Countering violent extremism in Kenya: stakeholders’ experience sharing

The workshop brought together experts with practical experience in P/CVE.

Date: 2019-11-07

Time: 08:00 to 17:00

Venue: Hotel English Point, Mombasa, Kenya

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), with funding from the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), commissioned a research study on ‘Countering violent extremism in Kenya: stakeholders’ experience sharing’. The findings were validated at this workshop, attended by stakeholders from diverse background.

The objectives of the workshop were to:

Consolidate practical recommendations from the findings, with a view to making the study as useful as possible for policy makers
Explore new areas of similar evidence-based research in the region
Bring together experts with practical experience and allow them to enrich the study through further engagements
Create a platform where new approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) can be discussed in order to bring theory closer to practice
Share lessons learned

The workshop brought together experts with practical experience in P/CVE. A total of 34 participants attended including representatives from: the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), National Muslim Leaders Forum, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), academia, researchers in the P/CVE field, civil society organisations (CSOs), county government officials, and the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC).

Overview of the research findings

Adan Mohamed presented the findings based on the field work that was conducted. The report captured the achievements, challenges and lessons from ongoing P/CVE efforts in Kenya. The first part of the report defined the problem statement and provided background on violent extremism in the local context. It also provided a trend analysis of the statistics and dynamics of violent extremism by providing a chronology of major violent attacks in Kenya from 1975 – 2019.

Participants provided comments and input on the research results based on their knowledge and experience. The discussions enriched the findings and examined key issues concerning P/CVE and the role of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in promoting and facilitating the fight against violent extremism. Participants also identified gaps that need to be filled in order to finalise the report.

Achievements

Workshop participants discussed the notable achievements in the prevention and countering of violent extremism in Kenya:

Development of the County Action Plans on P/CVE
Establishment of County Engagement Forums on CVE in some counties (co-chaired by the County Commissioner and Governor)
Better cooperation and relationships between state and non-state actors, as a result of the fact that it is a requirement in law but also because soft approaches to addressing the drivers of VE are needed
The Government of Kenya’s willingness to stamp out terrorism by establishing a robust institutional framework
The establishment of court users’ committees in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties, which has created spaces for dialogue to inspire justice and peace
There has been a notable improvement in the relationship between the community and the justice actors

Challenges for preventing and countering violent extremism

Civil society has been given an opportunity to engage in CVE, but the government seems to want to control the form of this engagement.
Although soft approaches have been well embraced in the strategy against violent extremism, little attention is paid to the ‘do no harm approach’. Both hard and soft approaches currently being implemented should be more sensitive.
Information sharing between the various CVE actors is a major challenge. CSOs are offering information to government agencies but government is not very open with CSOs in return. On the other hand, the county government feels excluded from certain CVE processes undertaken by national government, based on their nature that lacks enforcement. For example, the county government does not sit on the County Security Intelligence Committee.
Some respondents felt that the national government lacks responsiveness and works in isolation without involving other partners. Yet it expects other actors to collaborate with the government.
The private sector is not being adequately engaged in P/CVE.
Inadequate and short-term funding cycles present a challenge to the sustainability of CVE programmes.
The massive roll out of CAPs development in all 47 counties raises the challenge of monitoring. There has been a drastic shift from 9 to 47 counties within three months under the rapid CAP approach.
The process of reviewing the National Strategy on CVE to address emerging dynamics has been slow. For instance, gender inclusivity as a principle has been proposed in the review.

Recommendations

The research findings concluded that the shift to softer approaches of CVE has improved coordination but has created new challenges that need to be addressed. Consequently, it recommends the following:

There is need to review the Prevention of Terrorism Amendment Act made under the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2019 with the aim of adjusting the approval and reporting mechanisms of civil society organisations to the NCTC.
There is a need to employ a gender perspective in the design and implementation of CVE programmes.
The national government should set aside designated funding for CVE programming to support community initiatives working against violent extremism.
Fast track the review of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in order to incorporate gender ideals.
National government should give adequate funding to NCTC to facilitate its coordination role.
Government should designate an information management or command post where information on suspected terror/violent extremism acts is disseminated to the public for purposes of validating and legitimising it.

Gap analysis

National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC): The research should clearly indicate the role of the NCTC and its achievements thus far as a coordinating body on P/CVE issues.
Funding support: The report did not mention details of funding support from various development partners on P/CVE in Kenya and how this has impacted P/CVE work in the country.
International events/policies: The report did not identify how international events or policies have impacted or directed the P/CVE approaches used in the country.
Modes of recruitment: Information on previous and new recruitment strategies is unclear, and a detailed description on both aspects is needed.
The role of women and youth: The report did not capture in detail the role of women and youth in P/CVE. Both can play a pivotal role in P/CVE.
Experience sharing: The report doesn’t highlight the experiences of different P/CVE actors, which could be the niche to the report. This could take the shape of stock taking of the work done and impact achieved thus far.
Economic perspectives of CVE: The report lacks a discussion on the economic perspectives of violent extremism, which could provide a detailed understanding of different aspects of P/CVE.
Security officials and youth: The report did not mention how the relationship between security officials, youth and the community can impact on P/CVE initiatives.