01 Mar 2002: Death of Savimbi Renews Hope for Peace in Angola - And yet, can the Black Cockerel Fly?

SITUATION REPORT: DEATH OF SAVIMBI RENEWS HOPE FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA. AND YET, CAN THE BLACK COCKEREL FLY?
João Gomes Porto with Richard Cornwell and Henri Boshoff, March 2002

The death on 22 February of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) suggests that a watershed may have been reached in the course of the 28 year old civil war in this southern African country. The Angolan government had long admitted that Savimbi was not a trustworthy interlocutor and had since 1998 consistently refuse to negotiate with UNITA under his command. In fact, the removal of Savimbi from the equation had been considered by Luanda as a precondition for peace and had risen to stated policy objective. In this policy, the Angolan government was supported by the international community for whom Jonas Savimbi was a true ‘pariah’, a man who had repeatedly failed to comply with his own commitments under the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol and later the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). Jonas Malheiro Savimbi had become widely regarded as the main cause of the civil war in Angola, his leadership of UNITA the main reason behind the first time the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on a political movement.

It is not surprising that now that Savimbi is dead, expectations regarding an end to the conflict have grown exponentially. In fact, several members of the international community have attempted to persuade President dos Santos that this might be the opportune moment for negotiations leading to the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka protocol. In fact, following a brief visit to the United States with a stop-over in Lisbon, President dos Santos returned to Luanda and on March 14 followed suit with a ‘15 Point Plan’ that instructed the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to stop all offensive actions against UNITA rebels. By handing UNITA an ‘olive branch’, the Angolan government has been widely praised, both internally and externally. Justified on the grounds that it will permit initial contacts between both sides’ military commands on the ground, this unilaterally announced truce should hopefully lead to a general cease-fire in the country. In addition, in the ‘15 Point Plan’ presented to the Angolan people, the government makes a pledge to put before Parliament a blanket amnesty to all UNITA fighters for crimes committed during the war; proposes a re-integration programme for all demobilised soldiers and promises to implement the necessary conditions so that elections can soon be held such as a speedy approval of the new Constitution.

Following the unilateral declaration of a truce by the Angolan government, the commanders of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and of UNITA forces (FALA) met in Cassamba, Moxico Province on the 15 of March. This pre-negotiation meeting was led by General Abreu ‘Kamorteiro’, Chief of the Supreme General Staff of UNITA, and General Nunda of the FAA, himself an ex-UNITA military. In this meeting, both sides considered the immediate perspective of a definitive cessation of hostilities as promising and agreed that the FAA should be responsible for the organization and provision of all logistical and technical means indispensable for the holding of talks, including the transport of UNITA military forces’ members to the venue of negotiations. The sides decided that for practical reasons it would be appropriated for both delegations to be based in the city of Luena, about 770 km southeast of Luanda.

Yet, just as these pre-negotiations are about to begin, they are surrounded by controversy and accusations which indicate that, as in the past, the Angolan conflict will not be ended as swiftly as growing expectations would imply. Accusations coming from UNITA’s ‘external mission’ have claimed that their representatives at the talks are ‘prisoners of war’ who are not negotiating freely. UNITA’s representatives in Portugal have branded the talks a ‘farce’, claiming that the UNITA delegation as announced by the FAA was under the government’s control. As a result, UNITA’s external mission has clearly stated that the delegation to be present in Luena has no legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of UNITA, an allegation that may seriously compromise these talks.

In addition to the speculative nature of much of what is made public, what these latest events have demonstrated is that after the death of its leader, UNITA is profoundly divided, perhaps more than ever. This should not come as a surprise since UNITA has for a number of years been splintered over a number of questions, not least whether to pursue war or to make peace. These divisions are now coming to the fore with a vengeance, with prominent UNITA officials bidding for leadership of a unified UNITA, in an attempt to seize an opportunity that may not come again in the near future. The prospective gains attached to the reunification of the movement are enormous. In fact, although reduced to a fraction of what it once was, if transformed into a legitimate albeit unified political party, UNITA will surely constitute a serious contender for power in Angola as was demonstrated in the 1992 legislative elections where UNITA commanded 34% of the votes. Many analysts believe that that was a disappointing result and that UNITA could increase this result substantially.

Yet, what are the prospects of a unified UNITA? For one, the so-called UNITA-Savimbista (the military faction loyal to Savimbi which in 1994 rejected the Lusaka Protocol and returned to the battlefield) is estimated to have now less than 10,000 soldiers concentrated in the northern parts of Angola as well as between Benguela and Kwanza Sul. This is the UNITA that has been gradually destroyed by the sustained efforts of the FAA and that, since the FAA’s occupation of the strategically crucial Andulo and Bailundo towns, has lost much of its conventional capability. Since the death of its charismatic yet highly controversial founder, UNITA-Savimbista has not been able to appoint a successor. In terms of the party`s internal regulations, General Antonio Dembo (UNITA’s Vice-President) should have assumed the movement’s leadership for a period of 60 days before a UNITA congress could be convened to decide on the issue. However, recent statements by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) have claimed that General Dembo is dead from prolonged ill-health. If these reports are confirmed, General Paulo Lukamba "Gato" (UNITA’s Secretary-General) is the next in line to inherit UNITA’s leadership. Yet, a man more feared than revered in UNITA circles, General ‘Gato’ is not regarded as the right man to either negotiate peace with the government or unify the various UNITA factions. After all, ‘Gato’ has lead since 1994 what became known as the ‘Lusaka Protocol rejection front’ and as a consequence is by all accounts intensely disliked by the other UNITA factions. The vision of reuniting the UNITA family under ‘Gato’ seems therefore frankly improbable. Adding to this, ‘Gato’ himself has been out of sight for a number of weeks as has not appeared in public. Is ‘Gato’ dead or is he planning some sort of return to war?

Meanwhile, in the capital city Luanda, UNITA’s Members of Parliament have positioned themselves at the other end of the spectrum. Having remained in the capital, after Savimbi’s late 1998 return to war which destroyed any hopes for the GURN, UNITA’s parliamentarians have threaded a thin line in the complex political game in Luanda. Some of these parliamentarians have remained secretly loyal to Savimbi, while others have opted for other avenues founding new parties as was the case with Nzau Puna and Tony da Costa Fernandes who have created the Tendencia de Reflexao Democratica or the most prominent of all, Eugenio ‘Manuvakola’ who created the UNITA-Renovada party believing that the only game left for UNITA is political not military. Reports coming from Luanda indicate that within the UNITA parliamentarian group, Abel Chivukuvuku who has remained equidistant from both the military wing of UNITA and UNITA-Renovada, appears well positioned to take the lead in a future hypothetical unified movement.

Furthermore, this group of parliamentarians has placed its support in UNITA’s members in exile to pursue contacts with the government. This so-called ‘External Mission’, has become another important actor in this complex puzzle. It is this group, led by Isaias Samakuva in Paris that has disavowed the current team involved in pre-negotiations with the FAA. And within this exiled group, Samakuva, the man who represented UNITA in the commission responsible for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, has all the necessary credentials to run for leadership of a unified movement. He maintains good relations with several members of the international community as well as with the United Nations And he is considered by several analysts to be the man who has been able to relate to all UNITA factions in equal footing and that has the necessary conciliatory approach that could just be what UNITA needs at this time.

Finally there is UNITA-Renovada under the leadership of Eugenio ‘Manuvakola’. Renovada claims to be the only legal and democratic UNITA, a claim that owes substantially to the Luanda government’s recognition of Renovada as the sole legal interlocutor of UNITA. ‘Manuvakola’, a soldier turned intellectual has been busy in the last couple of years harnessing support in Western capitals for his party. His intentions and his belief that the only way forward in Angola is the political way have guaranteed him some support in western circles. After all this is the man who signed the Lusaka Protocol, and as a result, was sentenced by Savimbi to a two year jail sentence. Manuvakola is trying to lead the unification drive although there is as yet no sign that the other factions are willing to contemplate unification under Renovada. All indicates that this will not be the case.

A cynic might argue that this highly complex scenario would not be altogether unwelcome to the authorities in Luanda, since it would delay the awful moment when the MPLA begins to be judged as a party in control of a government no longer at war. A peacetime administration would involve the expensive, and potentially embarrassing, business of accounting for state revenues and then expending them in creating an effective administrative structure throughout the national territory, capable of ministering to the needs of a population, the vast majority of whom have known nothing but conflict.

But let us ignore our natural instincts and take the more optimistic view. UNITA`s leaders manage to persuade their people in the field that they must lay down their arms and the movement in its entirety transforms itself into a unified political movement, willing to test its popularity at the polls. This, of course, could not happen overnight, but the process itself would constitute a severe test of the government`s commitment as well as UNITA`s. Would the necessary political space be opened for multiparty politics to germinate if not flourish? Would Angolan civil society, limited though it is to a minority of educated urban population, non-governmental organisations, the urban church and youth and intellectual groups, be permitted to voice criticisms of the way public affairs have been conducted these past twenty-eight years?

Across much of south and central Africa we appear to be approaching a point where serious political will to democratise must take over. Elites in Angola have yet another chance to prove to the Angolan people that Angola is not just a country with great potential but a country that realises the heavy cost of its recent history and constructively seizes an opportunity to realise that potential. These chances don’t often come in the murky waters of civil war. Otherwise the grand designs and impossible promises implicit in the New Partnership for African Development will be seen as the chimera many doubters have already identified it as. In Angola, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and through to the Sudan there are openings for a reduction in the incidence of conflict and the reconfiguration and reconstruction of the state. If these opportunities are lost, the children of Africa, and their children after them, will curse their leaders -- and they will be right.