How ECOWAS can make its new counter-terrorism force effective

Resourcing is key, but the real test will be whether the brigade can coordinate with the AES Unified Force.

Published on 25 March 2026 in ISS Today

By

Hassane Koné
Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel

In February, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) chiefs of staff endorsed the establishment of a regional force to combat terrorism and insecurity. The force falls within the framework of the ECOWAS Standby Force as provided for by the African Union (AU).

Announced in August 2025, the force was initially intended to comprise 260 000 troops with an estimated annual budget of US$2.5 billion. However, the military chiefs opted for a counter-terrorism brigade of 1 650 soldiers to form the core of the force.

Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal reaffirmed their commitment to providing troops. Contingents will be stationed in their respective countries, ready for deployment.

ECOWAS has discussed the creation of a regional standby force since 2004. The bloc has sought a military instrument to replace the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, which intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s and Côte d’Ivoire in the early 2000s.

For over a decade, ECOWAS has been criticised for its inaction in the face of terrorism and insecurity

However, member states have lacked the resources, funding and political will to turn this ambition into reality. Several announcements in recent years regarding activating the standby force or creating a new counter-terrorism force have not materialised. For over a decade, this has exposed ECOWAS to criticism for its inaction in the face of terrorism and insecurity in the region.

The February decision signals the organisation’s desire to restore its credibility and check the expansion of terrorism towards Gulf of Guinea countries, which risks plunging the region into widespread insecurity.

Creating a force is not the hardest part – the real challenge is making it operational and effective. To achieve this, ECOWAS needs to overcome the recurring issues of political will, financing and logistics.

Countries that have pledged contributions should make them available from the moment the force is constituted. These troops must be well equipped, trained and motivated to confront the asymmetric attacks of terrorist groups that are constantly innovating and adapting. That means experienced and responsive units are needed.

Above all, ECOWAS must secure predictable, sustained funding for its force. The principle of self-financing guarantees autonomy and will spare it the fate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and Accra Initiative, which have been hampered by dependency on external partners.

Questions arise about the brigade’s manoeuvrability against terrorist groups that move fast and cross borders

Member states should commit to making regular financial contributions and strictly enforcing the levy and payment of the 0.5% community tax on imports from outside the ECOWAS zone. This was recommended at the defence and finance ministers’ meeting in Abuja on 29 August 2025, and efforts to identify other innovative funding sources are ongoing.

ECOWAS could also seek support from the AU, which has a Peace Fund and a continental logistics base in Douala, Cameroon where unused military equipment belonging to the African Standby Force is stored.

Despite challenges in securing funding for AU peace operations in Somalia, ECOWAS should also explore United Nations support under Security Council Resolution 2719, which commits to financing 75% of peace support operations conducted in Africa.

The ECOWAS force also faces the challenge of deploying its modest 1 650 troops across a vast area of operations. With contingents stationed in their respective countries, questions arise about the force’s manoeuvrability against widely spread terrorist groups that move rapidly and cross borders. Pooling the logistical resources of the region’s armies could, in time, facilitate rapid troop deployments to theatres where they are urgently needed.

The brigade’s concept of operations – which has not yet been made public – will define its principles of employment, rules of engagement and coordination mechanisms.

Fragmentation between ECOWAS and AES continues to weaken West Africa’s collective security initiatives

However, a fight against armed groups cannot be effective without cooperation from the three central Sahel countries, which remain the epicentre of terrorism that is spreading to coastal countries. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s military authorities – angered by the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS following their coups – withdrew from the organisation in January 2025 after forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The need for collaboration to face a common, cross-border danger requires dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES to rebuild trust and establish a security cooperation framework that benefits all of West Africa.

ECOWAS must also structure its force to foster synergies with the recently created AES Unified Force. Operational coordination to jointly combat terrorism and transnational crime is imperative, and ECOWAS-AES negotiations must incorporate this objective.

As a first step, direct lines of communication must be restored between the general staffs of the two blocs. This will allow intelligence sharing and synchronisation of cross-border security operations to resume. The AU can serve as a ‘neutral mediator’ to facilitate exchanges between the armies of ECOWAS and AES countries.

ECOWAS’ counter-terrorism brigade can be effective if it drives regional security coordination. But its impact will remain limited as long as the fragmentation between ECOWAS and the AES continues to weaken collective security initiatives in West Africa.


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