DRC: is President Joseph Kabila guilty of high treason? and South Africa: Developments at Cosatu's conference will determine the way forward

The crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to have repercussions on the political leadership in Kinshasa. While the crisis once again highlights the chronic weak governance architecture in the country, recent developments point to a potential risk for the political survival of President Joseph Kabila. Indeed, opposition forces are calling for his indictment on treason charges. Their call is motivated by the secret deal presidents Kabila and Paul Kagame of Rwanda allegedly made in 2009.

The provisions of the secret deal appear to have allowed Rwandan armed forces to ‘invade’ the eastern DRC. The controversy is not new. In 2009, disagreement over the same issue of allowing Rwandan troops into the DRC without the parliament’s approval soured relations between President Kabila and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Vital Kamhere, formerly a close ally of the President. A key question that needs to be explored is whether the current opposition in the DRC is capable of successfully taking up the challenge of impeaching the President.

Rwanda has invaded the DRC twice, in 1996 and 1998. According to a report written by the United Nations Group of Experts (UN GoE), 2012 marks the third time that Rwanda has invaded the DRC. The report claims, among other things, that Rwanda has been backing the M23 rebellion that started in April 2012.

There are ongoing discussions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) to assess the validity of the arguments of both parties. Rwanda has to prove its innocence and rebut the allegations levied against it by the UN GoE. Rwandese Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo has to persuade the UNSC that the report is not based on fact, and that Rwanda is innocent of all charges. According to some media reports, she has not been successful. While Rwanda has elaborated its rebuttal, it is reported that Mushikiwabo’s presentation consisted more of personal attacks on the UN GoE head, Steve Hege, and President Kabila, whom she described as an incompetent and ‘ghost’ leader. However, the DRC’s presentation seems to have been well articulated and convincing enough to dispel doubts over the validity of the experts’ findings.

Members of the opposition in Kinshasa claim they do not understand why Rwanda maintains hundreds of troops in the DRC, as this is a serious violation of the country’s constitution.  The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) has taken the lead in accusing President Kabila of high treason, as it believes he should never have allowed the Rwandan troops into the country at all. The UDPS claims that because President Kabila was willing to let these troops be deployed without the knowledge of the Congolese people, the action constitutes high treason. A coalition of opposition parties has now called for President Kabila to be impeached.

However, since the 2012 legislative elections the presidential camp has managed to secure a majority in parliament. This appears to be an important factor in any attempt to impeach President Kabila. The opposition in its current composition is not capable of offering a serious challenge to the president. Indeed, it was the need to remove focus from his contested election that motivated President Kabila to announce his intention to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda, a factor that has contributed significantly to the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC. 

Whether President Kabila is really guilty of treason, or whether the opposition has simply recognised a political opportunity, will yet become clear. What is undisputable at the moment is that both President Kabila and President Kagame carry some responsibility for the M23 rebellion. President Kabila is ultimately responsible for how mineral resources are governed in his country, as well as for allowing Ntaganda, Sultani Makenga and other known leaders of the M23, who are notorious human rights abusers, to operate with impunity for many years. President Kagame provided support to Ntaganda, and allowed Rwandan special forces to invade the DRC on the basis of Rwanda’s concerns over the FDLR.

The neutral force proposed by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is not something upon which the vulnerable people in the east should place their hopes. The proposal is now being replaced with one for a joint verification mechanism (JVM), which consists of 24 senior military officers from the ICGLR countries. The JVM is meant to be the first step in resolving the crisis in the eastern DRC. However, it is likely that the JVM is yet another diplomatic distraction, as both Kinshasa and Kigali are well aware that serious engagement is needed at the highest level to frame a lasting solution to the crisis in the eastern DRC.

Southern Africa

South Africa: Developments at Cosatu’s conference will determine the way forward

At the 11^th congress of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in Midrand, which runs from 17–20 September, delegates elected to maintain the status quo by retaining S’dumo Dlamini and Zwelinzima Vavi as president and secretary general respectively of the labour federation. However, this show of a united front belies underlying tensions and factionalism ignited by the succession battle within the African National Congress (ANC) and fuelled by the Marikana tragedy.

Over the last few years, the relationship between Dlamini and Vavi has deteriorated. Vavi, who had played a pivotal role in ensuring President Jacob Zuma’s ascendancy to power through a well-orchestrated victory at Polokwane in 2007, has now come out in defiance against the ANC (Cosatu’s tripartite alliance partner). Although he has been vague in his response to questions of whether he is pro- or anti-Zuma, Vavi has repeatedly stated that Cosatu needs to focus on its own issues as opposed to becoming embroiled in the ANC succession battle. In the run-up to the Cosatu congress Vavi had set himself on a collision course with President Zuma’s supporters in the alliance as a result of his criticism of the current administration’s failure to deal adequately with corruption and the twin challenges of inequality and unemployment. His harsh criticism of corrupt government officials was interpreted as a veiled proposition that President Zuma and the current crop of ANC leaders have to be dislodged from power.

Vavi’s supporters in the labour federation had pushed for the removal of Dlamini, who has publicly stated that he supports the re-election of President Zuma. They approached National Union of Metalworkers South Africa (Numsa) president Cedric Gina and South African Democratic Teachers Union (Sadtu) president Thobile Ntola to challenge Dlamini for president. But many in the ranks of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) supported Dlamini and approached Cosatu’s provincial secretary in KwaZulu-Natal, Zet Luzipho, to contest the position of secretary general.

As expected, the Marikana mineworker strike took centre stage at the congress. In its report tabled at the congress, the labour federation acknowledged that although violence during the recent strike was not at the same level as that experienced in the 2006 security sector strike, it was on the increase. Cosatu called for a complete overhaul of the manner in which the police dealt with striking workers. In its online edition of 18 September, the Mail and Guardian newspaper reported that in a series of reports compiled for the congress Cosatu noted that ‘brutal force’ by the police was intolerable and that ‘changing the way in which our police operate will go a long way to breaking the cycles of violence in strikes’.

 The violent mine protests were attributed to factionalism within the NUM, which is the largest union in Cosatu. There have been concerns that the union has lost touch with the workers it represents. The inability of the government and NUM leadership to relate to the average worker has been cited as one of the reasons why both parties have failed to address the legitimate grievances of the mineworkers. The government’s response over the weekend, in which it sent police and military personnel to take control of the area and disband striking workers, is evidence of its inability to peacefully address the situation in Marikana. It is worrisome that hard and tough tactics such as the deployment of military personnel are used before concluding any meaningful negotiations. An ANC member of parliament, in response to the opposition’s call for the workers’ grievances to be assessed and brought to parliament, stated that ‘we (government) can’t speak to people with suicidal tendencies’. This sheds light on the government’s unwillingness to hold discussions with workers. The crackdown at the weekend was most likely meant to assuage the worries of foreign investors.

Cosatu’s role in the chain of events pre- and post-Marikana and its failure to bring a peaceful resolution to the general impasse in the mining sector will undoubtedly be questioned at the congress. The government’s approach to the situation and the blame shifting that has thus far been employed to explain the problems in Marikana is no longer sustainable. Cosatu’s national congress will likely indicate the way forward through members’ response to Marikana and whom they will support in the race to Mangaung. Although succession struggles will be an important factor on the way forward, the approach to the Marikana tragedy and the multitude of problems plaguing the mining sector and labour unions will be an important factor in the stabilisation of the federation. If the situation in the platinum belt, which has now spread to some gold mines, is not dealt with effectively, it may lead to more division in the labour federation. Such divisions will cripple Cosatu’s ability to play its activist role in a number of issues and, most importantly, to address the panoply of challenges faced by many poor working class people.

Compiled by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division