SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development

The recent elevation of South Africa to the chair of SADC and the obligations that this position bestows upon the country, it's time to take stock of

The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC, signed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State and Government in Windhoek in 1992, expressed confidence that recent developments such as the independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa "... will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co- operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development ..." The Declaration called, among others, for "... a framework of co-operation which provides for ... strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony ... The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security." The subsequent establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has given some effect to these ambitious intentions. Given the recent elevation of South Africa to the chair of SADC and the obligations that this position bestows upon the country, it is time to take stock of the progress made in this regard some 12 months down the line.

As chair of SADC, South Africa is responsible to operationalise and realise the ambitions of the Organ. President Mandela has recently engaged in an intensive series of regional consultations in an effort to mitigate emergent sources of conflict in Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as in assisting to find a solution for the ongoing humanitarian and political tragedy in Zaire. These recent initiatives by the South African president are a welcome departure from the apologetic diplomacy that the region`s dominant power had been engaged in previously. Prior to these developments, SADC member states had been reluctant to exercise regional leadership in issues related to preventive diplomacy and conflict management. One reason for this reluctance may be that certain heads of states have themselves been under intense pressure to allow a greater degree of transparency, freedom and democracy in their own countries. Too obvious a programme to facilitate democratisation and elections in another country may backfire on regional leaders who themselves face criticism for a perceived increase in authoritarianism and intolerance. A second reason is that the Organ is still in its infancy, although it does draw from the extensive memory of the previous Front-Line States, and is able to build on the existing Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).  

Authors

Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa