Focusing on M23 allows ADF insurgents to expand in eastern DRC

The Islamic State-aligned Allied Democratic Forces has exploited security vacuums and tapped into conflict economies.

Published on 22 September 2025 in ISS Today

By

Nirvaly Mooloo
Research Officer, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS

The capture of Goma and Bukavu early this year by the March 23 Movement (M23)/Alliance Fleuve Congo has drawn sustained national, regional and international attention. It has strained the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) already weak national army, creating a security vacuum that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has exploited to expand its operations.

The ADF was formed in 1995 under the ADF-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda – a merger of two Ugandan rebel groups. The insurgents fled to former Zaire following military pressure from Uganda.

Since gaining a presence in eastern DRC, the group has become deeply embedded in the local landscape, while forging and maintaining outside links.

Until the end of 2013, the ADF kept a low profile. But a surge in civilian attacks and the targeting of Congolese soldiers marked a turning point in its operations, forcing a national military response.

This escalation underscored the limitations of earlier counter-insurgency efforts, setting the stage for military collaboration. The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) jointly launched Operation Shujaa in 2021 to dismantle the ADF in Ituri and North Kivu.

ADF areas of operations, eastern DRC

The operation has had some successes using coordinated air and ground assaults. Several top commanders were captured, ADF camps destroyed and firearms and ammunition recovered. However, logistical gaps, low troop morale and weak intelligence sharing and coordination ultimately rendered it ineffective. In fact, rather than dismantling ADF bases, Operation Shujaa has led to growth in the conflict sphere.

The ADF was initially located in North Kivu’s Beni territory, specifically its longstanding havens and fallback zones such as the Rwenzori mountains, Mwalika Valley and Oicha. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that since 2021, the group’s presence has increased. Operation Shujaa’s military pressure shifted the group from its strongholds, leading it to expand into Ituri and southward into Lubero, creating new zones of insecurity and displacement.

On 9 September, the ADF reportedly killed over 70 people at a wake in Lubero. A few days later, it killed four civilians in Mbau, Beni. On the same day, the insurgents targeted a health facility, looted businesses, and razed 15 houses, forcing residents to flee.

This expansion reveals two patterns. First, when pushed from its strongholds by the military, the insurgents dispersed into new, weaker-governed zones. There, they could avoid state forces while rebuilding cells and terrorising civilians into fleeing. This was exacerbated when the FARDC was redeployed to counter M23 further south.

Second, ISS data show that the group operates in smaller, agile cells instead of large camps, enabling them to infiltrate urban and peri-urban areas as taxi drivers and merchants. This shows that the ADF’s expansion is not just ideological or a response to military pressure, but strategic. The group employs a hybrid insurgent-criminal model using guerrilla hit-and-run tactics. This sustains it despite territorial losses.

The ADF’s ties to the local economy also contribute to its expansion. ISS data shows that although military operations have diminished its grip on resource exploitation, cross-border trade and land control since 2014, the group still engages in the illicit trade of gold, cocoa and timber. Uganda remains a major outlet for these commodities, with the smuggling of goods often bypassing Congolese markets.

ADF cross-border trade suggests the group is operating through illicit trade corridors, an activity increasingly undertaken by armed groups across Africa. Being embedded in local economic networks deepens ADF’s financing model. Motorcycle taxis and transporters reportedly provide logistics, moving fighters, goods and weapons, sometimes through coercion.

Rather than dismantling ADF bases, Operation Shujaa has led to growth in the conflict sphere

The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that the group is complicit in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, extortion and forced taxation of local communities.

Civilians often unknowingly facilitate money transfer through mobile money and unregistered cash transfers. ISS data reveal that the ADF, through allies in local economic activities, uses intermediaries who blend terrorist finance into everyday informal payments. These transactions are small and fragmented to avoid detection, enabling the group to finance operations, recruitment and logistics.

Ideologically, the ADF demonstrates links to the widening jihadi terrorist landscape globally and across Africa. As Islamic State’s Central Africa Province, the ADF follows its propaganda and social network strategy. Using coercion, religious indoctrination and deception, the ADF recruits fighters skilled in bomb-making and military training from the DRC and neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania.

However, local sources told ISS that the ADF has a more hybrid jihadist identity. Some of its actions contradict Islamic State policy, rendering its motivations unclear.

The ADF’s entanglement in the local economy blurs the line between insurgency and organised crime, signalling the need for the DRC and Uganda to disrupt its illicit financing and supply chains. Cross-border collaboration between state forces is vital, as the ADF’s economic and ideological resilience also threatens regional stability.

National, regional and international counter-insurgency efforts to combat the group have been unsuccessful. The FARDC’s military limitations (due to limited logistics and resources, political interference and a failure to act on credible intelligence) have contributed to the ADF’s resilience. The lack of political will from the Congolese government adds to the challenge.

The ADF’s entanglement in the local economy blurs the line between insurgency and organised crime

Uganda’s dual role as a counter-insurgency partner and economic actor raises concerns. Reports claim that Operation Shujaa aims to protect Uganda’s financial interests in eastern DRC, and the UN Group of Experts says Uganda doubled its presence since the M23 incursion, signalling ulterior motives.

The limited resources of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has also been stretched by M23’s operations. Negative local perceptions of the mission have hindered its efforts to combat the ADF and prevent attacks on civilians. MONUSCO’s shortcomings fuel disillusionment, indicating the need for stronger protection mechanisms for civilians.

Counter-insurgency efforts should treat the ADF as an asymmetric threat rather than a conventional one. Strategies should monitor and disrupt the group’s local supply chains and financing model, which contribute significantly to its expansion and resilience. The DRC should equip its army with resources to deter attacks, including aerial combat capabilities using armed drones.

Non-military efforts such as economic sanctions and diplomatic peace talks should also be used by national and regional actors to combat the ADF’s expansion. Finally, although regional efforts sometimes lack coherence, they are integral to addressing the cross-border nature of the conflict. They must include setting up sustained and consistent intelligence-sharing mechanisms.


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