US Response to African Crises: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis of the ACRI

In response to the criticism, the US transformed the idea of an African intervention force into a longer term capacity-building initiative.

During the three-year intervention in Somalia (1992-1995), more than 130 peacekeepers died. This was the highest fatality rate in the history of peacekeeping. Significantly, the death of 18 United States Rangers during October 1993 led to the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia soon thereafter. By March 1995, the complete withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping troops had been effected, with few of the mandate objectives of UNOSOM II achieved. In May 1994, President Clinton`s Presidential Decision Directive 25 had decreed that the US would not intervene in future crises unless American national interests were clearly at stake, and the mission had clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy. But the horrors of Rwanda, and more recent crises in Burundi, Zaire, the Congo Republic, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic made it clear that there remained an urgent need for the international community to develop methods for rapid and effective intervention in African conflicts. At present, response capacity depends on the UN standby forces arrangement, which has proven grossly inadequate for meeting the challenges of rapid intervention in African crises. The solution, it seemed, was to devolve responsibility for such interventions from the international community to African countries and organisations.

During October 1996, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher travelled to Africa to promote a proposal to set up an all-African military force. The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), as it was then known, was to be used to deal with African crises where insurrections, civil war or genocide threatened mass civilian casualties. The purpose of the proposed force was not to intervene in hostilities, but rather to protect designated safe areas where civilians could gather to receive protection and humanitarian assistance. The intermediate objective of the ACRF was to develop a rapid reaction capability for such contingencies. The US was offering to fund half of the cost of the force, estimated at 25-40 million dollars, depending on whether or not the force would be deployed within a year. It was hoped that the remainder of the cost would be met by European Union members and perhaps Japan. The concept of the ACRF was based on the idea of a marriage of African resolve (and troops), and international resources.  

Author

Mark Malan, Institute for Security Studies