01 Jun 2002: Angola at DD+040: Preliminary Assessment of the Quartering, Disarmament and Demobilisation Process

SITUATION REPORT: ANGOLA AT DD+040: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE QUARTERLING, DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION PROCESS

João Gomes Porto, 4 June 2002

The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’

The civil war in Angola came to a formal end last 4 April with the signature by the two belligerent parties, the government of Angola and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), of a cease-fire agreement entitled `Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol`. Intended to replace annexes 3 and 4 of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, which remains for both parties the accepted and legitimate framework for peace in Angola2, this cease-fire agreement defines:

• An amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict
• The modalities of the cease-fire
• The disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA’s military forces
• The integration of UNITA generals, senior officers, captains and junior officers, sergeants and men in accordance with existing structural vacancies
• The integration of generals and senior UNITA officers into the national police
• Demobilisation of excess UNITA military personnel and disbanding of UNITA military forces
• Vocational re-integration of demobilised personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national life

Institutional Structures created by the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’

Two institutional structures were created to oversee the coordination and management of this process:

A Joint Military Commission (JMC) with the responsibility to promote and oversee the application of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ as a whole. The JMC is headed by a military representative of the government (president and executive member) and a military representative of UNITA (executive member). As Permanent Observers, the JMC includes a military representative of the United Nations as well as a military representative of each of the `Troika` of observer countries (Portugal, United States and Russia).

A Technical Group (TG). The TG’s main responsibilities include assisting the JMC in the performance of its duties, including the drawing up detailed timetables and definition of specific activities to be carried out to guarantee the application of the provisions of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. The TG is composed of up to 20 military experts of both the Angolan Armed Forces as well as UNITA’s Military Forces. In addition, the Permanent Observers contribute with up to 10 military experts each to the TG. At present nine regional TGs have been created.

There is no provision in the agreement for any formal third party monitoring or verification role (as was the case with the United Nations’ mandate under the Lusaka Protocol which established UNAVEMIII). In fact, both parties have reverted to an institutional structure similar to that used in 1991-1992 when the responsibility for verification and compliance with the demobilisation process defined in the 1991 `Bicesse Peace Agreements` lay directly with the belligerents under a Joint Political Military Commission (CCPM). In addition, because the process is centralised at the level of the JMC, with no independent verification or monitoring, information concerning the quartering, disarmament and demobilisation (QDD) is largely that which is made public by this structure (and within it by an official spokesperson), making it very difficult to obtain neutral evaluations of the whole process.

Yet, while both the United Nations (UN) as well as the ‘Troika’ are merely observers in this process (a framework agreement spelling out the UN’s responsibilities is still to be drafted) the level of technical input by these members of the JMC should not be underestimated. A number of Portuguese, American and Russian military experts have already arrived and have taken their places in the TGs. The UN is also negotiating its role in the QDD process, which will initially focus on the quartering areas. To this end, the UN will most likely send 11 military observers (JMC+TGs) and 36 non-military observers (quartering areas). But this will only be possible under a clearly defined mandate, including the provision of technical assistance as well as the very important need to monitor the political and human rights situation across the country. This assistance will also be necessary for the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration components of the process.

Application Timetable

The following implementation timetable is defined in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’:

DDay: the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ comes into effect after its signature and the declaration and coming into effect of the bilateral cease-fire

DD+001: formalisation and beginning of operation of the JMC and the TG as well as promulgation of the amnesty law

DD+002: consolidation of re-establishment of cease-fire

DD+002 to DD+047: disengagement, quartering and conclusion of UNITA’s demilitarisation; quartering, disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces under UNITA’s control

DD+048: Integration of Generals and Senior Officers, Captains and Subordinates into FAA

DD+079 to DD+080: demobilisation of military personnel of UNITA

DD+081 to DD+262: vocational reinsertion of demobilised personnel

The agreement’s established timetable has suffered a number of alterations, in particular as regards the start of the QDD process, delayed due to technical and logistical constraints. As a consequence, rather than starting the day following the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 4 April, the process’ official time-table begins on 20 April, date agreed upon by the JMC as representing the start of the QDD. The 20th of April has therefore been identified as DD+002. According to this new schedule, the QDD process should be completed on 3 June (DD+047). Yet this timetable is likely to be revised and the latest information from Luanda points to 7 June as the date when the QDD will be officially completed.

The Process at DD+040: Quartering, Demilitarisation and Demobilisation (QDD)

…the quartering of the UNITA military forces must provide the living conditions necessary for the stay of the military in a total of up to 50,000…3

The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ provides for the quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation (QDD) of a total of 50,000 UNITA troops. In addition, 300,000 family members are to be catered for in areas adjacent to assembly locations. This figure has been revised upwards several times and at present, 76,654 UNITA soldiers are assembled in quartering areas, as can be seen in the table below, based on press statements by the JMC. Furthermore, from an initial 27 quartering areas defined in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, a current 35 assembly locations are spread across 15 of Angola’s 18 Provinces.

Table 1: Quartering of UNITA’s Forces and Family Members at DD+040 (28 May 2002)

24 April

1 May

5

May

8

May

11

May

UNITA Soldiers

11,868

24,553

32,208

39,250

42,153

Family Members

12,202

33,697

57,073

71,575

73,800

Total

24,070

58,250

89,281

110,825

115,953

15 May

17 May

21 May

24 May

28 May

UNITA Soldiers

51,354

55,618

65,343

67,967

76, 654

Family Members

91,234

106,763

145,819

159,659

212,881

Total

142,588

162,381

211,162

227,626

289,535

The table above makes patently clear that the QDD process in Angola has advanced at an unusually fast pace. On a political level, several observers consider that this is a result of considerable and credible political will from both the government of Angola and UNITA in successfully conducting this process. In fact, UNITA’s Management Commission has been consistent in its desire to put an end to the war and comply with its obligations under the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. No breaches of the cease-fire have been reported and the quartering of UNITA’s military forces has proceeded largely in an orderly fashion. Nevertheless, to a large extent this is a result of the military conditions prevailing at the end of the war. At the time of Jonas Savimbi’s death on 22 February, UNITA’s military forces were severely weakened, its regional commands uncoordinated, its troops facing critical shortages of food and fuel supplies among others. War weariness, disorientation at the loss of its top leadership, hunger and disease left UNITA with no alternative but to sit at the negotiation table and swiftly agree to a comprehensive cease-fire agreement in Luena.4 That the implementation of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ is proceeding at a similar pace should therefore not come as a surprise, for the same conditions apply. In fact, at the opening of a new therapeutic feeding centre (TFC) in Camacupa, Erwin Van Der Borght, head of mission of MSF in Angola, recently said that ‘even families of high-ranking UNITA members (who normally have access to better living-standards) are in our centres’.

Nonetheless, whether out of necessity or a genuine willingness to comply with its obligations under the cease-fire agreement (or in fact both), the fact is that the speed at which troops and family members have been assembled has created a dire humanitarian situation in the camps and surrounding areas, where a total of 289,535 people are currently located. The JMC has recently recognised that UNITA’s military forces and family members are showing serious levels of malnutrition and disease upon arrival in the assembly areas. According to a recent IRIN report, relief workers operating in the quartering camps’ family areas have described the humanitarian situation there as critical.5 Reports from a number of humanitarian agencies present in areas previously inaccessible due to the war confirm alarming levels of malnutrition, hunger and disease. This has been corroborated by a preliminary report from the ongoing United Nations’ common assessment of new accessible areas, particularly in Bie, Huambo, Huila and Moxico Provinces.6 The horrifying conditions found by Medicins Sans Frontieres in some of these previously inaccessible areas have led them to term this Angola’s ‘Grey Zones Emergency’.7 According to this organisation’s latest report,

…the current emergency is also due to the fact that negotiated access for humanitarian assistance was not pursued in Angola, and the government and UNITA exhibited a complete disregard for standards of international humanitarian law…in spite of the starvation, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA delivered food to tens of thousands of people in need and held under their respective control...this pattern of neglect is repeating itself with regard to the quartering and family areas (QFAs), to which UNITA troops and family members must now report as part of the demobilisation process. Early indication from the QFAs are that high numbers of UNITA family members are in extremely poor condition…MSF has visited 13 sites with a total population of more than 61,109 people (military and civilians combined). Gross food shortages, severe malnutrition, and alarming death rates have been found in most of the QFAs MSF has visited so far [my emphasis].8

Although the remoteness and inaccessibility of a large number of these quartering locations may partially explain the difficulties involved in tackling the critical situation described above, the fact of the matter is that the majority of these locations (27) as well as the scheduling of QDD itself were decided by both parties in the cease-fire agreement. That at the time a number of observers questioned the feasibility of such an ambitious endeavour did not discourage either the government of Angola or UNITA, with the quiescence of the ‘troika’ of observers and the United Nations, from proceeding with QDD as planned in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, that is as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, all parties involved in the JMC have claimed the need to sustain the momentum of the peace process as the primary justification for pursuing QDD in the present circumstances. A pre-requisite for the maintenance of the cease-fire as well as a litmus test of UNITA’s compliance with demilitarisation, QDD has therefore proceeded largely in an ad-hoc fashion, more dependent on political considerations than on humanitarian concerns and without proper planning or systematic (not to mention prior) assessment of needs.

While the total number of UNITA soldiers in assembly areas has reached a staggering 76,654 in no way should this be interpreted as an indication that all is going well with the Angola QDD process. There is considerable controversy as to whether all these people are or have ever been UNITA military, especially since UNITA’s own declared strength (on 30 March) was 54,583. The gradual increase in numbers of soldiers in quartering areas is increasingly taken to be a survival tactic pursued by individuals that are expecting possible benefits from demobilisation and re-integration packages. This is greatly facilitated by the fact that, according to eye witness accounts, each camp exhibits a different logistical capability as regards the collection of personal identification information and the registration and verification of weapons. Consequently, while in some areas registration of personal information and weapons has been done, allowing the regional Technical Group to obtain a more realistic idea of the number of effective military personnel as well as proceeding with the evacuation of arms from the camps, in the vast majority of quartering areas this has still to be completed. Adequate logistical capability in the quartering areas for the collection of personal identification information and the registration and verification of weapons is therefore a pressing logistical need.

Furthermore, concerns have been voiced pointing to a worrying discrepancy between the number of troops in assembly areas and the number as well as the quality of weapons that have been handed over, as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below. This is an essential element of the QDD process, and a guarantee of the cease fire’s sustainability in the immediate short-term. Observers of this process fear that UNITA may be delaying the surrender of weapons to guarantee that the process will be dealt with properly, meeting its needs. Unconfirmed reports point to the fact that although UNITA has provided the JMC with information on the location of its arms caches, only a portion of these have been confirmed, leaving a unspecified number unnacounted for. Eyewitness accounts of the situation in the camps also indicate that some of the arms handed-over are obsolete and do not represent UNITA’s real armaments.

Even though a return to war at this particular moment in time is highly unlikely, the widespread existence of weapons (especially small weapons) is cause for concern, particularly in view of a possible increase in cases of banditry and looting around quartering areas. In fact, an increase in the occurrence of banditry and looting as been registered by a number of humanitarian agencies present on the ground. For the most part un-coordinated and spontaneous, looting seems to be in some cases (as yet limited in numbers) the only option left for UNITA soldiers facing starvation or deprivation of basic needs. With the prospect that these soldiers will remain quartered in these camps for several more months, the incidence of crime and banditry is likely to increase dramatically.
In this regard, it should be noted that according to the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, UNITA retains authority inside the quartering areas, being responsible for the internal organisation of the camps as well as ensuring the safe-guarding of weapons handed over by soldiers in arms depots within the camps, until personal identification and the registration and verification of weapons is completed. Although eye witness accounts testify to the high discipline maintained by UNITA in the quartering areas, this is unlikely to remain the case for a protracted period of time, considered inevitable in the present circumstances.

Table 2: The Demilitarisation of UNITA (Weapons handed-over as of 22 May)

Province

Number of Quartering Areas

Arms

Uige

2

2,479

Zaire

1

312

Bengo

2

754

Kuanza-Norte

1

966

Malange

2

1,327

Lunda Norte

2

1,212

Lunda Sul

2

614

Moxico

3

728

Huambo

5

4,448

Bie

3

1,727

Benguela

5

4,697

Kuanza Sul

2

2,066

Huila

1

1,642

Kunene

1

217

Kuando Kubango

3

1,988

TOTALS

35

23,450

Table 3: Weapons handed-over by Type as of 22 May

Pistols

Light Weapons

AGS-17

M/60

M/82

Canons

TOTALS

106

23,004

15

201

100

25

Conclusion: Current Responses, Possibilities and Limitations

… in the absence of adequate support during the assembly phase of demobilisation, soldiers will not remain in quartering areas. This lesson was driven home by the failed Bicesse peace process…ex-combatants have considerable potential for disrupting the peace process, given the lack of viable employment alternatives and the ease with which weapons can be acquired in post conflict environments. The increase in banditry in several Angolan provinces during 1996 and 1997 can be attributed in part to UNITA soldiers who have retained their weapons…9

Having assumed primary responsibility for steering, coordinating and financing (as well as fund-raising for) this process, the government of Angola is now caught in a tremendously complex situation, lacking adequate planning, resources and logistical capability to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the making as well as carry the QDD process to a successful conclusion at DD+262. Observers of this process point out that although conditions in the quartering areas have now improved, the situation in the family areas is reaching serious proportions. Family areas have become the only choice for thousands of internally displaced people who flock to the camps in search of food or medical assistance. A number of humanitarian, relief and development agencies have been trying to cope with this situation. The World Food Programme, for example, has approved an aid plan worth US$ 233 million directed at assisting internally displaced people. UNICEF, the World Health Organisation, Medicins sans Frontieres, International Committee of the Red Cross, Save the Children’s Fund and Oxfam have targeted both the family areas as well as the so-called ‘grey zones’. The United Office for the Co-Ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been providing assistance in the family areas but still lacks an adequate framework agreement with the government of Angola as regards the provision of this assistance.10

This co-ordination problem is affecting the capacity of agencies to respond quickly to a number of critical situations. United States Ambassador to Angola, William Bell, has recently expressed concern at what he called the lack of a point of contact with the government for the co-ordination of humanitarian aid. The same concern has been voiced by a recent World Bank mission to Angola meant to rapidly assess the situation in the quartering areas and develop a demobilisation and re-integration plan, which if approved by the government will benefit from an estimated US$ 125 million in aid. From the government’s side, there is no clear responsibility for the QDD process, and the President, the Cabinet as well as different Ministries are involved (Defence, Health, Interior, Education and Social Re-Integration), a factor that contributes to delaying delivery of much needed aid.

Nevertheless, the government has taken a number of important steps to avoid some of the above mentioned problems. President dos Santos has written to the United Nations’ Secretary General, to the President of the European Commission as well France’s Jacques Chirac asking for humanitarian aid and support for the reconstruction process. The European Union has reacted and contributed 125 million Euro to the process. In addition, on 22 May the Angolan Cabinet of Ministers approved a Programme of Social Re-Integration of UNITA soldiers, drafted by the Peace and National Reconciliation Intersectoral Commission of the National Assembly. This plan comprises elements of training and professional conversion; support for the establishment of family owned businesses; creation of jobs and community resettlement and development of populations. Also of relevance, and following President dos Santos’ ’15 Point Peace Plan’, announced 14 March, the implementation of the programme will count on the participation of public and private entities, including local and foreign non-governmental organisations, as well as churches and community based associations.

In financial terms, according to a 28 May press statement by the Special Commission for Logistics (one of the TG’s special commissions) the current quartering phase has cost the government an estimated US$ 22 million. Although some effort has been made to use local products, procurement of goods and logistical equipment for the quartering areas has been to a large extent deficient, over-reliant on expensive imports. Nevertheless, the JMC has identified the most pressing needs in the quartering and family areas. The following were identified as immediate and urgent needs:

urgent supply of nutrients and powder milk for the nutritional recuperation of 40% of children and women in quartering areas

distribution of water reservoirs of all kinds in all quartering areas

urgently supply medical clinics within the camps with mattresses, linen, blankets and mosquito nets

used clothes, shoes, blankets

personal hygiene utensils and supplies

cooking equipment

construction tools (housing, latrines, waist disposal and farming)

recreational

seeds, fertilisers

In terms of demobilisation and re-integration, JMC’s spokesman Gen. Francisco Furtado has recently confirmed that the selection of UNITA military surplus for demobilisation has already begun. According to this source, this operation consists of filling up the forms of soldiers awaiting demobilisation whose number will be established by the 7 June meeting of the JMC, meant to assess the quartering process and set a date for its official closure. Out of a contingent of around 60,000-70,000 not more than 5,000 UNITA soldiers will be selected and integrated into the national army. Nevertheless, the FAA should be well equipped for this task as it kept UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola (UCAH) database used with considerable success in the previous demobilisation process.

The demobilisation and re-integration phases of the process will be particularly important. In this regard, care should be taken to look at some of the lessons learned from the failed demobilisation under the Lusaka Protocol.11 Some of the lessons learned which may be relevant for the present situation include:

Planning for all phases of the demobilisation and re-integration process should be conducted within the same body, which also must engage in strong co-ordination with other relevant agencies to ensure integrated planning. Where a transfer of responsibility for long-term re-integration activities is anticipated, it would be desirable from the outset to second a staff person from the organisation which will subsequently assume responsibility to the original planning body to facilitate transition.

Flexibility in planning and implementation of demobilisation and reintegration programmes is essential. Post-conflict demobilisations are particularly vulnerable to delays and other programme changes. Although early planning is desirable, it is important to understand that the parameters of demobilisation and reintegration are very likely to change. The ability to anticipate and plan for the unexpected should be an important criterion in choosing staff to support these activities.

Demobilisation and re-integration are a ‘family affair’: the provision of basic services to soldiers’ dependents should be considered an integral part of the peace process and provided for in the peace agreement. The funding for these services should come from the assessed budget, and any support provided to assembled troops should also be provided to their dependents.

Re-integration is a ‘community affair’: community-oriented re-integration programmes need to be evaluated to determine their effectiveness and provide guidance for future re-integration programming.

Demobilisation should be entirely funded through the assessed budget, and in order to ensure sufficient flexibility, all financing channelled through the UN system should be deposited in a trust fund or similar arrangement managed by the co-ordinating body. The co-ordinating body could sign a memorandum of understanding which would govern in a general sense how the funds are to be used and the methods for accounting for them.

Humanitarian actors can provide crucial support to the diplomatic aspects of the peace process, both by bringing their technical expertise to assist in actual implementation and through fulfilling a more diplomatic function: using their technical expertise to ensure that outstanding political issues are addressed correctly and transparently

All UN personnel need to have a better understanding of the mandates of their colleagues whether from the UN, and NGO or other international organisations, so that mutual expectations are realistic and there is appropriate respect for the institutional responsibilities of other entities. This can be achieved through pre-training and in-country orientation sessions, and reinforced by regular meetings of all relevant UN actors in-country.

All actors must be prepared to take on tasks that lie outside their official mandates but which are necessary for the achievement of specific, peace-process related objectives

Demobilisation operations should constitute management teams in quartering areas, ideally with a civilian in charge of them. Civilian leadership is desirable in order to reinforce the notion among soon-to-be demobilised soldiers that militaries are subordinate to civilians in democratic societies.

While there may be distinct advantages to subcontracting with NGOs to deliver services in quartering areas, those in charge of planning and co-ordinating these activities must weigh the potential benefits against the potential disadvantages and be prepared to provide support if relatively inexperienced NGOS are chose. To minimise problems, the lead agency for demobilisation exercises should request seconded sectoral experts to ensure a high quality and level of accountability of assistance in quartering areas.

ENDNOTES

By João Gomes Porto, Senior Researcher, Africa Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies.

The parties reiterate their unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the relevant legal and political instruments, in particular, the Lusaka Protocol and the resolutions of the United Nations’ Security Council relative to the Angolan Peace Process.

Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol. ANNEX 1: Document Relative to the Quartering of the UNITA Military Forces’, 1.

For details of the Luena negotiations please refer to an earlier ASAP ‘Summary Brief’ on Angola distributed in May 2002. Three factors may be singled out as having had a crucial impact on the present course of events, partially explaining the pace at which developments are taking pace in Angola:

* The devastating effect that the multi-phased campaign of the Angolan Armed Forces’ ‘Operation Restauro’, had on UNITA’s military forces. This particularly applies to the third and final phase, intended to destroy UNITA’s guerrilla capability and known as ‘scorched earth phase’. This last thrust of the FAA significantly reduced UNITA’s capacity to rely on local populations for the provision of food and other items essential for the maintenance of a guerrilla-type war. While the effects of the ‘scorched earth phase’ on UNITA are undeniable and go a long way to explaining the levels of malnutrition and disease found among UNITA’s soldiers now being assembled, it should be noted that a critical humanitarian situation has been found in the areas where this campaign developed (known within the humanitarian community as ‘grey areas’ only now accessible to humanitarian aid: in particular the eastern Provinces of Moxico, Lunda-Norte and Lunda-Sul).

* The strangulation effect of the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime on UNITA. From 1993 to 1998 the Security Council imposed a series of sanctions on UNITA ranging from arms embargoes to bans on the sale of diamonds and the travel of UNITA officials, to the closure of UNITA offices and the freezing of their assets. Although a large number of sanctions violations have been reported, the creation by the UNSC of the Panel of Experts and then the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, contributed, through the capacity to identify sanctions violators and monitor compliance, to both limiting the number of violations as well as deterring future violations.

* The death of UNITA’s top military leadership.

In this regard see ‘Angola: Focus on Quartering Areas’,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27878&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA

UNICEF. Angola Situation Report Apr 2002. According to a USAID report, though the demobilisation and reintegration have been underway for only one month, logistical constraints and limited capacities with the QFAs have prevented the delivery of adequate food, water, sanitation and health services’. IRIN. Angola: Donors prepared to assist ‘sensitive’ demobilisation process. 8 May 2002. www.irinnews.org

According to Anne Fouchard, ‘MSF staff has discovered horrifying conditions: ‘grey zones’, containing thousands of people in a state of severe malnutrition and appalling health. These people were virtual prisoners in areas that became inaccessible when the war resumed in November 1998. These areas represent nearly 90% of the country and are today characterised by complete destitution and starvation’. Anne Fouchard, ‘End of War , Beginning of Hunger’, in MSF Article, 8 May 2002. www.msf.org

See Medicins Sans Frontieres. Emergency in Angola- An Operational Update, 28 May 2002.

Nicole Ball. Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.OCHA Online. www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/angola/

OCHA believes that 500,000 people from areas inacessible during the war need urgent assistance. In fact, OCHA’;s Rapid Assessment in 26 such areas indicate that thousands of people need help immediately. According to a OCHA official, operations will be extended within the current ongoing provincial programme and in a ‘pragmatic manner within current logistical and funding constraints’.

Nicole Ball. Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA Online. www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/angola/