Minerals not the Only Cause of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

The debate on conflict minerals in the Great Lakes has mostly been held in isolation, but to be effective and sustainable, efforts to tackle conflict minerals should be mainstreamed into wider conflict transformation strategies addressing the systemic core causes of conflict in the region.

Published on 23 February 2012 in ISS Today

Nyambura Githaiga, Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Nairobi

The term ‘conflict minerals’ has been used in reference to minerals that have been linked to financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  These minerals are tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold with the first three from the respective ores of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite and wolframite.  The debate over conflict minerals in the Great Lakes region has captured centre stage with the mushrooming of international, regional and national initiatives directed at stopping the flow of the said minerals through a variety of supply chain traceability and disclosure reporting mechanisms. Illegal exploitation of these minerals has indeed been linked to armed conflict in the DRC, but this seemingly one-track focus on conflict minerals has created a silo effect neglecting the systemic issues of regional conflict and insecurity that gave rise to this phenomenon. 

While stemming the flows of these minerals will likely impact on financing of armed conflict, it is no panacea for the violent conflict and insecurity that plagues the Great Lakes region. If we consider conflict in the Great Lakes as a system, it would consist of parts such as historical grievances, unresolved trauma, socio-economic deprivation and political failure.  As a consequence of inadequate political, security and economic administration, conflict minerals are but a part of this system.    To be effective and sustainable, efforts to tackle conflict minerals should be mainstreamed into wider conflict transformation strategies addressing the systemic core causes of conflict in the region. 

Comparing the tepid engagement of the international community during DRC’s recently concluded election polls, to the earnest debates on conflict minerals from the Great Lakes, the focus seems to be biased towards a single dynamic in isolation of the systemic conflict issues in the region.  Arguably, the objective of the conflict minerals debate in the Great Lakes region is not to resolve all parts of the conflict system, however a failure of the initiatives to engage with other elements of the conflict system will be akin to pruning a diseased tree in lieu of uprooting it.

Some of the major initiatives to curb conflict minerals include section 1502 of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, due diligence guidelines of both the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Regional Initiative on Natural Resources (RINR) of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).  The European Union is also advocating greater compliance with the OECD due diligence guidelines.  With a particular focus on the Great Lakes countries, the section 1502 in the US Dodd-Frank Act requires companies listed in the US that are sourcing minerals from DRC and neighbouring countries to issue a public report on their supply chain due diligence to determine if their minerals are ‘DRC conflict free’.  The due diligence guidelines of the UN and OECD, also recommend supply chain traceability.  RINR of ICGLR is the regional approach that focuses on the six aspects of certification, harmonisation, database, formalisation, peer learning and whistleblowing. 

Certain limitations to these initiatives will impact on their feasibility.  Most striking is the lack of attention in any of the initiatives towards addressing or collaborating with stakeholders who are addressing security and socio-economic challenges on which conflict minerals are hinged.  However, looking at the initiatives exclusively from the objectives, which they portend, there are still limitations to their projected efficacy.  For instance, none of these initiatives actually expressly prohibit mining from conflict areas or trading in conflict minerals.  When mining in conflict areas, the emphasis is on disclosure and demonstrable efforts at mitigation as in the case of the due diligence guidelines of the OECD and the UN.  Without any prohibitions, it then becomes a case of willing seller, willing buyer.  If a buyer has no concern as to the origin of the minerals, then the trade of conflict minerals will persist albeit less visibly.  It will be business as usual for countries or companies not bound by national legislation or disinclined to adhere to recommendations of the international bodies. 

Similarly, the lack of harmonisation of these initiatives may create onerous or supplementary demands on a mining sector that already has significant challenges like unregulated artisanal mining.  Without appropriate coordination and harmonisation, these well meaning laws and guidelines which require implementation and collaboration from a local level, will struggle to remain relevant to the realities of the mining industry.

Unintended consequences will also negatively impact on the dynamics of the conflict. First, as conflict minerals are not the only source of funding for illegally armed groups, what is likely to occur is a diversification of conflict financing with adverse effects on local populations and the region as a whole.  They will then diversify their fund raising activities like illegal taxation, illegal trade in timber and raiding local populations.  Second, conflict minerals initiatives target specific constituencies whose compliance will temporarily create a gap that will likely be filled by unscrupulous actors who are not bound by similar mineral regulations thus further accenting global market disparities.  Third, companies that have to comply with new regulations and guidelines may find the requirements burdensome enough to be dissuaded from investing in the mineral industry of the Great Lakes region.  This will be bad for local and regional economies stigmatising minerals from DRC and adjoining countries.  Fourth, as energies are harnessed to eliminate trade in conflict minerals, advocacy efforts will inadvertently be derailed from core causes of the systemic conflict in the Great Lakes.