The realistic expectations of the new African Union Commission Chairperson and Libya: the resignation of Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagur
On 15 October 2012 Dr Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa’s former foreign affairs minister, will assume
office as Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) to replace Dr Jean
Ping of Gabon. The handover has generated huge expectations in some quarters.
But how realistic are these expectations? The rules governing the office of the
Chairperson, in terms of powers, functions and limitations, can begin to give
us an idea.
There is no single document that
comprehensively elaborates on the powers and functions governing the position
of the Chairperson. Instead, there are several documents from which one can
tease out the different rules. In that sense, six relevant public and non-
public documents can be identified. The public ones are the AU Constitutive
Act, the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), statutes
of the Commission and rules of procedure at the AU General Assembly. The
non-public documents are the AUC Staff Rules and Regulations and the AUC
Financial Rules and Regulations.
The AUC Chairperson is expected to
assist the PSC in the formulation and implementation of PSC decisions. The
Chairperson does this through the information and assistance provided by the
PSC structures (such as the Continental Early Warning System, African Standby
Force, Panel of the Wise and Military Staff Committee). This peace and security
architecture of the AU is designed to prevent and respond to conflicts and
crisis situations.
Regarding the administrative,
legal and financial roles of the Chairperson, s/he will serve as the chief
executive officer, the legal representative and the accounting officer of the
commission. Despite the considerable role of the AUC Chairperson, Dr
Dlamini-Zuma, like her predecessors, will have to contend with some
limitations. Three main limitations are discernible:
- The
Chairperson does not have enforcement power. This curbs her ability to
transform key decisions made by PSC declarations into reality.
- The
Chairperson does not have discretionary power. In fact, she is not allowed
to exercise her discretion in responding to crises not anticipated by
instruments and policies of the AU.
- The
Chairperson lacks significant control over the rest of the Commission. The
Chairperson does not play a role in the election and appointment of the
Deputy Chairperson or the Commissioners. This does not allow for proper
oversight by the Chairperson of Commissioners. Importantly, the
Commissioners are often subject to the political whims of member states.
Due to these limitations, the new
leadership will have to contend with the statist structure of the AU and her
capacity to deliver will depend on her ability to reach consensus with member
states on the formulation and implementation of policies. This is more
important than previously because of the controversial and heated character of
the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. Political reconciliation will therefore be one
of her foremost priorities. The constitution of her cabinet will be significant
in bridging the political divide. There is a legitimate view that Francophone countries
should be represented at the cabinet level. This is especially so because of
the fact that the Chairperson and her deputy are both from Anglophone
countries.
In conclusion, the impact of the
chairperson on decision-making is limited because the main decision-making
organ of the AU is the Assembly of Member States. There is, however, a lot of
room for her to make an impact in rationalising and improving the
administrative and financial structures of the AUC. She should also be able to
bring new impetus to the operational reality of Pan-Africanism and the African
Renaissance. Despite all the bottlenecks in the functions of the AUC
Chairperson, her ability to to enhance the internal governance structure of the
commission could be a far-reaching contribution during her tenure.
Compiled
by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis division of the ISS Addis Ababa
office.
Libya: the resignation of Libyan
Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagur
Late Sunday night, 7 October 2012,
nearly four weeks after the killing of the US ambassador to Libya Christopher Steven and three other
American embassy staff in Benghazi, Libya’s General National Congress passed a
vote of no confidence in the newly elected prime minister, Mustafa Abu Shagur, and thereby dismissed him.
The General National Congress also rejected an emergency cabinet of 10 new
ministers who had been appointed by Shagur to run the country for the next six
months. The General National Congress was voted into office last July, becoming
the first elected parliament in 60 years.
The Prime Minister had been
elected by the Assembly on 12 September, but had struggled to establish a
government that satisfied all Libyans. He was appointed with the intention to
lead the drafting of the new constitution. However, he lost the support of the
majority of the deputies due to several reasons: firstly, he had been part of
the former National Transitional Council government, so deputies perceived him
negatively. Secondly, he was viewed as being too close to the Gulf States since
he spent many years there. Thirdly, due to his prolonged stay abroad he was
somehow ‘out of touch’ with the reality of Libya. Finally, he lacked a power
base due to the fact that he was a consensus appointment, so he didn’t have
strong support from the beginning.
Much of the criticism he received
revolved around different factions looking to secure representation for their
regions in the cabinet, a demand Shagur said undercut his efforts. His
intentions were aimed at the eventual formation of a government of national
unity that was not based on quotas. This decision was not supported by the
other political groups or, to some extent, by society at large, as people
demanded ministers from their regions.
The political situation in Libya
remains fragile and the power vacuum can hold serious implications for security
and governance. The Libyan Assembly’s members still lack political credibility
and experience, and they are probably more concerned with their own interests
than with those of the country.
As far as the security situation
is concerned, Libya is currently facing a potential catastrophe. The country
has approximately 700 self-governed militias, a situation that could lead to
greater instability or even anarchy. Furthermore, it has been reported that
there could be a coalition between the state apparatus and the militias in
which the latter are responsible for the security management of different
territories. Libya remains a tribe-based country and this is an element that
Muammar Ghaddafi had understood, and he had tried to keep their loyalty. But
this is something that has yet to be done by members of the new formal
government structures. As a result, those militias today are far more willing
to deal and reach agreements with local leaders rather than a central
government in Tripoli or even Benghazi. Hence, if this trend is maintained,
Libya’s focus will be more local than national, which can condemn it to a
worsening security situation.
Ultimately, the precarious
security situation in Libya, the spill-over effects in the Sahel area of Libyan
arms trading and the expansion of militias’ settlements, the ‘possible planned’
assassination of the US Ambassador, the upcoming trial at the International
Criminal Court of Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam for crimes against humanity, and
even the eventual resignation of the Prime Minister, all have serious
implications for the near future.
Compiled by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division
