Addressing Rising Insecurity in Kenya
As another spate of attacks kills 17 people in northern Kenya, many questions are being asked about how to deal with the increasing insecurity that has caused the death of at least 57 people since October last year.
Irene Ndungu, Consultant, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division and Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Pretoria Office
Kenyans are still reeling from the shock of the latest of an
increasing spate of terror attacks on civilians across the country, mostly
blamed on Somalia’s Al-Shabaab. On Sunday, 1 July, 17 people were killed and
over 40 wounded in attacks on two churches in the northern town of Garissa. This
follows several similar attacks, including the hellish Nairobi city centre
bombing on 28 May, in which one person died and a dozen were wounded. While
local and international security agencies collaborate in trying to identify the
perpetrators, their modus operandi and modalities for addressing the crisis, a
number of crucial factors seem to be the enablers for the worsening attacks. These ought to be addressed urgently in order
to more comprehensively address the crisis of rising insecurity in Kenya and the
region.
Monitoring
the modus operandi of all the attacks since October 2011, when Kenya launched
its ‘Operation Linda Nchi` in Somalia, the preference for small arms and light
weapons by the attackers has clearly established the prominent role of guns,
hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While the proliferation
of weapons in Kenya, and indeed the region, is not new, the rising readiness to
use them against civilian targets raises many questions as to the nature of the
insecurity dynamics that may ensue if the availability of weapons is not
checked with utmost urgency.
Addressing
the issue of arms proliferation is particularly problematic given the numerous avenues
for arms flow into Kenya. The most important challenge bedeviling dealing with
arms proliferation in the country is tied to the insecurity in countries such as Somalia. Given
the reality of the porous borders and ill-equipped security agencies, it is
clear that real success in dealing with the crisis of arms proliferation in
Kenya is as much external as it is internal. Without peace and stability in
Kenya’s neighbours, it will be impossible to effectively deal with the scourge
of arms proliferation.
Closely
related to the arms question is the deadly trend of weaponisation of products
for everyday use. The alleged role of fertiliser in the 28 May bombing in the Nairobi
city centre brought this to the fore. Even though this is also not a new issue,
the concurrent proliferation of do-it-yourself information on the Internet,
including the availability of various radicalising manuals and videos, makes it
easy for non-professionals to produce IEDs and has opened up another dimension
of human susceptibility in the face of rising radicalisation. In this
prevailing atmosphere in the region through the appeal of groups such as Al Shabaab
and the availability of young desperadoes who are ready to join them, the
vulnerability of Kenya cannot be overemphasised.
Clearly one of the most worrying
aspects of this is the characteristic sporadic nature of the attacks, which
makes it extremely difficult for security agencies to anticipate and contain
them. The increasing preference for places of worship is also worrying because of
the potential it has to set various religious groups against each other and
distort the underlying variable for the on-going violence away from what it is
now to cycles of inter-religious revenge attacks
It is
becoming clear that for any security agency, ‘sporadicity’ is overwhelming and Kenya’s
security agencies are no exception. This has sometimes called for the support
of external expertise in analysing crime scenes and the nature of attackers.
Practically, however, it does imply that a more internationalised or
regionalised response is necessary both in pooling together expertise and in
tracking the operations of those who have chosen to communicate their
discontent through violence.
Given the
fluid and amorphous nature of the perpetrators and the crisis, it is also only
by increased intelligence gathering across the length and breadth of the
country that the situation can be effectively addressed. Given the limited
resources and sporadic nature of the attacks, there is the need for the
implementation of strategies that urgently rally civilian support in the
collection and passing on of information vital for the safety of all Kenyans.
If
realistic progress can be made to stop these trends, there is the need for the
sources and existing mechanisms of arms acquisition and flows to be more
closely and effectively monitored and addressed. Most importantly, so should
the demand for SALW’s. Current efforts have largely focused on managing the
supply of SALW but the socio-economic factors driving these demands need to be
prioritised in national action plans.
Related to
that is the need for state security agencies to increase their visibility and
patrols so as to enhance, at least, their role in crime prevention. At the
moment, the security and visibility of state presence is confined to the major centres.
As one moves further from the capital Nairobi, for instance, there is less and
less visibility of state security structures, which is a reflection of state
deficit. This is not only in terms of security provision, but also the
distribution of resources and infrastructure. Such patterns have fomented
feelings sympathetic to extremism amongst sections of young people who have no
sense of patriotism or attachment to the country. These issues, including high levels of youth
unemployment and marginalisation of communities need to be prioritised,
properly addressed and effectively managed through inclusive development
programmes.
