Madagascar: A Triumvirate to head the Transition Government
On 7 November, Malagasy political protagonists reached an agreement on some of the remaining contentious issues in the country’s political crisis. It took them one week of intense negotiations to reach the deal. Among other things, they have opted for a collegial solution to appoint the head (s) of the transition government. President Andy Rajoelina will have to share his executive powers with two co-presidents (one from the camp of former President Marc Ravalomanana, the other from former President Albert Zafy’s camp).
David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, Pretoria Office
On 7 November, Malagasy political protagonists reached an agreement
on some of the remaining contentious issues in the country’s political
crisis. It took them one week of intense negotiations to reach the
deal. Among other things, they have opted for a collegial solution to
appoint the head (s) of the transition government. President Andy
Rajoelina will have to share his executive powers with two co-presidents
(one from the camp of former President Marc Ravalomanana, the other
from former President Albert Zafy’s camp). There is no clear division
of authority among the three presidents. But it was agreed that all
major decisions would require the approval and the signing of all
three, which gives, at least in theory, a sense of equal authority
among them.
The experience of “Three-Presidents-in-One” or a triumvirate is not
new. And so are the difficulties inherent in such an approach to
political stalemate. In May 1970, Benin put in place a similar
structure that consisted of a “presidential triumvirate” with the
executive position rotating every two years between the three members
of the Committee. Evidently, the formula failed five months into the
presidency of the second leader. Lt Colonel Mathieu Kerekou had
exploited disagreements within the committee to stage his 26 October
1972 coup and established a Marxist-Leninist regime in the country.
With a deep-seated antagonism among the four camps that met in Addis
last week and agreed on this formula, one wonders if the solution
itself is not going be a problem in the end.
The current political crisis in Madagascar began at the beginning of
the year and there are no clear signs of its end. Even though the
leadership issue might be overcome, other positions within the
government are likely to revive tensions, particularly those considered
to be of strategic importance such as Defense, Finance, and Foreign
Affairs portfolios.
Following the signing of Maputo Agreement on 8 August, it was
expected that the second phase of the process, the setting up of the
transitional institutions, would not be easy. It is not that Maputo
arrangements have not provided direction as how to proceed. The Maputo
Charter was quite clear on this aspect, as it left the appointment to
these positions to the discretion of political actors. But the problem
lies in political resistance from all sides. This is what led to the
unilateral decision by Andy Rajeolina to disregard the Maputo consensus
and keep his Prime-Minister Mondja Roindefo. This was understandable
given that Roindefo is a key political and military ally of Rajoelina
and getting rid of him was likely to raise tensions within Rajeolina’s
camp.
It could be argued that SADC’s success in denying Rajeolina the
platform of the UN General Assembly in September reminded Rajoelina
that the regional grouping was a force to reckon with. And because SADC
insisted on a consensual resolution of the crisis, Rajoelina had no
choice but to make concessions to that end. Otherwise, opposition
forces would have had little leverage in the new talks that took place
in Addis Ababa.
As the leader of the transition headed to Addis Ababa for the new
round of talks, Rajoelina appeared weakened by the concessions he had
made throughout. His decision to keep the Maputo deal by sacking his
current Prime Minister was resisted within his camp while Mondja
Roindefo openly opposed it. Albert Zafy, Didier Ratsiraka and Marc
Ravolomanana seemed to have had an upper hand in the process.
Ravolomana continued to impose conditions that were difficult to meet,
including the appointment of a “neutral leader” for the transition
government. He vowed not to legitimise Andy Rajoelina’s appointment.
It needs to be recalled that the power-sharing deal is a
transitional arrangement and should not in any way be seen as a
legitimization of coup makers. In that sense, the most important issue
is how to plan and hold credible elections by the end of 2010. It is
where the opposition including Ravolomanana should put their popularity
to test. While it is essential that ministerial positions be
distributed through consensus, contention around the remaining
positions can only delay the resolution of the crisis while prolonging
the suffering of the citizens.
The Addis meeting was critical for all the Malagasy protagonists. As
indicated by AU Commission chair Jean Ping at the opening of the
talks, each one of the leaders has his responsibility fully engaged in
the resolution or otherwise of the crisis.
Looking at the political landscape, it is clear that Rajeolina and
Ravolomanana are the most influential political actors and political
stability in Madagascar largely depends on their attitude throughout
the transition. But politically, the balance of power could be
constantly shifting making the process long and complex. Some believe
that if an alliance between Rajoelina and the former President Didier
Ratsiraka (who could have commendable support from the east coast and
the city of Toamasina) is confirmed, this could be a powerful political
force, representing a wide range of geographical, political and ethnic
interests behind Rajeolina in 2010 elections.
Ravalomanana for his part has consolidated his original power base
amongst the urban middle class and the business community with some
support for rural community leaders in various regions. He might see
this as the basis for a comeback, if he can overcome the current urban
popular resentment about his business interests and previous leadership
as president. But in the present mood, with the economy depressed, as
it has been demonstrated during the riots leading up to his
destitution, there could be a popular welcome for fresh faces, who are
seen as largely untainted by the rivalries of the past decades. Only
free, fair and credible elections could provide a definite answer to
this equation. The problem is that nobody knows if these elections will
be held - and whether the unholy trinity will survive.