it is far better for the region to face a strong Uganda than a weak, destabilised one.
